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ABSTRACT

When historians write about Watergate, they do not immediately think of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI). This dissertation argues that they should. Watergate represented
a perilous moment for the FBI, as its director allowed himself to become an arm of President
Richard Nixon. In turn, Nixon used his control of the FBI to frustrate its investigation into
Watergate. The break-in of the Watergate Hotel in 1972 took place six weeks after the death of
longtime FBI director, J. Edgar Hoover. For nearly half a century, Director Hoover remained
loyal to the Bureau and held his own against eight presidents, both Democrats and Republicans.
History largely remembers Hoover for his numerous indiscretions, seen in COINTELPRO, his
vitriol towards Martin Luther King, Jr., and his tyrannical crusade against Communism.
Towards the end of his life, Hoover was weakened by failing health, vocal critics, and President
Nixon. This dissertation argues that despite Hoover’s indiscretions and the diminishment of his
power, he manifested one critical strength: Hoover was apolitical and more than willing to stand
up against a president's orders when he believed such orders compromised himself or his Bureau.
Hoover's replacement, L. Patrick Gray, a longtime friend of Nixon, held no such qualms.
During his 360-day tenure as interim director, Gray professed his loyalty to Nixon and ordered
the FBI to assist with the president's reelection campaign, thwarted the FBI's investigation into
Watergate (leading his Associate Director, Mark Felt, to become the Washington Post's infamous
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"Deep Throat" source), and destroyed Watergate documents seized from “Plumber”
Howard Hunt's secret White House safe. This dissertation compares Hoover's directorship to
that of Gray and contends that a political FBI director who blindly followed a president turned
the Bureau into a state police.

iii

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to Matthew and Nora.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I could never have written this dissertation without the help of many people. I am deeply
indebted to the wonderful individuals who encouraged and mentored me. My advisor, Dr. Ted
Ownby provided thoughtful feedback and constructive criticism throughout the writing of this
dissertation. It was a privilege to work under such a tremendous scholar, and I am grateful for
the opportunity. I am a better writer and historian because of him. I am also grateful for the
feedback provided by my readers Dr. Charles Wilson, Dr. Darren Grem, and Professor Matthew
Hall. In addition to serving on my dissertation committee, all have greatly influenced my
academic career. Dr. Wilson saw me through my master’s thesis; Dr. Grem coached me through
comps; Professor Hall helped me find my voice in law school. I am fortunate to have received
help from four giants in their fields who have held my feet to the fire and helped me become a
better scholar.
This dissertation would not have been possible without the help of Dr. John Elliff. I had
the good fortune to find his name in Loch Johnson’s A Season of Inquiry, a book about the
Church Committee. I ran an internet search on Dr. Elliff’s name and sent him an email, asking if
he might have papers that I could review. He responded enthusiastically and invited me to visit
him in Alexandria, Virginia. For a week, he and his wife, Linda, set me up in their dining room

v

and fed me an endless supply of granola bars to ease my queasy stomach in the early weeks of
my pregnancy while I photographed thousands of documents. Talking to Dr. Elliff allowed me
the opportunity to ask myriad questions about the FBI in the early 1970s. His influence in my
understanding of the FBI is indelible.
Many librarians assisted me in my research. Megan Lee and the staff at the Richard
Nixon Presidential Library patiently hunted for me. While researching this dissertation, I had to
narrow its scope, as I found myself overwhelmed by primary sources. My research took me to
the Gerald Ford Presidential Library, the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, the ACLU Archive
at Princeton University, and the National Archives, where librarians helped me uncover a broad
array of sources representing the political climate for the Bureau in the 1970s. Though I have yet
to use those sources in my writing, I look forward to continuing my research of the FBI in the
future and using those resources for further analysis. The Society of Former Special Agents of
the FBI generously allowed me to solicit members for oral histories; Christopher Pyle provided
insight to help me understand the military’s influence on the FBI’s surveillance. Many thanks
also to John Fox, FBI Historian, who answered my many questions and helped me understand
how to find unclassified historical sources about the FBI.
I am grateful to the faculty and staff of the Center for Intelligence and Security Studies at
the University of Mississippi. Former director and former FBI agent Carl Jensen has mentored
me and influenced my decision to settle on the FBI as a research topic. No one has influenced
my academic trajectory more than Carl, and I am grateful to work with him. Colleagues Carl
Hill, Wesley Yates, Walter Flaschka, Mackenzie Metcalfe, Connor Hagan, Marie Barnard, and
Christy Babb are dear friends who share an interest in the intelligence community. The

vi

thousands of hours of study and discussion about the intelligence community with them
developed my understanding of the field. To the many students, whom I have taught, that work
in the intelligence community and the FBI—your tenacity and service inspires me.
Finally, I wish to express my heartfelt appreciation to my family for their support. My
in-laws, Jerel and Carolyn Graves, have eagerly encouraged me as I have continued my
academic pursuits. My parents, Andy and Nita Minshew, instilled a love for learning in me at a
young age and have seen me through years of school and studying. My brothers, Matt and
Michael, and my sister in law, Meribeth, provided laughs along the way. My best friend,
Meaghin Burke, served as my text messaging and drinking buddy throughout grad school.
Countless problems were solved (and tabled) over glasses of wine and computer memes.
I am deeply grateful for my husband, Matthew. Shortly after finishing law school, I told
him that I really wished I’d pursued a Ph.D. instead. Instead of responding with exasperation, he
encouraged me to pursue my new dream. That conversation ignited a seven-year pursuit towards
a Ph.D., and he has supported me every single step of the way. He’s cooked meals, brought me
lunch, cooked me breakfast, eaten late dinners, brewed coffee, provided soul-sustaining study
breaks, and served as a sounding board for my ideas. Thank you for your unending patience,
your encouragement, and your love. This dissertation is as much yours as it is mine.
As I worked to complete this dissertation, Nora Blythe Graves entered the world. I
traveled the country, heavily pregnant, during the summer of 2015. During the day, I’d research
in archives. At night, I’d go “out on the town” and shop for baby clothes. Towards the end of
the summer, as her birth drew near, I felt an urgency to write. After she was born, I continued
writing and editing in between feedings and during naps. In many ways, her impending birth

vii

inspired me to work hard in order to finish. I will always associate this dissertation with her and
be grateful for the immense happiness and sense of fulfillment that her birth provided me.
Nothing could have prepared me for the glorious wonder that she is. I am happy that in the midst
of working on this dissertation, she served as a daily reminder of life beyond the walls of
academia, and all that truly matters.

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Abstract ............................................................................................................................... ii
Dedication .......................................................................................................................... iv
Acknowledgements ..............................................................................................................v
Introduction ..........................................................................................................................1
Chapters
1. HOOVER SABOTAGES THE HUSTON REPORT ................................................9
2. THE FBI AND THE NEW LEFT ...........................................................................51
3. THE FBI UNDER SCRUTINY ...............................................................................85
4. HOOVER'S RETIREMENT..................................................................................118
5. HOOVER'S SUCCESSOR, NIXON'S CHOICE ..................................................152
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................188
Afterword .........................................................................................................................190

Bibliography ....................................................................................................................192
Vita...................................................................................................................................200

ix

INTRODUCTION

When people think of the FBI, they often conjure an image of J. Edgar Hoover, the famed
director of the Bureau for 48 years. Since his days as leader, historians have viewed the Bureau
as an extension of Hoover.1 These political histories have explored Hoover’s actions and their
impact on the United States, portraying him as fierce, relentless, and idiosyncratic.2 Dichotomy
is interwoven through these accounts. Hoover is both the consummate law enforcement officer

1

Following Hoover’s death in 1972, historians, journalists, and popular writers clamored to write
the definitive piece on the enigmatic man. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones’s The FBI: A History contends
that early Bureau historians, such as crime fiction writer Courtney Ryley Cooper and Pulitzerprize winning journalist Don Whitehead, portrayed the history of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation as “virtually synonymous with the efforts of Hoover himself.” See Rhodri
Jeffreys-Jones, The FBI: A History (Hartford, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 10.
2
Don Whitehead’s The FBI Story stated, “the history of the FBI, in reality, is the story of
America itself and the struggle for an ideal.” Whitehead’s The Federal Bureau of Investigation
presents the FBI as an institution with a precarious start that later evolved, under the leadership
of Hoover, into a great and honorable crime-fighting institution. Whitehead, a journalist, wrote
to Hoover requesting permission to write an article about the Bureau’s battle against
Communists. Rather than grant his request for an article, the Bureau extended an unprecedented
offer to Whitehead to draft a book about the FBI, offering him unparalleled access to FBI files.
After the response to Lowenthal’s disparagement of the Bureau, Hoover demanded that citizens
read his approved version of the organization’s history. In exchange for Whitehead’s access to
files, Hoover insisted upon personally reviewing the drafts, reserving the right to make changes
when necessary. See Don Whitehead, The FBI Story: A Report to the People (New York, NY:
Random House, 1956), 323. Some excerpts related to the FBI historiography appeared in an
earlier chapter. See Melissa Graves, “FBI Historiography: From Leader to Organization,” in
Intelligence Studies in Britain and the US: Historiography Since 1945, ed. Christopher K. Moran
and Christopher J. Murphy, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 129-145.
1

and the personification of persecution run amuck. He is destroyer of the Ku Klux Klan and a
racist.3 Some works have questioned his sexuality.4 Others have heralded and berated his
relentless drive to fight communism.5 Historians remember Hoover largely for his
3

Richard Gid Powers’ Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover argued that Hoover’s
childhood values as a Southerner (born in Washington DC, which Powers argues is part of the
South) shaped the priorities of the Bureau under Hoover’s leadership. Hoover came from a
traditional, middle-class, and religious background. He used the FBI to protect the values that he
espoused. Powers argues that Hoover held onto his position as director for too long. As the
world around him changed, his Southern and segregated values increasingly contrasted with
progressive agendas espoused by the civil rights movement. Towards the end of his life, Hoover
no longer represented the values of America but rather his own, outdated values and the values
of his Bureau. See Richard Gid Powers, Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover (New
York, NY: The Free Press, 1987), 20.
4
Popular author Anthony Summers’ Official and Confidential: The Secret Life of J. Edgar
Hoover relied upon hearsay and rumor to argue that Hoover was a homosexual who donned drag
clothing to homosexual orgies and that organized crime bosses used compromising information
on Hoover’s sexuality to neuter any efforts on the director’s part to investigate or prosecute their
wrongdoing. See Anthony Summers, Official and Confidential: The Secret Life of J. Edgar
Hoover (New York, NY: Putnam,1993). In response to Summers’ book, Historian Athan
Theoharis wrote J. Edgar Hoover, Sex, and Crime: An Historical Antidote. He deconstructs
Summers’ argument and finds no evidence to prove Hoover’s homosexuality. Theoharis
surmises that even if Hoover had been a homosexual, he would never have entered into the sort
of compromising situations Summers details. See Athan Theoharis, J. Edgar Hoover, Sex, and
Crime: An Historical Antidote (Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee, 1995), 55.
5
Courtney Ryley Cooper’s Ten Thousand Public Enemies praised Hoover’s fight against
Communism. Arguably one of the most important books written about the Bureau, it depicted a
fearless and effective agency. Approved personally by Hoover, the account shaped the public’s
earliest impression of the FBI. In the preface, Hoover endorsed the author, claiming he could not
imagine a man more fit to recount the FBI’s history. Despite Hoover’s outward praise, he
insisted upon reviewing and editing Cooper’s book prior to publication. The book is as much a
historical product as it is a mass-marketed piece of propaganda; Cooper aggrandized Hoover as
“the most feared man the underworld ever has known.” See Courtney Ryley Cooper, Ten
Thousand Enemies (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1935), 30. Richard Gid Powers
maintains that Cooper’s book introduced the “FBI formula,” an easily readable crime story
involving villains and action by the federal government, with Hoover as the central hero. See
Powers, 185. Using melodrama to effect, Cooper warned readers of ubiquitous networks of crime
supported by seemingly ordinary people; he made his audience aware of many threats so they
would, in turn, believe in the need for a federal law enforcement agency. Cooper posited that,
but for the FBI, any person might fall victim to crime at any moment. Fred J. Cook’s 1964
critical piece, The FBI Nobody Knows, provided a scathing analysis of the FBI and attacked
Hoover’s power-driven hunt for Communists. Cook contended that the FBI historically abused
2

indiscretions—his intimidation of public figures such as presidents, congressmen, and civil rights
heroes.6 He seems a shadowy figure with a file on everyone and an insatiable hunger to collect
more intelligence.
Those negative portrayals of Hoover bear more than a kernel of truth. He was a paranoid
man. He walked a thin ethical and legal line between national security and respecting U.S.
persons’ Constitutional rights when expanding his intelligence unit. He directed the Bureau to
its powers, thereby violating citizens’ Constitutional rights. He argued that the Bureau pressured
agents to secure convictions at the behest of civil liberties. Cook refuted Whitehead’s earlier
analysis by portraying Hoover as obsessive, conceited, and erratic. He discussed Attorney
General Harlan Fiske Stone’s promotion of Hoover to the role of Director of the FBI in 1924.
When Stone offered Hoover his position as director, he explicitly asked Hoover to reduce
activities the Bureau engaged in, making them responsible only for “investigations of violations
of the law.” Instead of following orders, Hoover greatly expanded the Bureau to fight the inflated
threat of communism. See Fred J. Cook, The FBI Nobody Knows (New York, NY: Macmillan,
1964).
6
Historian Athan G. Theoharis and freelance writer John Stuart Cox’s The Boss: J. Edgar
Hoover and the Great American Inquisition examines Hoover’s abuse of power and usurpation
of civil liberties. Theoharis and Cox conclude that Hoover, more than any politician before or
since, had done more to “[undermine] American constitutional guarantees.” The notion of
Hoover as a figure to which American presidents answered to originates in this book. Theoharis
and Cox also shed light on Hoover’s gross misuse of power. The authors relied upon interviews
with Hoover’s family members, former acquaintances, and employees as well as FBI files,
including three “sensitive FBI files” never used before in any historical research: the record
destruction file, the Symbol Number Sensitive Source Index, and the Surreptitious Entries file.
Their use of such files is particularly noteworthy, as the authors also surmise that Hoover’s files
allowed him to “shape the government [and] alter the laws and attitudes of the country.” Because
Hoover held such sensitive and, at times, compromising information about politicians, he was
able to wield a great amount of power and control; presidents, attorneys general, and other
politicians did not have the courage to act against him and politicians refused to insist upon any
congressional investigations. This “inquisition” on the part of Hoover to uncover as much
negative information about his political counterparts as he possibly could, ensured his continued
authority as “Boss”; he could wield serious leverage on presidential decisions and he ran the FBI
with unlimited authority. In addition to Hoover’s access to such information, the authors
contend that Franklin D. Roosevelt’s directives allowing for limited federal wiretapping by the
FBI were exploited by Hoover and expanded the power of the FBI. Towards the end of his life,
however, the authors find that Hoover’s authority as boss had been greatly diminished in light of
the COINTELPRO controversy. See Athan G. Theoharis and John Stuart Cox, The Boss: J.
Edgar Hoover and the Great American Inquisition (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press,
3

infringe upon American citizens’ civil liberties. He was the man who tormented Martin Luther
King, Jr. and his family by bugging the famed preacher’s phone lines and hotel rooms and
declaring him “the most notorious liar in the country.”7 Even during his lifetime, both admirers
and critics of the Bureau acknowledged the “myth” of Hoover. In the heyday of his directorship,
he wielded an enormous amount of power; the great extent of Hoover’s power dominates FBI
historiography.8 In contrast, this dissertation examines a time in Hoover’s life when his power
was compromised. At the end of his life, his failing health, vocal critics, and distrust from
Richard Nixon led the aged director to look nothing like the mammoth icon he had been.
This dissertation examines the Bureau under Richard Nixon. As the president who is
most often associated with “law and order,” it is ironic to see his dysfunctional relationship with
a law enforcement agency. While Hoover was alive, Nixon demanded that the Bureau enforce
law and order at the behest of Americans’ Constitutional rights. The First Amendment right to
speech and the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful search and seizure were
waylaid, as Nixon demanded investigation and prosecution of political dissidents at all costs.
After Hoover’s death, Nixon strong-armed the Bureau into carrying out its Watergate
1988).
7
David J. Garrow’s Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference7 details Hoover’s obsessive surveillance of King. He disdained King and
described him as “a ‘tom cat’ with obsessive degenerate sexual urges, “the “most notorious liar”
in America,” and “one of the lowest characters in the country.” Hoover allowed the FBI to bug
King’s hotel rooms. Garrow relays King’s experience, particularly the fear that King felt when
his wife Coretta Scott King received a package from the FBI containing a threatening note and
illicit recordings of King’s conversations as well as sexual indiscretions. See David Garrow,
Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference
(New York, NY: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1986), 313, 360.
8
Curt Gentry’s J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets exposes Hoover’s enormous power
wielding, and further advances Theoharis and Cox’s thesis that Hoover had a huge amount of
control over presidents due the compromising information he kept on them. See Curt Gentry, J.
Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1991).
4

investigation under his aides’ supervision. Thus, “law and order” became a façade.
In looking at Nixon’s demands upon the Bureau, this dissertation also looks at Hoover’s
final days, Hoover’s immediate successor, and the Bureau’s involvement in Watergate.
Watergate historiography is dominated by biographies of Nixon as well as tomes about the
media’s role in exposing the president’s illegal doings, with much focus on Washington Post
reporters Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward.9 Watergate histories make the FBI tangential to a
plot that revolves around the President. If historians discuss the Bureau in relation to Watergate,
they focus on the identity of Bernstein and Woodward’s source, Deep Throat, as FBI Associate
Director Mark Felt.10 This dissertation argues, however, that Watergate was a key moment in the
9

See Mark Feldstein, “Wallowing in Watergate: Historiography, Methodology, and Mythology
in Journalism’s Celebrated Moment,” American Journalism 31, no. 4 (2014): 550-570. Feldstein
maintains that Watergate historiography falls into one of three categories: the heroic narrative,
the villainous narrative, and the minimalist narrative. The heroic narrative views Woodward and
Bernstein as reporters who “tenaciously uncovered the evidence implicating the Nixon White
House in the Watergate burglary, piercing the administration’s cover-up and thereby forcing
reluctant law enforcement authorities to prosecute the most powerful officials in the
government.” (Feldstein, 552) The villainous narrative challenges the heroic narrative by
claiming that reporters, the CIA, and Deep Throat sought to destroy Nixon’s presidency. Much
has been made of Mark Felt’s motives for leaking information to the Washington Post. Feldstein
maintains that Felt’s influence on the investigation may have been exaggerated after the fact in
Woodward and Bernstein’s best-selling book, All The President’s Men. Historian Beverly Gage
has argued that Felt was hardly the “hero” that popular culture has portrayed him as, and she
writes that he “had far more in common with Richard Nixon than with his liberal enemies.”
(Feldstein, 561) Feldstein maintains that ambition and revenge led Felt to become a source.
Because he had served for years under Hoover, he was angry that Gray had been chosen as
director instead of himself. The third type of narrative, the minimalist narrative, downplays the
media’s impact in Watergate. Political scientist Edward Jay Epstein ascribed to this view and
credited the FBI, federal prosecutors, the grand jury, and Congressional committees with
carrying out the investigations that implicated Watergate participants. Historian Stanley Kutler
argued that media revelations simply repeated leads that the FBI had already uncovered. He
wrote, “media revelations of crime and political misdeeds repeated what was already known to
properly constituted investigative authorities . . . carefully timed leaks, not media investigations,
provided the first news of Watergate.” (Feldstein, 567)
10
Much of what is known about Felt’s involvement as Deep Throat in the Watergate
Investigation stems from his memoir. See Mark Felt and John O’Connor, A G-Man’s Life: The
5

Bureau’s history because of the destructive actions of its interim director, L. Patrick Gray.
Hoover’s absence was felt throughout the Watergate investigation, and by the time of Gray’s
Senate confirmation hearing, even one of Hoover’s harshest critics publically declared that he
believed Hoover was a better director than Gray. This dissertation argues that Nixon’s
presidency coincided with and caused a crisis within the FBI. Gray was an incapable successor.
Though he is little more than a footnote in FBI historiography, his damage to the Watergate
investigation provides reason to reexamine the FBI’s relationship to the presidency. When Gray
allowed Nixon to use him and his office, he brought the Bureau as close as it had ever been to
functioning as a federal secret police.
Because Hoover had reigned as director for so long, leading the Bureau under eight U.S.
presidents, and acquired such mythical status, he largely stood as a barrier between Nixon and
his desired political use of the Bureau. Though the president wished to use the FBI to pursue
subversives and those whom he believed threatened his presidency, Hoover had the fortitude and
standing to refuse. In doing so, he suffered the indignation of Nixon, the ridicule of the
Department of Justice, and the defiance of his own agents. Hoover ended his tenure on the brink
of being fired and reticent to collect any intelligence; he was anything but the myth of strength
perpetuated about him.
Hoover’s replacement, Gray, was inexperienced, blindly loyal to authority, and did not
defend the Bureau against Nixon’s interference. He declared his loyalty first to the president and
second to the Bureau, thereby complicating the FBI’s investigation into Watergate. Under his
361-day leadership, Gray destroyed Watergate evidence on behalf of the Nixon administration.
FBI, Being “Deep Throat,” and the Struggle for Honor in Washington (New York, NY:
PublicAffairs, 2006) and Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, The Secret Man: The Story of
6

He became a pawn in Nixon’s quest to thwart the FBI’s investigation into his indiscretions. His
absence of leadership stirred his number-two man, Mark Felt, to become Carl Bernstein and Bob
Woodward’s infamous source, Deep Throat.
The juxtaposition of Hoover’s and Gray’s leadership of the FBI under Nixon illuminates
the complexities inherent in the executive branch’s control of a federal law enforcement agency.
Such a comparison also underscores the extent to which the FBI is both an extension of the
president while also an extension of its leader. Nixon threatened the FBI unlike any president
before him. Under both Hoover and Gray, the Bureau faced unprecedented hardship. Yet, Gray
allowed for the gross misappropriation of the FBI by Nixon. That Hoover held his own against
Nixon in his weakest days is both a testament to his leadership and a departure from the
historiography about him.
Chapter 1 of this dissertation examines the Huston Plan, an intelligence collection
program imagined by the Nixon Administration. It looks at Hoover’s reluctance to join the plan
and his sabotage of it. Chapter 2 examines the events that led Hoover to worry about the
American public’s acceptance of his most secretive and most invasive intelligence techniques.
Hoover’s vulnerability under Nixon developed over time as a response to a growing chorus of
dissenters who voiced their displeasure with the FBI. Chapter 3 looks at criticism emerging from
left-leaning academics who convened in 1971 to examine the Bureau at a conference held at
Princeton University. These scholars not only examined Hoover’s faults and strengths, but they
also studied the legal basis for his intelligence operations, identifying a direct relationship
between the FBI and the presidency. Chapter 4 looks at Hoover’s final days in office and the
lengths to which the Nixon administration went to fire him. Chapter 5 looks at the appointment
Watergate’s Deep Throat (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2005).
7

of Gray as the Bureau’s interim director and his interference with the Watergate investigation.
The Bureau’s time under Nixon is extraordinarily unique. The intersection of such
powerful and iconic figures—Nixon and Hoover—and then the imbalance of power between
Nixon and Hoover’s replacement, Gray, allow a glimpse into the profound effects of a President
upon the Bureau. In comparing Hoover and Gray’s responses and actions to Nixon’s demands, a
Bureau emerges that is every bit as much the President’s as it is that of an FBI director.

8

CHAPTER I
HOOVER SABOTAGES THE HUSTON PLAN

In the early 1970s, J. Edgar Hoover and Richard Nixon believed that one of the greatest
security threats facing the United States emanated from the New Left’s aspirations to foment
political revolution. The nation’s struggle against the New Left emanated from the radicals’
association with communism. For decades, Hoover’s FBI fought against the Soviet Union’s
infiltration within the US homeland. Following World War II, the FBI sought, first and foremost,
to squelch Communism; its famed director, J. Edgar Hoover, believed “the mad march of red
fascism”11 could “overthrow the American way of life.”12 During the mid-twentieth century, the
FBI’s crusade against communism evolved from aiding Joseph McCarthy’s Congressionally
sponsored witch hunt13 to quelling anti-war protests of the early 1960s.14 By the mid 1960s,
11

J. Edgar Hoover, “Speech Before the House Committee on Un-American Activities” (26
March 1947), Voices of Democracy: The U.S. Oratory Project.
http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/hoover-speech-before-the-house-committee-speech-text/,
paragraph 26.
12
Ibid, paragraph 34.
13
Seth Rosenfeld, Subversives: The FBI’s War on Student Radicals And Reagan’s Rise to Power
(New York, NY: Picador, 2012), 28, 29. During this time, FBI clerks assembled thousands of
index cards that contained intelligence on American citizens’ alleged Communist leanings.
Much of the information included Constitutionally-protected First Amendment speech.
Rosenfeld writes, “many of these activities [carried out by the Bureau], Hoover knew, were
unauthorized, if not outright illegal, but he deemed them necessary to protect the nation from the
enemies of democracy.”
14
Ibid, 71. Rosenfeld writes that in 1960, Hoover began to take an interest in the protest
activities happening in universities. In a report compiled by the FBI in March 1960 entitled
9

however, the peaceful protests of hippies and students changed into furious mayhem; in 1966,
the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) publically hailed the slogan “from protest to
resistance.”15 The FBI viewed the SDS and other “radical” groups as a threat; despite a lack of
evidence, they believed that Communist governments were sponsoring the unrest. Dotson
Rader, a member of SDS, explained his organization’s shift, stating:
The meaninglessness of non-violent, “democratic” methods was becoming clear to us in
the spring of 1967. The Civil Rights Movement was dead. Pacifism was dead. Some
Leftists—the Trotskyites, Maoists, radical socialists…some of the radicals in SDS,
Stokely Carmichael, Rap Brown, Tom Hayden—knew it early. But it took the rest of us
awhile to give up the sweet life of the democratic Left for revolt.16
“Revolt” would characterize Leftist protest movements, including those launched by SDS, the
Weather Underground, and the Black Panther Party, from the mid 1960s into the 1970s and
1980s. These groups were frustrated by their lack of success; the peaceful protests of the antiwar
and civil rights movements had failed to bring progress. They believed that only revolution (an
overthrow of the current government) would bring about the change they believed the United
States needed. By the early 1970s, protesters began resorting to violence to achieve a revolution
that their peaceful activism had failed to arouse.
These groups proclaimed a willingness to use violence, sometimes for self-protection and
sometimes to attack or unsettle authority and institutions.17 One protestor, Abbott “Abbie”
“What Is the University of California?” the Bureau alleged, “it is of interest to note…that there
are a good many individuals who either are members of the faculty, students, or employees of the
University and its branches who are of considerable interest [to the FBI].”
15
Bryan Burroughs, Days of Rage: America’s Radical Underground, The FBI, and the Forgotten
Age of Revolutionary Violence (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2015), 59.
16
Ibid, 59-60.
17
For a while, the leading works about the New Left originated from those who had participated
in the movement itself. Major works on student organizations include Allen Matusow’s The
Unraveling of America (1984), Todd Gitlin’s The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage (1987),
James Miller’s “Democracy is in the Streets”: From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago (1987),
10

Hoffman, an activist and anarchist who co-founded the Youth International Party (also known as
the “Yippies”), wrote a manual for revolution entitled Steal This Book. In it, he ranted, “the
purpose...is not to fuck the system, but destroy it.”18 To bring about the system’s demise, he
provided advice on shoplifting, bomb making, and the use of guns. He exhorted readers, saying,
“If you see a fugitive’s picture on the post office wall take it home for a souvenir…Soon the FBI
will be printing all of our posters for free. Right on, FBI!”19 Hoffman’s behavior typified
political activists during this time. Journalist Bryan Burroughs, in his book about New Left
revolutionaries, stated:
There are so many myths about the 1970s-era underground. Mention today that an armed
resistance movement sprang up in the months after My Lai, the Manson family, and
Woodstock, and the most common response is something along the lines of “Oh, wasn’t
that a bunch of hippies protesting the Vietnam War during the sixties?” This couldn’t be
more wrong. The radicals of this new underground weren’t hippies, they weren’t
and Maurice Isserman’s If I had a Hammer…:The Death of the Old Left and the Birth of the New
Left (1987). Only around the beginning of the twenty-first century did a new generation of
writers appear who had not been involved in the student organizations. The traditional historical
narrative involving the New Left tells of students full of “Kennedyesque optimism and youthful
enthusiasm” who gathered at Port Huron to draft a new agenda for their generation. These “New
Left” students, while not advocating communism, refused to renounce it. Such distinction
separates the New Left students from the “Old Left.” These students were unprepared for the
growth their organizations experienced as a result of Vietnam War protests. Throughout the
sixties, the movement descended into drug use and violence, culminating with the 1968
Democratic National Convention, the “Days of Rage,” or with the explosion of a Manhattan
apartment occupied by three militant Weather Underground members. Most histories of these
organizations have included top-down analysis, focusing on leaders and popular members.
Newer historiography has featured social histories that include a bottom-up view of the sixties
and that look outside of New York and San Francisco to pockets of New Left followers around
the country. Finally, newer scholarship examines the New Left’s connections to other
progressive agendas such as gay liberation, radical feminism, hippie counterculture, the civil
rights movement, and black power movements. See John McMillan, “Introduction: ‘You Didn’t
Have to Be There’: Revisiting the New Left Consensus,” in The New Left Revisited, edited by
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primarily interested in the war, and it wasn’t the 1960s…The young radicals who
engaged in bombings and the assassination of policemen during the 1970s and early
1980s were, for the most part, deadly serious, hard-core leftists.20
During Richard Nixon’s first Presidential term, the United States witnessed an explosion of
bombs in occupied buildings, plane hijackings, and demands for revolution. Nixon was keenly
aware of the surge in political violence. In his memoir, he recounted, “by 1970 the evolutionary
cycle of violent dissent spawned an ugly offshoot: the urban underground of political terrorists
urging murder and bombing.”21
In the autumn of 1969, Sam Melville—a thirty-five year old activist who became the
progenitor of 1970s New Left violence22—exploded a string of bombs across New York City,
igniting the Department of Commerce, the RCA Building at Rockefeller Center, the General
Motors Building at Fifth Avenue and Fifty-ninth Street, and the headquarters of the Chase
Manhattan Bank.23 Melville’s string of violence portended more to come. During the 1970s,
such bombings became frequent occurrences in New York, Washington D.C., and other major
US cities. The pattern included “a rash of bombings followed by a wave of copycat threats,
followed by the mass evacuations of skyscraper after skyscraper, leaving thousands of office
workers milling about on sidewalks, wondering what had happened.”24 This series of explosions
alarmed the government; both the FBI and President Nixon believed that the radicals should be
20
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stopped.
President Nixon feared that political activists were financially supported by Communist
regimes like the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and North Vietnam. Journalist Tim Weiner writes:
Nixon insisted that the CIA and the FBI discover the sources of underground Communist
support for American peace groups. Where was the evidence? His intelligence chiefs
reported that none existed. Yet Nixon convinced himself that the capitol was besieged by
Americans who had formed enemy battalions financed by Moscow and Beijing and
Hanoi and Havana. He saw the antiwar movement as the fifth column of international
communism.25
Nixon affirmed his belief in the activists’ ties to Communism in his memoir. He recounted, “I
was eager to learn whether the foreign support went beyond ideological sympathy. I was sure
that it did; the patterns were too clear. But the intelligence community never had a conclusive
answer.”26 Because he believed that the activists received international support from Communist
nations, he tasked the intelligence community with spying on them. The longer that the FBI and
CIA failed to find his suspected international connections, the harder Nixon pushed them to
collect more intelligence.
Rather than being motivated by Communism, many of the groups involved in such
political violence were driven by racial discrimination within the United States. Burroughs
writes, “Every single underground group of the 1970s, with the notable exception of the Puerto
Rican FALN, was concerned first and foremost with the struggle of blacks against police
brutality, racism, and government oppression.”27 That these New Left groups purported to
change race relations and social order garnered the attention of the FBI. In 1969, Hoover
testified before Congress that the Black Panthers represented “the greatest threat to the internal
25
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security of the country.”28 Hoover feared the group’s paramilitarism and politics, and he used
the Bureau against them to undermine and stop their efforts.
By the time Richard Nixon assumed the presidency in January of 1969, it seemed to
many that the New Left threatened to upend the country. The Washington Post reported:
Demonstrations and bombings rocked campuses, many of them directed against the
unending Vietnam War. In one 24-hour period there was 400 bomb threats—if not
explosions—in New York City alone. On March 6, 1970, an accidental dynamite
explosion in Greenwich Village killed three members of the Students for a Democratic
27
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Midnight Hour (2006) studied the origins of black power and found myriad international
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a “larger struggle for radical democracy in postwar America.” Joseph’s observations provide
context for why Nixon and Hoover believed that the BPP movement within the United States
was receiving aid from Communist governments. BPP members did not hesitate to exploit
revolutions happening abroad for their own domestic agenda. This, combined with their desire
for a revolution, threatened both Nixon and Hoover’s governmental control. See Peniel Joseph,
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Society and led police to a basement bomb factory.29
Though some violence had subsided by 1969-1970, the White House held steadfast to its fears of
Communism and its law and order message against radicals of many kinds.30 Nixon had
campaigned on the promise of eradicating the New Left through the language of “law and order.”
This message resonated with the Silent Majority, a populace of conservative, middle class,
mostly white voters who could not relate to nor understand the plight of such groups as the Black
Panther Party, the Weather Underground, or the Yippies.31 As the days and months rolled by,
violence fueled by the New Left continued to erupt. In April 1970, after Nixon ordered
American troops into Cambodia, student demonstrations continued, culminating in the deaths of
four Kent State University students by guardsmen on May 4, 1970.32
The FBI tried to counter these New Left groups but largely met failure. Despite trying,
the Bureau’s clean-cut “Hardy Boys” agents could not fit in when they tried to go undercover
within the radical organizations. Burroughs writes that agents complained that “Weatherman’s
‘degenerate living habits, their immoral conduct, and their use of drugs’ made it ‘extremely
difficult to find informants.’”33 The FBI’s inability to penetrate the radical groups frustrated
29
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both agents and the White House Administration. Nixon demanded a crack down on student
protesters as campus violence reached an all-time high. In the winter of 1968-69, 41 incidents of
bombings and arson, including the use of Molotov cocktails, occurred on college campuses; New
Left members set fire to ROTC facilities in Delaware, Texas, Berkeley, Oregon, and Washington
University in St. Louis; student radicals bombed campus buildings at Georgetown, the University
of Michigan, New York University, and four campuses in California.34 By March of 1970, Nixon
ordered Hoover to deal with the New Left, once and for all, before they assassinated him.35
To stem the tide of recruits to New Left radical groups, Hoover appealed to those he
deemed most likely to become recruits: university students. On September 21, 1970, Hoover
addressed a letter to college students across the nation. His correspondence read as a warning—
beware the dangers of the New Left or risk becoming mixed up in a subversive movement to
overthrow the government. Hoover began, “as a 1970 college student, you belong to the best
educated, most sophisticated, most poised generation in our history. The vast majority of you, I
am convinced, sincerely love America and want to make it a better country.”36 He assured
readers that there was nothing wrong with student dissent stemming from their unhappiness with
national policy. But, he warned, “there is real ground for concern about the extremism which led
to violence, lawlessness, and disrespect for the rights of others on many college campuses during
the past year.”37 Over the course of his six-page admonition to students, he outlined eight
methods by which extremists would try to “lure” students into their activities.38 Such efforts
entailed everything from encouraging students to abandon respect for their parents to seeing
34
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college as an irrelevant “tool of the Establishment.”39 Such radicals would entice students to
abandon their “basic common sense,” Hoover warned.40 They would brainwash students into
viewing, with pessimism, their school and their nation. Such negativity represented to Hoover
“one of the most insidious of New Left poisons”41 because in seeing the world through such
murkiness, students would forget the role of police officers as community helpers. New Left
radicals would convince naïve college students to see police officers as “pigs;” Hoover reminded
the students that a police officer is “your friend and he needs your support.”42 Finally, Hoover
warned against students seeing works of anarchism or arson as idealistic. The New Left, he
argued, would persuade unwitting students to believe that democracy was ineffective in the face
of needed social change, leading them to resort to “[hurling] bricks and stones instead of logical
argument at those who disagree with your views.” In closing, Hoover reiterated his great hope
for the incoming cadre of students, explaining, “Personally, I don’t think the outlook for campus
unrest this year is as bleak as some prophets of pessimism proclaim.”43
Judged by present standards, Hoover’s letter seems a relic—evidence of a bygone era of
dissent between the old government establishment and students, borne out of bitter feelings
towards the Vietnam War. His letter, warning students of radical danger, today reads as
hyperbolic, paranoid, and curmudgeonly. Yet, Hoover’s viewpoints reflected a wider
government outlook towards students and the New Left, a viewpoint that infected the presidency
and intelligence agencies in the early 1970s. Such fear of the New Left, manifested in a paranoia
38
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that students, nationwide, would abandon democracy in favor of anarchism and bombs in order
to effect change and support their dissent, led not only Hoover but the Nixon Administration to
resort to extreme measures in 1970. In an effort to halt the fomentation of student radicalism, the
Nixon Administration, the FBI, and the intelligence community sought to quell student protests,
gather intelligence on the New Left, and preserve the democratic form of government that they
genuinely believed had been called into question. Their quest to contain dissent, however, led
them to disregard legal limits. The Nixon Administration, driven by fear and paranoia, briefly
authorized forms of intelligence collection that violated protesters’ civil rights. Central to this
breach in legality was the FBI. Hoover complicated and ultimately thwarted the Nixon
administration’s ability to capture intelligence on students.
As much as Hoover feared the ability of college students to join forces with the New
Left, no one feared the young people as much as Nixon. In a Presidential Talking Paper drafted
after a meeting with Hoover, Richard Helms (director, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)), Lt.
General Donald V. Bennett (director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)) and Admiral Noel
Gayler (Director, National Security Agency (NSA)), Nixon’s cabinet classified the threat posed
by students, explaining:
We have moved from the ‘student activism’ which characterized the civil rights
movements in the early ‘60s through the ‘protest movements’ which rallied behind the
anti-war banner beginning with the March on the Pentagon in 1967 to the ‘revolutionary
terrorism’ being perpetrated today by determined professionals. We are now confronted
with a new and grave crisis in our country—one which we know too little about.
Certainly hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Americans—mostly under 30—are determined
to destroy our society. They find in many of the legitimate grievances of our citizenry
opportunities for exploitation which never escape the attention of demagogues. They are
reaching out for the support—ideological and otherwise—of foreign powers and they are
developing their own brand of indigenous revolutionary activism which is as dangerous
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as anything which they could important from Cuba, China, or the Soviet Union. 44
Because Nixon believed student radicals threatened his presidency, he resorted to unprecedented
measures to equip the intelligence community to gather intelligence against them. He justified
such intervention by stressing the connections between student radicals and foreign communism,
an association that would forever remain speculation. His plan, approved for a mere five days in
1970, evoked controversy when revealed to the public,45 and highlighted the dissension between
intelligence agencies as well as their willingness to secretly carry out operations behind the
President’s back and without his permission.
In 1970, the Nixon administration sought to unite intelligence agencies to collect
intelligence on the New Left, even if it meant authorizing illegal activity. A group of agency
directors, led by J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI, drafted a plan allowing them to search mail, enter
houses, and monitor student groups, based almost entirely upon their First Amendment-protected
speech. The plan gave the government the ability to collect intelligence on students for merely
expressing viewpoints counter to the Administration; political speech, typically protected by the
First Amendment, became fodder for a federal investigation. If the Administration or
intelligence agencies decided a person or a group posed a threat (and the meaning of “threat” was
diffuse, at best), they had full authority to resort to practically any means necessary to investigate
them. The plan became known as the Huston Plan, named for the White House staffer, Tom
44
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Charles Huston, a young lawyer who coordinated the committee’s drafting of the document. The
CIA, FBI, DIA, and NSA approved the plan created by a committee chaired by J. Edgar Hoover.
Though he reluctantly signed his approval of the plan, Hoover sought to demolish the plan and
five days later, Nixon revoked his authorization of the document. Huston acknowledged
multiple times in a memo to the White House that the document authorized illegal activities on
the part of the intelligence community.46 Nonetheless, he justified each and every egregious
violation. The plan is noteworthy for its flagrant disregard of civil liberties on behalf of the entire
intelligence community.
Most remarkably, the efforts of the Nixon administration to create an interagency
intelligence group to collect domestic intelligence led to the formation of the Plumbers, the
group of men that carried out Nixon’s dirty work. In June 1972, the Plumbers broke into the
Democratic National Headquarters, located in Washington DC’s Watergate complex. The
unification of intelligence agencies in the name of domestic intelligence, under the auspices of a
famed “Huston Plan,” was the precursor to Watergate. Central to the Huston Plan were J. Edgar
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Hoover and the FBI; Hoover chaired the committee that ultimately wrote the inter-agency report.
The report examined threats posed by the Black Panther Party, antiwar activists, New Left
Terrorist groups, and student protest groups. It authorized the intelligence community to work
together to search suspects’ mail, surreptitiously enter suspects’ houses and places of work to
plant wiretaps, and to cultivate campus sources or informants.47 Hoover’s refusal to cooperate
with the Huston Plan and his eventual dismantling of the entire agreement left a sourness across
the Nixon Administration, leading even Nixon himself to question whether or not it was time to
effectively “retire” the FBI director, tenured for nearly half a century. It also led Nixon to resort
to extra-agency means when gathering his intelligence, which over time, became increasingly
political in nature.
The Huston Plan
On June 5, 1970, Nixon met with Hoover, Helms and other Intelligence Community (IC)
directors. During the meeting, Nixon charged them with the task of collecting better information
on domestic dissenters. The increase in attacks by radical leftists worried Nixon. He recorded in
his memoir:
From January 1969 through April 1970 there were, by conservative count, over 40,000
bombings, attempted bombings, and bomb threats—an average of over eighty a day.
Over $21 million in property was destroyed. Forty-three people were killed. Of these
40,000 incidents, 64 percent were by bombers whose identity and motive were
unknown.48
This increase in violent activity stemmed from Nixon’s decision to invade Cambodia in an effort
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to attack the North Vietnamese Army and the Vietcong.49 Nixon knew that his announcement
would incite mayhem on university and college campuses, and, indeed, it did.50 Nixon believed
that the shootings at Kent State stemmed from his foreign policy decisions regarding Cambodia.
He described those days following the shootings as “among the darkest of my presidency.”51 He
recalled that even Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s National Security Advisory and the strategic
mastermind behind the Cambodian invasion, suffered a blow to his morale after Kent State.52
On May 25, the Weathermen published “A Declaration of a State of War,” promising war
against Nixon’s administration. They stated:
The hundreds and thousands of young people who demonstrated in the Sixties against the
war and for civil rights grew to hundreds of thousands in the past few weeks actively
fighting Nixon’s invasion of Cambodia and the attempted genocide against black people.
The insanity of Amerikan ‘justice’ has added to its list of atrocities six blacks killed in
August, two in Jackson, and four white Kent State students, making thousands more into
revolutionaries.
The parents of “privileged” kids have been saying for years that the revolution was a
game for us. But the war and the racism of this society show that it is too fucked-up. We
will never live peaceably under this system.53
Central to his obsession with New Left groups was his belief that they evinced ties to Communist
governments. Nixon believed that such groups as the Weather Underground and the Black
Panther Party were directly receiving aid and funding from communist governments in an effort
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to overthrow his presidency.54 He believed it was high time that the intelligence community
collected the evidence to prove his hunch.55 Nixon hired Huston “to do his bidding and
instructed him to write a report detailing options for dealing with the New Left.” His
recommendations ranged “from the innocuous to the extreme, from doing nothing to violating
the civil liberties of American citizens.” Years after the Huston Plan died, the Senate committee
investigating his proposal noted that journalist Theodore White posited that the Huston plan
would give intelligence agencies enormous power, allowing federal authorities to reach “all the
way to every mailbox, every college campus, every telephone, every home.”56 Indeed, the
Huston plan gave presidential authorization not only to the FBI but to the CIA, NSA, and DIA—
three agencies whose founding charters permitted them to collect only international intelligence,
outside the jurisdiction of the United States—to read mail, tap telephones, and conduct black bag
jobs, or robberies, to obtain intelligence in the name of national security. When Congress
revealed the plan to the public in its 1975 Senate hearings, the ultimate irony of the Huston Plan
54
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came to light.
Even though the plan authorized intelligence agencies to carry out such searches in the
name of national security, the agencies were already doing everything authorized to them under
the plan and continued to do so after the plan fell apart. When Nixon revoked his authorization
of the plan five days after authorizing it, the agencies expressed their disappointment and quietly
went back to doing everything the Huston Plan had authorized to them, without presidential
approval or oversight.57
The Huston Plan, as it came to be known,58 led to fallout between Huston and Hoover,
and, on a larger scale, foreshadowed the difficulties that would characterize the FBI for the next
decade, as the organization succumbed to politicization under the Nixon administration and then
spent years trying to divest itself of the repercussions of that relationship.59 The Huston Plan
signaled the beginning of a tumultuous decade for the Bureau.
One of the clearest and most immediate examples of these tensions occurred in October
1969 when Huston received reports from the FBI regarding plans by the New Mobilization
Committee to hold a press conference at the Ambassador Hotel in Washington DC. By
November, sources confirmed that the Chicago-based SDS “Weatherman” faction also intended
to participate in the demonstrations. Further sources suggested that the Black Panther Party was
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also planning to travel to Washington.60 The reports gained notoriety when a “reliable source”
suggested that Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin (Yippie Leaders) stated they would attempt to
“break into the Justice Department, breaking windows and possibly using Molotov cocktails.
While police are busy at Justice, an attempt will be made to blow up the Vietnamese Embassy.”61
Early estimates from the FBI suggested that approximately 100,000 demonstrators would travel
to Washington DC for the November protests.62 The number of protesters, combined with the
Yippie threats of inciting violence, led the Nixon administration and the FBI to anticipate a
possible eruption in the DC protests.
When their predictions for violence failed to come true, Huston found himself defending
Hoover to Nixon’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs, John Ehrlichman. In a memo dated
November 20, 1969, Huston intimated to Ehrlichman that Hoover was upset at the suggestion
from a recent news article that the FBI had performed unsatisfactorily.63 Countering the news
article’s claims that the Bureau had wildly overestimated the amount of protesters, Huston came
to Hoover’s defense, writing:
The FBI believes, and I concur, that the assessment was not incorrect. FBI intelligence
enabled us to pinpoint the targets of violence in advance, thus enabling the MPD to have
sufficient manpower on hand to keep the situation under control. Had we not been aware
of the plans to storm the South Vietnamese Embassy, we would have had an international
incident on our hands if the effort had been successful.64
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Huston disagreed with the reporter, explaining to Ehrlichman, “It is my opinion that the FBI did
a first-rate job in gathering intelligence for the November Mobilization. Their information was
accurate, timely, and complete.”65 Furthermore, he rationalized their overestimates regarding the
number of protesters as a result of relying on the practice of counting buses attending the
protests, and not the number of protesters on the bus. Finally, Huston proposed that Ehrlichman
send Hoover a letter to reassure him of the Administration’s appreciation for the Bureau’s work.
He attached a draft of the letter, in which Huston proposed that Ehrlichman say to Hoover, “I
wish to call to your attention the fine job which your people in the Domestic Intelligence
Division did during the weeks preceding the November Mobilization.”66
Though Huston praised Hoover’s work in 1969, the relationship would turn by 1970,
when Huston and Hoover found themselves at odds over the Huston Plan. By the time Huston
proposed drafting the Huston plan, he met only resistance from Hoover. Huston testified before
Congress “it was my opinion that [Hoover] was heading down a course difference from that the
President had outlined.”67 In a memo for Haldeman, Huston wrote in July 1970, “I went into this
exercise fearful that CIA would refuse to cooperate. In fact Dick Helms (Director of Central
Intelligence) was most cooperative and helpful, and the only stumbling block was Mr.
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Hoover.”68 Huston explained that though the working group of intelligence agency directors,
comprised of Hoover, CIA Director Helms, DIA Director Bennett, and NSA Director Gayler
approved an official plan to collect domestic intelligence, Hoover refused to go along with the
plan. In fact, Hoover’s assistant director William Sullivan testified before the Senate that he
recommended that Huston first get the signatures of the CIA, DIA, and NSA directors before
sending the draft to Hoover. Huston explained, “Bureau personnel (i.e., Sullivan and Brennan)
on the committee felt that if they took the report back to Mr. Hoover, that he would go
completely—he would refuse to go along with it, and they felt that, tactically, if they went to him
and said, the report has already been approved by the other three Directors, that perhaps he
would then acquiesce.” In fact, despite the best strategies of Huston and Sullivan, Hoover
continued to resist efforts by the other directors to expand intelligence collection. Huston wrote
to Haldeman, “When the working group completed its report, Mr. Hoover refused to go along
with a single conclusion drawn or support a single recommendation made.”69
The report recommended to Huston that the intelligence agencies “commence” (ironic, as
they were already conducting) the illegal opening of mail and surreptitious entries.70 Hoover
objected to the report, believing that any revelations related to the intelligence community’s
gathering of such information would only lead to embarrassment for the Bureau and for the
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Nixon Administration.71 The report recommended that the FBI recommence “black bag jobs” or
burglaries to acquire intelligence.72 Huston testified on the subject that “I was told the Bureau
had undertaken ‘black bag’ jobs for a number of years—up until 1966. That it had been
successful and valuable again, particularly in matters involving espionage. And that they felt
this, again, was something given the revolutionary climate, they thought they needed to have the
authority to do.”73 Indeed, “they” referred to the Bureau’s assistant director, William Sullivan.
Huston testified before the Senate that he believed Sullivan felt the FBI had become “unduly
inhibited” in its intelligence collection on domestic groups. On July 19, 1966, Hoover sent a
letter to Cartha DeLoach, his Assistant Director, prohibiting the use of black bag jobs.74
Whatever restrictions Hoover had placed upon his intelligence unit within the Bureau in regards
to the collection of domestic intelligence, the Huston Plan sought to eradicate.
In a bitter memo to Haldeman, Nixon’s chief of staff, Huston described in detail how
Hoover had successfully dismantled the Huston Report. Huston explained that Hoover’s lack of
support stemmed from two reasons. First, Hoover believed that current Bureau operations were
satisfactory and did not require the help of other agencies.75 Second, he refused to accept any

authority. And after he revoked that authority, the practices continued, even though he had
revoked it.” (pg. 16)
71
Ibid, pg. 189.
72
Ibid, 8.
73
Ibid, 8.
74
Ibid, 98. In his memo, Hoover wrote, “I note that requests are still being made by Bureau
officials for the use of ‘black bag’ techniques. I have previously indicated that I do not intend to
approve any such requests in the nature, and, consequently, no such recommendation should be
submitted for approval of such matters. This practice, which includes also surreptitious
entrances upon premises of any kind, will not meet with my approval in the future. Very truly
yours, John Edgar Hoover.” See Exhibit 33, pg. 276.
75
Ibid, 189.
28

comments from other agencies about the Bureau’s methods for collecting intelligence.76 Huston
refused to see Hoover’s point of view, explaining to Haldeman that Hoover’s “objections are
generally inconsistent and frivolous.”77 To voice his disagreement, Hoover inserted footnotes
into the final report that disagreed with the report’s conclusions. This addition to the final report
angered the other agency heads. Huston had to assuage the protests of Admiral Gayler and
General Bennett, delicately convincing them to not make a scene regarding Hoover’s changes.
In exchange, Huston offered to make their opposition to the footnotes known to President
Nixon.78
FBI and CIA Disputes
The Huston Plan exposed a harsh reality in the world of the intelligence community:
namely, that the FBI had severed all connection with the CIA. In the spring of 1970, Hoover
became irate when the CIA refused to tell Hoover “who had leaked information from his
organization regarding an investigation into a Czech professor’s disappearance.”79 Though the
Bureau publicly denied the breakdown in communication, the Senate hearings with the Huston
plan confirmed the total halt in cooperation.80 Indeed, Hoover’s own memo confirms the split
with the CIA. On a letter from CIA director Helms, Hoover wrote at the end, “This is not
satisfactory. I want our Denver Office to have absolutely no contacts with CIA. I want direct
liaison here with CIA to be terminated and any contact with CIA in the future to be by letter
only. –H.”81 Hoover’s subordinates in the Bureau believed that the split with the CIA was fatal
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to FBI operations. In fact, some of the Bureau personnel went behind Hoover’s back and
continued to meet with CIA officials in order to exchange information related to cases.82 Charles
Brennan, Former Assistant Director of the FBI’s Domestic Intelligence Division, testified before
Congress that he believed the ban on working with the CIA definitely affected the FBI’s ability
to collect intelligence. He explained:
I feel the various members of the intelligence community must work together in order to
fulfill everybody’s basic intelligence responsibilities, and I felt that the decision by Mr.
Hoover to cut off relationship with the CIA was just totally an atrocious decision and was
not consistent with what the responsibilities of the intelligence community are. We rely
upon and deal with the CIA closely, as they do with us, in the interchange of matters of
mutual interest to both of us, and it just did not square with the abilities of each to be able
to carry out the responsibilities and perform the functions by saying, ‘discontinue liaison
with the CIA.’83
The breach in communication between CIA and FBI developed over a relatively small
disagreement. In 1969, the FBI and CIA looked into a case involving the disappearance of
Thomas Riha, a Czech-born associate professor of modern Russian history at the University of
Colorado.84 The professor left the university under mysterious circumstances, disappearing and
leaving no clues as to his whereabouts. Though his friends and colleagues believed that his
disappearance suggested he was dead, the University of Colorado President, Joseph R. Smiley,
assured the public he was still very much alive, citing his “reliable sources” in Washington.85
Smiley spoke with such confidence because he had been briefed by a CIA agent as to Riha’s
whereabouts. He announced publicly that Riha had not been a victim of foul play.
From that moment forward, Hoover recognized a leak in information and sought to find
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it; thus began the breakdown between the FBI and the CIA. The CIA initially took an interest in
the case based upon Riha’s Czech citizenship and “wanted to know if there had been foreign
interference.”86 The FBI discovered that the professor was alive and well and simply had chosen
to disappear for personal reasons. When Sam Papich, an a FBI agent in the Bureau’s Denver
office, chose to act on his own accord and tell a CIA agent what the Bureau had discovered, his
message led to the breakdown in communication. Papich’s official role was liaison officer
between the CIA and FBI. Unfortunately, when Hoover learned that Papich passed along
information to the CIA about the Bureau’s classified notes on the case, he cut off communication
with the CIA. Papich was devastated. The New York Times reported that Papich “beseeched the
Director in the strongest language to reconsider, pleading that a close relationship between the
two agencies was vital to controlling Communist-bloc intelligence operatives.”87 Hoover refused
to listen. Instead, four months after he severed liaison with the CIA, he “abolished the sevenman section that maintained contact with the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Office of Naval
Intelligence, Army Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, the Air Force Office of Special
Investigations, the National Security Agency, the State Department, the Post Office, the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the United States Information Agency, the
Bureau of Customs and the Immigration Service.”88 James Jesus Angleton, Chief of
Counterintelligence for the CIA, remarked of the split that Hoover’s command was a “cutting off
of all liaison within the intelligence community with the exception of the White House…over
this one case.”89 The fallout resulting from such a simple case was extraordinary. Yet, it also
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highlighted the need for the Huston Plan. At the time the agency directors came together to draft
the Huston Plan, Hoover had eliminated contact with the rest of the agencies. That he would
ultimately sabotage the Huston Plan came as no surprise.
The Attorney General Intervenes
As Hoover saw it (and, indeed, as the law reflected), only the FBI had jurisdiction to
collect domestic intelligence. Though the CIA, DIA, NSA and military had collected domestic
intelligence for years, federal law did not actually give them the authority to do so. Hoover
knew this, and after he voiced his disagreement through his ample footnotes, he approached the
Attorney General, John Mitchell and briefed him about the creation of the report.90 Sullivan,
Hoover’s assistant director, described Mitchell’s dislike of Huston and the Huston Plan, writing:
Mitchell’s distaste for Huston and for what came to be known as the Huston Plan began
when the Ad Hoc Committee was originally formed. I don’t know if it was a deliberate
omission or merely an oversight, but Mitchell was never invited to join the committee.
As it turned out, Mitchell, Hoover’s nominal boss, had wanted to be a member of that
committee in the worst way.91
No other sources corroborated whether or not Mitchell truly wanted to be a part of the Huston
report planning committee “in the worst way.” Nonetheless, what is certain is that the Attorney
General was left out of the discussion entirely until the Huston Report had already been
drafted.92 This deliberate omission of information became a point of contention when the Senate
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interviewed Huston in 1975. When asked why he never informed Mitchell of the Huston Plan,
Huston gave four reasons: 1) he believed the plan dealt not with law enforcement matters, but
rather intelligence issues and therefore did not come under the purview of the Attorney
General;93 2) Huston decided that the FBI, as a part of the Justice Department, should be the
agency to keep the Attorney General informed of the meetings’ proceedings;94 3) Huston argued
that he wasn’t sure what conclusions the committee would decide upon in regards to the
collection of domestic intelligence and therefore, the “thought hadn’t occurred to him to include
the AG;”95 4) finally, and perhaps contradicting himself, Huston admitted that he simply didn’t
have any confidence in the Department of Justice.96 Only in 1976, when answering senators’
pointed questions, did Huston admit that his failure to consult the Attorney General had been a
mistake. When asked by Senator Church whether it never occurred to him, when “making
recommendations…that violated the law, that you or the White House should confer with the
Attorney General before making those recommendations.” Somewhat sheepishly, Huston
replied, “No, it didn’t. It should have, but it didn’t.”97
That Huston failed to consult with the Attorney General ultimately led to the plan’s
undoing. After the plan was finalized and Hoover had added his footnotes, he approached
Mitchell and told him everything that had been going on between the intelligence agencies and
the White House. Mitchell did not respond favorably; he contacted the White House and
matters when the Director of the FBI complained to him about a memorandum from Mr. Tom
Charles Huston which must be essentially the same text as the one I received under date of 23
July 1970.” See Exhibit 20, Senate Hearing, pg. 247.
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convinced Nixon to recall the plan.98 Huston’s failure to tell the Attorney General about his plan
not only doomed his plan, but, perhaps most disturbing, it also showed his disregard for the law.
Huston would eventually be called to testify before the Senate about his plan because it had
unheeded the Constitution, allowing agencies to not only thwart their own legal jurisdiction
(which, with the exception of the FBI, were strictly international)99 but also to sidestep the
Fourth Amendment by searching peoples’ mailboxes, houses, and places of businesses without a
warrant. By the time senators called Huston in for questioning, they wondered how he legally
justified the Huston Plan. Huston’s explanation pointed to one conclusion: he saw the President
as above the law and believed whatever he or the intelligence community needed to do in
furtherance of national security was okay. He stated, “it was my opinion at the time that simply
the fourth amendment did not apply to the President in the exercise of matters relating to the
internal security or national security.”100 Huston coordinated the efforts of the intelligence
community while ignoring the Attorney General. He quelled any doubts about the plan’s
illegality by deciding, simply and unilaterally, that the President was above the law. Yet, his
viewpoints had been supported by Nixon, as well as past presidents. Even though federal courts
had found domestic wiretaps to be unconstitutional, Huston claimed that until 1972, every
President believed that he had “inherent authority” as a part of his Executive Power to carry out
wiretaps anyway.101 Furthermore, Huston argued that the American public’s viewpoint on the
98
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issue supported the right of a President to collect whatever he needed, with the help of the
intelligence community.
Huston testified, “it is interesting to me, Senator, that in October 1971, on the Sunday
edition of the New York Times, there was a front page article which was obviously planted to
attack J. Edgar Hoover, which criticized Mr. Hoover for the fact that he had refused to engage in
‘black bag’ jobs that were necessary in dealing with espionage.”102 Indeed, the New York Times
article alleged that FBI agents risked their jobs and their personal freedom when they carried out
black bag jobs. Under Hoover’s weak leadership and his inability to work with other intelligence
agencies, the article argued, the intelligence capabilities of the Bureau had suffered greatly. It
stated, “an FBI man might find himself apprehended by the police when he does a ‘bag job’—a
surreptitious piece of counterespionage sometimes involving illegal activity.”103 The article
questioned the Bureau’s intelligence gathering capabilities, wondering if the FBI fell too far on
the law enforcement side and not enough on the intelligence gathering side, therefore carrying
out acts that would allow it to counter espionage and recruit Soviet defectors as spies. The
article stated, “the agents are basically trained in criminal procedures and techniques and think in
criminal terms…The subtleties of intelligence work seem to elude them.”104
Huston’s point about the attitude of the public towards Hoover and intelligence gathering
102

Ibid, 22. In the October 10, 1971 New York Times article, “F.B.I. Is Said to Have Cut Direct
Liaison With C.I.A., the article alleged that intelligence officials worried that Mr. Sullivan’s
departure from the FBI, following his “retirement,” would lead to further breakdown in
intelligence cooperation between the Bureau and the CIA. The article alleged that intelligence
officials believed the FBI was doing a poor job in the area of counterintelligence, or the act of
countering Soviet espionage. The article stated, “They argue that Mr. Hoover is so intent on
preventing any embarrassment to the FBI or any sullying of his reputation that he avoids the
risks of counterespionage work.” See pg. 62.
103
“FBI Said to Have Cut Direct Liaison With CIA,” 62.
104
Ibid.
35

had changed over the years was both correct and incorrect. The New York Times article
eviscerated Hoover for his inability to work with the CIA and for the Bureau’s inability to
capture valuable intelligence. The article seemed to have no regard for how and if the Bureau
might collect such intelligence legally or illegally—the viewpoint of the article simply criticized
Hoover for his inability to make the right call and to allow Sullivan’s Domestic Intelligence
Division to carry out the black bag jobs that they wanted, in the name of the national security.
Everything about the New York Times article reflected the attitude of Huston during the days of
drafting the Huston Plan—national security took precedence and if the CIA or any other
intelligence agency wanted to collect information, they could and should. Hoover’s hesitation to
cooperate with Huston or to carry out black bag jobs led critics to later wonder what his motives
had been in the early 1970s. Had he been ahead of his time, seeing the illegality of the
intelligence community’s actions? Had he acted on principle to preserve to the Constitution, to
ensure that the Bureau did not violate citizens’ fourth amendment rights to be free from search
and seizure?
The record stemming from the Huston Plan reflects that Hoover’s hesitation had far less
to do with principle and more to do with his formidable personality; in 1970 and 1971, Hoover
found himself in a difficult place. Past actions by the Bureau were finally coming to scrutiny,
and yet, he hated the thought of any other agencies infringing upon his domestic intelligence
territory. He worked under a President who insisted upon collecting domestic intelligence and
refused to do so on Hoover’s own terms. That Nixon demanded Hoover work with other
agencies, and that Hoover knew his actions, though sanctioned at the time, could later be
reopened to scrutiny, led him to hesitate and ultimately thwart his own Bureau’s mission to
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collect information. One week after the New York Times Sunday spread criticized Hoover for
refusing to work with the CIA, the paper again featured a negative story on him in the following
Sunday paper. The story, entitled “Hoover, in an Unusual Letter, Defends Operations of the
FBI,” stated that Hoover had written a letter to Princeton professor Duane Lockard to defend the
Bureau’s actions. Lockard was set to host a conference at Princeton on the FBI.105 The Bureau
speculated that the conference would severely criticize Hoover and organization’s actions.106
Such an unprecedented, no-holds-barred event featuring prominent scholars terrified Hoover.
The article provided a litany of recent criticism against the Bureau and Hoover.
In recent months, Representative Hale Boggs, Democrat of Louisiana, has charged that
the F.B.I. tapped the telephones of Congressmen; Senator George McGovern, Democrat
of South Dakota, has accused Mr. Hoover of attempting to destroy the career of an airline
pilot who had been critical of the bureau’s handling of a hijacking, and Senator Edmund
S. Muskie, Democrat of Maine, has contended that the bureau conducted widespread
surveillance at Earth Day last year.107
The criticism reaped upon Hoover by the public destroyed his motivation to help Nixon. He was
not going to risk his future by carrying out actions to assist the CIA, the agency with which he
had stopped liaising. Regarding Hoover’s sabotage of the Huston Plan, Huston himself remained
opinionated about Hoover’s motives. He stated, “I did not think his objections were
principled…because in many instances he says, not that this is illegal, it should not be done, he
says, ‘I do not want to do it, but I do not care if somebody else does it,’ which does not strike me
as being a principled objection.”108 Furthermore, Huston argued that Hoover hated when other
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agencies infringed upon his territory.109
Others involved with the Huston Plan offered a slightly different perspective on Hoover’s
motivations regarding the memorandum. Angleton speculated:
I believe that Mr. Hoover’s real concern was that during the Johnson administration,
where the Congress was delving into matters pertaining to FBI activities, Mr. Hoover
looked to the President to give him support in terms of conducting those operations. And
when that support was lacking, Mr. Hoover had no recourse but to gradually eliminate
activities which were unfavorable to the Bureau and which in turn risked public
confidence in the number one law enforcement agency.110
Huston made clear that the Nixon administration had placed greater emphasis on intelligence
gathering and was willing to use the Huston Plan as the imprimatur of authorization for agencies
to collect such information. Hoover, however, had witnessed the same enthusiasm for
intelligence gathering under Johnson and had later been made to feel like a scapegoat of the
administration when the public expressed their disapproval of the intelligence gathering
activities. He refused to be moved. His own former Assistant Director of the Domestic
Intelligence Division, Charles Brennan, also posited his theory on Hoover’s inability to
cooperate with the Huston Plan. He stated:
I think when Hoover reached age 70, of course, he came within the Government’s law
which required mandatory retirement at that time. And I believe that was waived by
President Johnson, which virtually then called for the Director to be renewed as Director
of the FBI on an annual basis.111 And I think that Mr. Hoover was very conscious of the
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fact that to a degree this put him into a somewhat vulnerable position. I think he then
also became very conscious of the fact that any incident, which, within his understanding
might prove to be an embarrassment to the Bureau, could reflect questionably on his
leadership of the Bureau. And I think that perhaps he felt that such an incident could
provide certain individuals with the capacity not to renew his continued role as Director
of the FBI.112
The Huston Plan and Sullivan
Hoover’s opposition to the Huston Plan led to conflict with William Sullivan, the FBI’s
head of Domestic Intelligence Division. Sullivan made clear time and again that he disagreed
with Hoover’s approach to intelligence collection. In his memoir, Sullivan recalled that he had
often served as the point of contact for other intelligence agencies that brought their complaints
to him, when they felt like Hoover had isolated their agencies from the Bureau.113 He believed
that Hoover had acted completely out of line when he inserted his footnotes into the final Huston
Report. Though Sullivan noted that Hoover made only “minimal” changes to the report, he
stated, “Hoover was in no position to make them.”
Though Huston and Hoover had a terrible relationship, Huston developed a strong
relationship with Sullivan, who became the biggest proponent of the Huston Plan. Sullivan and
Huston developed a close working relationship. In his testimony before the Senate, Huston
stated, “I do not think there was anyone in the Government who I respected more than Mr.
Sullivan.”114 The relationship between Huston and Sullivan ensured that the FBI remained
involved with the drafting of the Huston Plan, as Sullivan chaired the working committee of
undone Johnson’s executive order and forced Hoover out the door. The New York Times article
detailing the split between CIA and FBI mentioned the speculation regarding Hoover’s possible
retirement. By the time, Nixon took office, rumors that Hoover would be forced to retire were
rampant. That these rumors appeared in the New York Times virtually guarantees that Hoover
knew of the negative buzz regarding his long tenure as director.
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agency subheads who drafted the version that eventually went to agency directors for approval.
At one point, Sullivan wrote optimistically to Huston, justifying the cooperation of the IC by
saying, “Individually, those of us in the intelligence community are relatively small and limited.
Unified, our own combined potential is magnified and limitless. It is through unity of action that
we can tremendously increase our intelligence-gathering potential, and, I am certain, obtain the
answers the President wants.”115 This optimism about bringing the intelligence community
together to leverage its limitless power would ultimately be the plan’s undoing, as Sullivan lost
Hoover’s trust. William Sullivan described Hoover’s intense dislike of Huston in his
autobiography, The Bureau, stating, “[Hoover] never called [Sullivan] by his right name, and in
our conversations, he never referred to him by any other name except ‘that hippie,’ taking his cue
from Huston’s two-inch sideburns.”116
Sullivan recounted that the White House reached out to him about the Huston Report
before contacting Hoover. Huston expressed the White House’s disappointment with Bureau
intelligence. Sullivan believed that Hoover had begun to shrink back from taking any risks
during the 1960s. He explained, “by 1970, [Hoover] was reluctant to allow his agents to break
into embassies, tap telephones, or open other people’s mail, even though these were the very
investigative techniques to which he owed his publicized successes.”117 More importantly,
however, by refusing to approve past illegal techniques, Hoover “put the Domestic Intelligence
Division of the FBI out of business.”118 This seemed crucial to Sullivan, as head of the Domestic
Intelligence Division. Frustrated by Hoover’s lack of support and feeling like his hands were
114

Ibid, 17.
Ibid, 9.
116
William Sullivan, The Bureau, 209.
117
Ibid, 205.
115

40

tied when the issue of intelligence collection arose, Sullivan immediately responded
sympathetically when Huston expressed disapproval for the Bureau’s intelligence operations. He
wrote, “the Nixon White House wanted the FBI to be more aggressive, not less. Hoover’s
refusal to bug, tap, and open mail was the straw that broke the camel’s back. The time had come
to apply pressure.”119 When Huston contacted Sullivan, he explained that the President was so
disappointed in the quality of intelligence received from the Bureau that he had instructed
Huston to work with the Bureau to do something different, something more effective.120
Furthermore, the White House was well aware that the Bureau’s refused to cooperate with the
CIA and other agencies. Sullivan explained:
All of these little empires in the intelligence—the FBI, State Department, NSA, and the
others—had built fences around themselves. I had never seen anything like it. We
wouldn’t share our information with anyone, and not other agency liked to give up
anything because Hoover would leak it to the newspapers and use it against them if he
could. To me, Huston looked like manna from heaven. A serious, informed analysis of
the nature, functions, and objectives of intelligence had never been undertaken in this
country. Perhaps, with my help, Huston and the White House could reorganize the entire
intelligence community.121
On June 5, 1970, Huston invited Hoover to the White House to discuss the structure of his
forthcoming plan. Though Huston had made clear he wanted to create a plan for collecting
future intelligence, Hoover only wanted to recount what the Bureau had done in the past.
Sullivan remembered, “At the meeting, Huston made it clear that the president was not interested
in Hoover’s one-sided version of FBI history. From that moment, Hoover hated Huston.”122
Shortly thereafter, Huston managed to corral an intelligence subcommittee, chaired by Sullivan,
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to create the famed Huston Report. Sullivan argued that the report did not reflect the viewpoints
of Huston but rather showcased the consensus of agency representatives who were charged with
devising a better way to cooperate in the pursuit of domestic intelligence gathering.123 In his
autobiography, Sullivan made no mention of the tactic that he advised to Huston as a measure to
get Hoover’s approval—namely that he secured the other three intelligence agency director’s
signatures before soliciting Hoover’s signature last. Yet, Sullivan recounted Hoover’s distaste
for the report’s draft; he wrote, “it was evident from the beginning that Mr. Hoover was opposed
to the entire report.”124 He argued that Hoover mostly opposed the idea that anyone in the
intelligence community had the authority to impose upon the FBI’s jurisdiction in domestic
intelligence by carrying out duties previously reserved solely for the Bureau.
Sullivan and Hoover had been at odds regarding FBI intelligence collection since as early
as 1967. A Time magazine article in 1971 reported, “since 1967, [Hoover and Sullivan] have
been at odds about espionage restrictions, ordered by Hoover, that severely limited FBI
investigations of spies.”125 The article chastised Hoover’s departure from controversial tactics
like wiretaps and electronic eavesdropping, stating, “civil libertarians have long condemned such
tactics; Hoover’s restrictions, however, resulted only from a pragmatic desire to avoid
embarrassing incidents and from his belief that American public opinion would not condone
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‘dirty games’ by FBI agents.”126 The article portrayed Sullivan as a warrior against Soviet
espionage who became concerned about the Bureau’s ability to detect spies under Hoover’s
restrictions. Hoover had long had a reputation as a staunch supporter of the Cold War against the
Soviet Union. Critics attacked his obsession with the Soviet Union, fixated on an “’archaic’ antiCommunist preoccupation.”127 That he was less of a Cold Warrior than Sullivan became a point
of irony; and yet, instead of questioning the motives of a man whose obsession with fighting
communism and espionage went beyond the almost comical obsession of J. Edgar Hoover, the
news report sided with Sullivan.
Although Attorney General John Mitchell sided with Hoover regarding the Huston
Report, he did not allow free reign of the Bureau. Instead, beginning in 1971, he allowed the
Justice Department to edit the FBI’s crime reports, a slight that Hoover could not ignore.128
Hoover believed that this development came about because “someone within the FBI was giving
the Administration a false picture of his operations.”129 Indeed, the Nixon Administration
believed, based upon what Sullivan told them, that the FBI did not have any effective analytical
capability. Huston found that the FBI was good “at collecting raw intelligence data,” but they
could not assemble the intelligence into a useful product for policymakers. In other words, the
Bureau could not make actionable intelligence.130
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Hoover’s subsequent actions implied that he believed that the “someone” leaking
negative information about the Bureau was Sullivan. In late July 1971, Hoover demoted
Sullivan from the number three position in the Bureau to number four by creating a new position
placed above Sullivan. Hoover also “summoned Sullivan to his office and heatedly berated him
for 2 ½ hours…[implying] that Sullivan was insolent and disloyal.”131 The clear implication that
day was that Hoover wanted Sullivan to resign. Against Hoover’s wishes, Sullivan held on.
Several weeks later, Hoover wrote Sullivan, “suggesting” that he take two weeks’ vacation.
When Sullivan declined the offer, Hoover sent an infamous “blue gem”—a note from the
director penned in blue ink—that stated, “Take two weeks. –H.”132 While Sullivan was on
vacation, Hoover choose his successor, Alex Rosen, the chief of the FBI’s investigative division.
By the time Sullivan returned to work, he found Rosen occupying his office.133 On October 1,
Sullivan went on sick leave. While he was away, Hoover changed the locks on his office and
removed his nameplate. The FBI press office announced that Sullivan had voluntarily retired.134
The dispute between Hoover and Sullivan led the public to question whether Hoover had too
much authority. The Time article stated, “The Sullivan-Hoover battle was more than simply an
internal bureaucratic feud, and more even than a controversy over different approaches to
intelligence operations. It raised serious questions about a secretive, enormously powerful
Government agency under dictatorial rule, operating on its own, answerable to no authority
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except the judgments—or whims—of one man.”135
The debacle with Sullivan illustrates two important points about the Bureau and Hoover
in the early 1970s. First, during the time when the Huston plan was developed, the press and the
public came down on the side of Sullivan instead of Hoover, showing the public’s acceptance of
intelligence gathering, even by illegal methods. That acceptance would dissipate following
Watergate, but at the time of Sullivan’s firing, many questioned whether Hoover had shot
himself in the foot. Sullivan was vehemently arguing for the return of controversial tactics in the
furtherance of collecting domestic intelligence, and even though the public would, only several
years, turn against such acceptance towards the collection, in 1971, they fell staunchly on his
side. Even stranger, the public and the press both attacked Hoover for being comically anticommunist, and yet, they believed that he had lost his spirit for collecting intelligence and
fighting espionage when he refused to give into Sullivan’s requests for expanded intelligence
collection. Even though Hoover remained popular within national polls, he clearly had critics
who believed Hoover was no longer fit to serve as director of the FBI. Some critics claimed he
was too aggressive and others claimed he was not aggressive enough. Second, Hoover was in a
delicate position during the early 1970s. Though he retained his position as director, he was
clearly vulnerable in ways he had not been earlier in his career. Brennan’s speculation that
Hoover had become so careful about collecting intelligence because he feared that he could
easily be fired, despite an Executive Order keeping him in office showed the fine line that
Hoover walked in making sure that he kept his job.
The Politicization of Intelligence
The Huston Plan and its demise had implications even broader than its effects on Sullivan
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and Hoover. The plan represented the politicization of intelligence by the Nixon administration.
In addition to using intelligence agencies, Huston also sought to use the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) to monitor New Left Groups. In a memo to Haldeman, Huston wrote, “I am
attaching a copy of a report from the IRS On the activities of its ‘Special Service group’ which is
supposed to monitor the activities of ideological organizations (for example, Jerry Rubin Fund,
Black Panthers, et cetera) and take appropriate action when violations of IRS regulations turn
up.”136 Most frightening, Huston recognized that the IRS and intelligence agencies could be
used by the administration to go after groups where no basis for criminal prosecution existed.
He wrote to Haldeman, “what we cannot do in a courtroom via criminal prosecution to curtail the
activities of some of these groups, IRS could do by administrative action. Moreover, valuable
intelligence type information could be turned up by IRS as a result of their field audits.”137
When questioned by the Senate committee about his use of the IRS to collect intelligence against
New Left groups, Huston denied that he had ever done so; yet, the memoranda declassified for
the hearing shows incontrovertibly that Huston had, at the very least, intended to use the IRS as a
part of his greater plan.138
When placed into the hot seat of questioning, Huston fell back on the fear the
administration felt stemming from the New Left. He argued that he was not going after hippie,
antiwar protesters but rather, wanted to stop a growing violence sweeping the country in the
name of “radicalism.” He testified:
I really was peripherally interested in the antiwar demonstrations. What I was concerned
about was the 40,000 bombings that took place in 1 year. What I was concerned about
was the 39 police officers who were killed in sniping…But all I want to say for the record
136
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is, I thought we had a serious problem. I was not concerned about people who didn’t like
the war. I wasn’t concerned about people who thought Nixon was a louse. I was not
concerned about who was going to be the Democratic nominee. I am talking about—we
were talking about bombers; we were talking about assassins; we were talking about
snipers.139
Later, he backed up his fear with numbers—noting that in 1970, bombings, assassination
attempts, and sniping incidents were at an all-time high. May 1970 saw 40,000 bombings and
ROTC facilities saw an average of six arsons a day.140 Those numbers became a buffer against
Huston bearing the brunt of congressional scrutiny for the plan that Senator Church classified as
“in violation of the law.”141 Huston argued that the intelligence community had manipulated him
continually by assuring him they needed the authority to conduct what the Huston Plan would
have allowed. Upon finding out later that the CIA had already been doing the things that the
Huston Plan authorized, Huston felt duped.142 When Huston believed the senators questioning
him were trying to place the entire blame for the Huston Plan from construction to (brief)
implementation on him, he retaliated:
The impression, Senator, of course, is that I kind of sat down here and created out of
whole cloth an entire array of new techniques to exploit and infringe upon the civil
liberties of the American people, and that I forced it down Dick Helms’ throat, and I
blackjacked Admiral Gayler, and I really used my heavy weight on all of these poor little
professional intelligence people and forced them into coming up with all of this. Now, I
think the fact of the matter is that the entire intelligence community, in the summer of
139
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1970, thought we had a serious crisis in this country. I thought we had a serious crisis in
this country. My attitude was that we have got to do something about it. Who knows
what to do about it? The professional intelligence community. The professional
intelligence community tells me, this is what—you give us these tools; we can solve the
problem. I recommended these tools.143
Although he deflected blame in the early proceedings, Huston later recalled his regret at being a
part of the plan. His final words, set against the backdrop of the fallout from Watergate,
admitted he was naïve at the time of the Huston Report. In retrospect, the plan was illegal.
Though Huston argued he had good intentions in setting up the plan, it became a political tool for
the Nixon Administration. The plan became, as Senator Schweiker stated, the idea that kept
emerging “almost like a phoenix out of the ashes,” to eventually become Nixon’s Plumbers.144
Huston explained his regret, stating:
The risk was that you would get people who would be susceptible to political
considerations as opposed to national security considerations, or would construe political
considerations to be national security considerations, to move from the kid with a bomb
to the kid with a picket sign, and from the kid with the picket sign to the kid with the
bumper sticker of the opposing candidate. And you just keep going down the line. I
think people start out with the best intentions in the world. I don’t think there was
anyone that was involved in this operation who was motivated by a desire to protect the
President, to secure his reelection, to embarrass the Democrats, to engage in any partisan
political purpose. There was no one who was going to get any medal put on him that
said, ‘hero,’ or who was going to be invited as a special guest to the White House Press
Club. But we went from this kind of sincere intention, honest intention, to develop a
series of justifications and rationalizations based upon this, what I believe to be the basic
issue of this distorted view of inherent executive power, and from that, whether it was
direct, as Senator Schweiker seems to think it is, or was indirect or inevitable, as I tend to
think it is, you went down the road to where you ended up, with these people going into
the Watergate.145
The Huston Plan, written in the early days of the Nixon Administration, before Watergate,
foreshadowed Nixon’s later trials. During the questioning of Angleton in 1976, Senator
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Schweiker asked, “did the Plumber’s unit not do some of the same things, breaking and entry,
illegal burglary, that the Huston plan proposed?”146 When Angleton answered affirmatively,
Schweiker proclaimed, “So in essence, [the Nixon Administration] went around the back door
instead of the front door. Even though the Huston plan was dead I believe it had nine lives.”147
The Huston Plan was a complicated intelligence indiscretion. As Brennan would testify
to the Senate in 1975, the FBI never effectively produced any intelligence to show that foreign
Communist elements were funding the efforts of the New Left.148 The federal government’s
General Auditing Office would later find that only 16 of the 676 cases opened by the Bureau to
investigate the New Left were ever referred for prosecution; of those 16 cases, only four resulted
in convictions.149 The Huston Plan evoked Hoover’s ego and his reluctance to collect domestic
intelligence, even with the direct endorsement of the President. It was borne amid a time of
actual peril, as evidenced by the statistics surrounding bombings and campus violence. Yet, the
efforts of the intelligence community, both before and after the Huston Plan, to counter domestic
violence resulted in few gains. Huston’s plan led to Hoover and Sullivan’s fallout, which
elicited public scrutiny of the Bureau. The later seventies showed that Hoover had disregarded
the Constitution plenty of times in the name of national security; perhaps he knew his earlier
thwarting of the Fourth Amendment would eventually be his undoing, hence, his reluctance to
follow along with the Huston Plan, given that he had no guarantees that Nixon would protect
him, if the Bureau ever came under public scrutiny.
The Huston Plan also represented the dysfunctional relationship among intelligence
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agencies in the early 1970s. Hoover, despite his waning power, still exercised enormous
influence on the intelligence community. Not only did he have the power to halt domestic and
international intelligence collaboration among agencies, but, as Huston noted, he had the ability
to demolish a plan agreed upon by the intelligence community. Though the Huston Plan has
merited a mere footnote or occasional page in histories about Bureau, its importance to
understanding the Bureau, and the Nixon administration, during the 1970s should not be
understated. Among other things, the Huston Plan, as Nixon’s attempt to authorize the US
intelligence community to counter political threats against him, was the precursor to Watergate.
And yet, it became so much more complicated. Hoover’s inability or refusal to work with the
intelligence community, coupled with the fact that he chaired the drafting of the Huston Plan and
then sabotaged it right before his fellow agency directors’ eyes, highlights deeply ingrained
issues within the Bureau that took the entire decade to uncover and to sort out before Congress
and the public. In short, the Huston Plan was only the beginning of a tumultuous relationship
between the Bureau and Nixon.
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CHAPTER II
THE FBI AND THE NEW LEFT

Following the demise of the Huston Plan, it seemed that Hoover had reached the height
of his insubordination. By allaying the Huston Plan, Hoover had effectively killed a method of
intelligence collection hatched by one of the President’s own staffers. At first glance, it appeared
that Nixon’s approval should have provided Hoover complete immunity from any public
criticism of the plan. Unfortunately for him, it did not. Events following the Huston Plan,
involving the Army and the Bureau, underscored the great extent to which Hoover and the FBI
were vulnerable to public opinion; when intelligence leaked to the public, Nixon refused to
jeopardize his own public support by providing any assistance to intelligence agencies. This
chapter argues that throughout Nixon’s first term, Hoover became increasingly reticent to
embark upon new intelligence retrieval methods. Hoover witnessed Nixon’s willingness to allow
the Army to take the fall for an intelligence program that Nixon had approved of and
encouraged. Hoover did not wish for himself or the Bureau to undergo the same criticism.
When political activists broke into an FBI office in March of 1971 and stole all of the Bureau’s
files in order to leak them to the Washington Post, Hoover’s distrust reached an apex.
Subsequently, the flood of FBI files into the general public armed leftist activists and academics
with the ammunition needed to launch a full-scale critique of the Bureau and its deficiencies.
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That event launched a circular pattern: Nixon would demand increasing amounts of intelligence,
Hoover would refuse, and Nixon would resort to other methods to procure the information he
needed. During this troubling time, Nixon failed to come to the aid of the Bureau and as a result,
Hoover was less and less inspired to come to the aid of the President.
The involvement of the intelligence community in domestic spying came as a surprise to
Americans upon the revelation of the Huston Plan through Congressional hearings. In actuality,
however, the Johnson and Nixon administrations had earlier gone to great lengths to collect
intelligence on radical dissonance using not the intelligence community but the military. The
Nixon administration was hardly the first to introduce intelligence gathering on people defined as
domestic radicals. In 1971, Senator Sam Ervin (D-North Carolina) initiated Senate hearings on
Army surveillance carried out in the late 1960s. Serving as the key witness for the hearings was
a former Army intelligence officer, Christopher Pyle. He reported on an operation known as
“CONUS Intel,” an acronym for Continental United States Intelligence.150 An article written
about Pyle’s testimony before Congress explained:
Set up originally during the riot-torn mid-‘60s to gather information which might be
helpful to the Army in quelling civil disturbances, CONUS had arrogated a broad
territory of responsibility. Its operatives made investigatory targets of all kinds of people
known in the spook trade as “Persons of Interest.” Some were of legitimate interest, like
Stokely Carmichael and the Weathermen, but many others were engaged in such
perfectly defensible activities as writing antiwar letters to their editors or congressmen,
signing petitions, marching in peace demonstrations. Agents trailed bishops and
politicians, photographed businessmen and birth control advocates, scribbled notes about
ecologists and civil libertarians. Literally millions of dossiers were gathered in this way,
and the Army’s response to outside queries about what had been done with this material
was not distinguished by either clarity or candor.151
Included in the article were specific examples of operations carried out by military intelligence.
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These actions included monitoring civil rights activist Stokely Carmichael after Martin Luther
King’s assassination; spying on a meeting of Catholic priests who opposed the Church’s
moratorium on birth control; monitoring the phone conversations of leftist Senator Eugene
McCarthy at the 1968 Democratic Convention; tracking the 1968 Poor People’s Campaign “mule
marching train from Georgia to Washington, D.C.,” in an effort to find signs of animal abuse;
spying on conversations of mourners at Martin Luther King Jr.’s graveside; and reporting on the
activities of college students at such events as Moratorium Day in 1969.152 By the time Nixon
became president, he tasked Army agents to “infiltrate groups of potential demonstrators at
President Nixon’s inauguration.” The article reported, “long-haired and bearded Army agents
were issued liquor money and also marijuana, with instructions to use it and to pass it out to keep
their cover.”153
The surge in domestic intelligence gathering by the military came in the midst of uproar
against the Vietnam War. Intelligence reports compiled by the military reported on
demonstrations. Occasionally, the demonstrations turned violent. On the early morning of
January 18, 1969, the military reported that the Selective Service National Headquarters was
“firebombed, causing major damage to the first floor.”154 On the evening of Nixon’s
inauguration, protesters, including GIs, planned to burn their voter registration cards and draft
cards and then host a “counter-inaugural ball” to last all night long.155 Some of the intelligence
reported on benign threats, like a hippie commune of “out-of-town dissidents” staying in
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Washington DC in January 1969. The surveillance was futile, as the young people were “unable
to agree on plans for demonstrations.”156 Also evident in the collected intelligence was an
interest on the part of the military in the civil rights movement. On March 12, 1968, the military
monitored an event featuring Stokely Carmichael.157 The military agents’ report discussed
Carmichael’s call to arms, writing, “he indicated that Negroes should arm themselves for
protection against ‘Whitey,’ and that they should fight in the United States and not in
Vietnam.”158 Despite the Army’s best efforts, and the large scale of their surveillance, its agents
“never predicted a riot or witnessed anyone trying to incite one.”159
That the military had come under an unprecedented amount of criticism from protesters
did not assuage the public’s tolerance of such monitoring. When former army lawyer
Christopher Pyle made the military’s actions public in a 1970 Washington Monthly publication,
readers were outraged. In its efforts to monitor antiwar protests, the Army had collected an
extraordinary amount of intelligence on 25 million individuals.160 Much of this information
resided in a “computerized data bank[s]” housed at Fort Halbird, Md., Alexandria, Va., Fort
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Monroe, Va., and Fort Hood, Texas.161 Using information gleaned from its own “plainclothes”
agents as well as from the CIA and FBI, the military compiled vast reports on Americans.
According to Pyle, some of the reports involved legitimate threats, while others did not.
Accordingly, “surveillance reports on legitimate, peaceful individuals and organizations went
into the bank along with reports on criminals and on organizations and individuals who were
indeed worth watching.”162 One agent even reported that the military allowed new operatives a
wide amount of discretion to make judgments on whether those being monitored were
Communists. As a result, he stated, “many persons who are not Communists have been so
listed.”163
Pyle became a whistleblower on the army’s CONUS operation because he believed that
the United States had created “the intelligence apparatus of a police state.”164 His 1970
Washington Monthly article described the army’s intelligence abuses.165 Though Washington
Monthly was a somewhat obscure publication, the article went into syndication and was
published in fifty-one newspapers across the country, including local papers with a wide
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readership like the Miami Herald and The San Francisco Chronicle.166 The article’s wide
syndication captured the attention of Congress.167
Pyle joined the army as a young attorney and taught at the Army Intelligence School
from 1966 to 1968. He lectured on the collection of domestic intelligence and its legal
boundaries. The more that Pyle looked at the law, however, the less certain he felt that the
Army’s actions were legal under the Constitution. During Pyle’s years of teaching, the army was
preoccupied with Vietnam and subsequent protests sparked at home by war efforts. It decided to
infiltrate civil rights groups and anti-war groups as a means of squelching demonstrations against
the Vietnam War, but also, the military was interested in suppressing race riots taking place
across the country. In the summer of 1967, when riots took place in Detroit and Newark,168 the
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violence provided a justification for the army intelligence officers to expand their
“counterinsurgency” efforts within the United States.169 Pyle visited the army intelligence
offices and read unclassified teletypes—reports from the Associated Press regarding
demonstrations that were printed instantly, upon receipt of information.170 He discovered that
through news reports and, significantly, through the work of their own informants and agents, the
army was monitoring not only possible violence but also American citizens’ protected speech.
Pyle found they were monitoring all sorts of things, and he was concerned to find it covered
forms of communication he understood to be protected by the First Amendment. Pyle began to
develop intelligence sources within the Army, recruiting informants from his legal classes. As
he taught soldiers the Constitutional bounds of their jobs, he convinced them to tell him about
instances where they superseded legal boundaries. At one point, he had 125 Army agents
engaged in domestic intelligence collection providing information to him. Pyle began running
his own intelligence operation against the Army, using the Army’s own intelligence agents.171
Pyle’s Washington Monthly articles were filled with anecdotes provided from Army agents in the
field. Pyle approached the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, chaired at the time by
residents of a large public housing project.” See Nancy Solomon, “40 Years On, Newark ReExamines Painful Riot Past,” NPR, July 14, 2007, accessed at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=11966375. Riots ensued. One resident
recalled “there was a rain of stones, rocks, Molotov cocktails at the precinct. The flames started
flickering down the side of the building, and the police came charging out with night sticks,
shields, riot gear, charging the crowd.” Similar to Detroit, Newark had seen racism and lack of
opportunities in the housing market and in employment influence the riots’ occurrence. Solomon
explained, “After World War II, whites began moving out of Newark to the suburbs in huge
numbers, spurred on by new interstate highways, low-interest mortgages and widespread access
to college provided by the G.I. Bill. As blacks moved into the Central Ward, they faced severe
discrimination in jobs and housing.”
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Senator Sam Ervin. Though Ervin was a staunch segregationist, he was interested in violations
of the First and Fourth Amendment and believed that CONUS violated both. He agreed to hold
hearings.172 Pyle left his position in the Army and went to work for Ervin, serving as a staff
member for the committee investigating CONUS. While serving on his staff, Pyle drafted many
of the questions that Ervin asked the Army representatives in Congressional hearings.173
Pyle’s Washington Monthly articles provided a cache of information about the Army’s
doings. At the time, the general public simply had no idea that the military was collecting
information domestically. Pyle described the origins of the program, dating it back to 1965.174
He wrote, “nearly 1,000 plainclothes investigators, working out of some 300 offices from coast
to coast, keep track of political protests of all kinds—from Klan rallies in North Carolina to
antiwar speeches at Harvard.”175 Pyle alleged that when the program began, it was intended “to
provide early warning of civil disorders which the Army might be called upon to quell.”176 The
purpose of the program gradually shifted. By 1967, “its scope widened to include the political
beliefs and actions of individuals and organizations active in the civil rights, white supremacy,
black power, and antiwar movements.”177 By 1970, the army maintained surveillance on
“virtually every activist political group in the country,”178 to include such peaceful units as the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Clergy and Laymen United Against the War in
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Vietnam, the American Civil Liberties Union, Women Strike for Peace, and the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People.179
He described the army’s interaction with the FBI and local law enforcement, claiming
that military intelligence received the majority of its briefings regarding upcoming protests from
the Bureau. The Army distributed their intelligence findings daily and weekly through a
“nationwide wire service…[that gave] every major troop command in the United States daily and
weekly reports on virtually all political protests occurring anywhere in the nation.”180 In addition
to the wire reports, the Army published a book known as the “blacklist,” which contained
profiles on people and organizations that Army officials believed could one day cause trouble.181
He warned, “some time in the near future the Army will link its teletype reporting system to a
computerized data bank.”182 The computerized system was significant because unlike computer
databases housed at the FBI, the Army’s computers “[would] not be restricted to the storage of
case histories of persons arrested for (or convicted of) crimes. Rather, it will specialize in files
devoted exclusively to descriptions of the lawful political activity of civilians.”183 This
unprecedented amount of computerized intelligence would be made available to the “FBI, the
Secret Service, the Passport Office, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, the Civil Service Commission, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the Navy, and the Air Force.184 To argue in support of its need for such
detailed intelligence, the Army likened its intelligence gathering efforts in Malaya and South
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Vietnam to break up guerrilla organizations, explaining, “without detailed knowledge of
community ‘infrastructure,’…riot-control troops would not be able to enforce curfews or quell
violence.”185 Indeed, the Army had brought its Vietnam War tactics home.
Crucial to the Army’s intelligence gathering was the question of legality. Upon what
legal basis could the Army carry out its acts of collection? Pyle authoritatively wrote, “within
the United States the Army has no authority to round up suspects the moment civilians take up
arms.”186 That power remained with the FBI and local law enforcement. For the Army to
intervene and arrest US citizens, the President would have to declare martial law, a “highly
remote circumstance.”187 When news of the CONUS program reached the public, the Nixon
administration justified the Army’s actions using the “inherent powers doctrine,” a legal theory
that authorized the President to use “whatever ‘intelligence-gathering operations he believes are
necessary to protect the security of the nation’ and that this authority ‘is not dependent upon any
grant of legislative authority from Congress, but rather is an inherent power of the President,
derived form the Constitution itself.’”188 Pyle, however, argued against the legal basis of the
inherent powers doctrine, explaining that federal courts had historically not upheld a president’s
power to do whatever he wanted without answering to Congress.189 In addition to finding no
legal basis for Nixon’s inherent powers doctrine, Pyle also argued that the Army’s CONUS
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program violated the First Amendment due to “the chilling effect which knowledge of
surveillance has upon the willingness of citizens to exercise their freedoms of speech, press, and
association, and their right to petition the government for redress of grievances.”190 In short, if
the program impinged upon people’s ability to feel secure in the ability to express their opinions,
radical or distasteful as they might be to the government, then the program violated citizens’
First Amendment rights to free speech. For Pyle, CONUS violated Americans’ right to
privacy.191 It also ensured that citizens would think twice before participating in political
activity. He wrote, “once citizens come to fear that government agencies will misuse
information concerning their political activities, their withdrawal from politics can be
expected.”192 Pyle also worried about worst-case scenarios where the military or other
government agencies would abuse intelligence and violate people’s rights. He wrote:
It is frightening to imagine what could happen if a demagogue in the Martin Dies-Joseph
McCarthy tradition were to gain access to the computer the Army seeks now, or if an
Otto Otepka in uniform were to leak a copy of the Intelligence Command’s so-called
“blacklist” to friends in Congress, or if a General Edwin Walker were to take charge of
the Intelligence Command.193
Pyle was so concerned about the illegality of CONUS and the dangers it posed that he
recommended that Congress hold a hearing to investigate the Army’s intelligence gathering and
to look into other intelligence agencies to search for similar violations.
As Pyle’s allegations reached the public, the army responded by creating a 50-man unit
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within the Pentagon to identify Pyle’s leaks and trace the source. Incidentally, Pyle continued
his intelligence operation against the Army by developing sources within the Pentagon group.
One of his sources, known as “Yellow Pants,” because of the mustard-yellow bellbottoms he
donned upon meeting Pyle for the first time, provided Pyle with information related to his leaks.
Pyle stayed several steps ahead of the Army’s investigation into his leaks. He also evaded
prosecution, a feat that he credits to his ability to keep his head down (he emphatically refused to
make the story about himself, focusing instead on the intelligence), his ability to conceal the
identity of his sources (to his knowledge, the military never realized the extent to which he had
sources within the Army or the identities of such sources), and also the military’s preoccupation
at the time with trying to prosecute Daniel Ellsberg for leaking the Pentagon Papers. Pyle
remained unscathed.194
In his hearing before Congress, Pyle testified that CONUS had failed miserably, as
evidenced by the fact that US Army operatives were tailing Martin Luther King, Jr. when he was
assassinated.195 In addition to learning about the human intelligence that military operatives
collected, Congress was also interested in their technical capabilities. The congressional
committee evinced great interest in the use of computer technology to obtain and store
information about those monitored by the Army. Ervin worried that “breakthroughs in computer
technology tend to create the real possibility of ‘a mass surveillance system unprecedented in
American history.’”196 Equally concerning, Ervin worried that the army was handing its material
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gathered through CONUS to the FBI for use on their investigations.197
Pyle’s decision to become a whistleblower placed him at the center of the government’s
suspicion. Years later, he would recall that upon his public disclosures, the army began targeting
him for surveillance, writing “it asked my mailman to monitor my correspondence and put me on
President Nixon’s ‘enemies list,’ which meant a punitive tax audit.”198 Despite receiving
funding for his Ph.D. through the GI Bill, Pyle claimed that the government tried to prove that
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the Chinese Communists were funding his tuition.199
When news of its CONUS program reached the public, the Army at first refused to
comment. It diminished the CONUS program only to “essential elements of information.”200 It
forbade its agents from discussing any aspect of the program with the press, and its office in the
Pentagon “suspended all replies to Congressional inquiries.”201 Finally, on January 26, 1970, the
Army “confirmed the existence of the nationwide intelligence apparatus,” but claimed that it
merely collected political intelligence “in connection with Army civil disturbance
responsibilities,” an assertion that Pyle decried as false.202 Pyle also found that the Army had not
answered truthfully regarding its use of undercover agents, claiming, “for some time there has
been a special prohibition against military persons undertaking such activities as undercover
operations in the civilian community.”203 Pyle replied, “of course, it did not say when the order
was issued, or whether it was being obeyed. (It is not.)”204 Though the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) brought suit against the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the
Army Chief of Staff, and the Commanding General of the Intelligence Command for violating
political groups’ rights to free speech, a federal judge dismissed the suit, writing, “there is no
threat that the Army is going to come in and arrest you.”205
Nixon eventually stepped in and demanded an end to the Army’s collection of domestic
intelligence, having overseen the Army’s collection efforts since assuming the presidency in
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1969.206 In a press conference held by the Nixon administration’s press secretary, Ronald
Ziegler on April 16, 1971, he stated, “I referred the other day, for example, to the fact that when
the President found out recently that under a previous Administration the Army intelligence
people were conducting surveillance, that the President immediately ordered that that stop. I said
the other day that that has stopped. The Army intelligence has absolutely no responsibility and
will not under direct order from the President and the Secretary of Defense engage in that type of
activity.” Later, when his administration approached the Army about participating in the Huston
Plan, the Army used the Congressional outcry against its CONUS program as justification to
decline participation.207 But, the effects of Pyle’s reveal would reverberate far past the army,
beginning in his own social circle. Following his testimony before Congress, Pyle would meet a
young professor, John Elliff. Elliff received his PhD from Harvard in 1968 and was teaching at
Barnard College, beginning in 1967. Elliff’s research centered around several issues relevant to
Pyle’s testimony—first, Elliff was interested in the FBI and the civil rights movement, an issue
pushed to the forefront of the discussion by Pyle and his unveiling of the army’s methods against
civil rights activists. Secondly, Elliff also had an interest in the tension between national security
and civil liberties.208 Those topics of mutual interest between Pyle and Elliff led to a mutual
friendship. Pyle encouraged Elliff to look more closely at the FBI’s domestic intelligence
gathering and introduced him to Senator Ervin’s Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights staff.
As Elliff transitioned to a position as professor at Brandeis University, he continued his
research into the FBI. Elliff’s interest propelled him to attend Princeton University’s 1971
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conference on the FBI and Hoover; it served as the topic of his book, The Reform of FBI
Intelligence Operations, and led him to serve as the lead Congressional staffer in the mid-1970s
Church Committee investigation into the FBI. Both Elliff and Pyle worked for the Church
Committee. Years later, Pyle recalled the CIA’s generous cooperation with him during his time
on the Church Committee. Even knowing that he had leaked information about the Army, the
CIA still issued him a Top Secret Secure Compartmentalized Information clearance, one of the
highest clearances available within the government.
Pyle’s work became important because it served as the impetus for intelligence
investigations that would follow, particularly into the FBI. Pyle demonstrated, for the first time,
that the seal of impenetrability that had long pervaded intelligence agencies could, in fact, be
broken. The public reveal of Operation CONUS also led Nixon to order that the Army stop its
surveillance of public citizens. Though it took several more years before the FBI answered to
Congress in the way that the military did in 1970, the FBI shortly experienced its own leak of
information when a group of antiwar activists broke into an FBI office in the middle of the night
and took all of its files to pass along to the media.
Media, Pennsylvania
Though the Army remained the focus on Congressional debate and public scrutiny
through 1970, the attention shifted to the FBI in 1971. That year became significant for the
Bureau, as Hoover encountered an unprecedented amount of criticism. New Left activists and
the academic community called the “cultism of Hoover” into question and exposed the Bureau’s
political agenda. The impetus for this scrutiny originated in the break-in of an FBI field office
on the early morning of March 8, 1971.
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The story started small. On March 9, the New York Times published a pithy article about
a break-in:
The Federal Bureau of Investigation office at Media, near here, was raided early today
and Government property removed, according to an FBI spokesman. In an anonymous
telephone call to a Philadelphia reporter, a group calling itself the Citizens Commission
to Investigate the FBI said it had “removed all the records.”209
Days later, more details about the break-in emerged. On March 24, Betty Medsger and Ken W.
Clawson, Washington Post staff writers, began to describe the content of files taken from the
FBI’s Media office. Although the burglars had sent anonymous copies of the documents to
multiple publications, only the Washington Post had any interest in publishing stories about
them. Medsger and Clawson wrote, “copies of stolen FBI records sent to The Washington Post
described the bureau’s surveillance of campus and black activist organizations at one college as
involving the local police chief, the postmaster, letter carriers, campus security officer and a
switchboard operator.”210 The documents, written by FBI agents running operations against New
Left activists, encouraged other agents to continue interviewing political dissenters in order to
propagate the notion that “there is an FBI agent behind every mailbox.”211 The Post article
further alleged that FBI surveillance had been directed towards black student groups on
university campuses, the Black Panther Party, and leftwing professors.
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The FBI and the Department of Justice attempted to wage damage control against the
spread of documents, as the people who had raided the office continued to copy and mail the
stolen files to journalists and congressmen. The burglars identified themselves as the Citizens’
Commission to Investigate the FBI. Attorney General John Mitchell asked that newspapers not
publish the contents of the files, citing as justification of his request the notion that “disclosure of
this information could endanger the lives or cause other serious harm to persons engaged in
investigative activities on behalf of the United States.”212 The anonymous activists sent copies
of the records to Senator George McGovern (D-South Dakota) and Representative Parren J.
Mitchell (D-Maryland). Both of the congressmen turned the documents over to the FBI.213
In the coming weeks, the Department of Justice tallied its losses, concluding that the
burglars who broke into the Media office took more than 1,000 documents.214 The documents
showed a history of “regular surveillance” against certain groups. They also showed a change in
FBI policy that allowed the recruitment of student informants as young as 18 years old.215
Also emerging were details about how the burglars managed to get into an otherwise
secure FBI office. The FBI’s office in Media, Pennsylvania was known as a “resident agency,” a
smaller, regional office tied to the larger Philadelphia office. The Washington Post reported that
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“the burglars forced open an unused door by pushing aside a file cabinet that normally blocked
the door. They jimmied open the locked file cabinets and ransacked the room.”216 The FBI
began an investigation into the burglars and increased security at its resident agency offices.
As information from the files seeped into the public, the New York Times reported, “FBI
surveillance of dissenters on the political left has been far more extensive than was generally
known.”217 Equally disconcerting, the documents released by the Citizens’ Commission to
Investigate the FBI demonstrated that “the subjects of inquiries include obscure persons
marginally suspected of illegal activity,” including investigations into any students, teachers, and
scientists who had visited the Soviet Union for one month or more.218 The FBI justified such
investigations by saying it wanted to determine if the travelers had been the subjects of any
counterintelligence efforts on the part of the Soviets.
Despite pleas from Attorney General Mitchell and the FBI, the Citizens’ Commission to
Investigate the FBI promised that they would make public “lists of ‘FBI informers and
provocateurs.’”219 The burglars contacted a Philadelphia paper and provided a statement:
In a few days we will contact a first group of these previously undercover agents and
suggest they cease their repressive actions if they have not already done so. We will then
inform those individuals and organizations against whom these agents were operating.
Following that we will make the names of the first group of agents public.220
The members of the Citizens’ Commission to Investigate the FBI remained anonymous, in an
effort to avoid arrest. Indeed, the FBI was going to great lengths to uncover who had broken into
the office. An FBI memorandum to Hoover from his Associate Director Clyde Tolson, dated,
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June 2, 1971, detailed the contents of a meeting among FBI executives regarding the Media
break-in. Tolson wrote, “the importance of the MEDBURG (Break-in of the Media Resident
Agency) case was emphasized.221 The Philadelphia FBI office was given authority over the
investigation, with the warning that “SAC [Special Agent in Charge] Roy K. Moore, on special
at Philadelphia, and SAC Jamieson, in Philadelphia, are not to take any leave until the
MEDBURG case is solved.”222 The FBI began scrutinizing copy machines, trying to locate the
machine that the Citizens’ Commission had used to run copies of the FBI files it sent to
journalists and congressmen. A report by the FBI in April of 1971 reported that the FBI had
focused in on a Xerox machine, with “virtually all machines [being] checked.”223 Another report
alleged:
After the surfacing of the Xerox copies of the stolen serials, immediate contact was made
with Xerox Corporation, Rochester, New York, in order to determine the model Xerox
copier utilized. When Xerox definitely determined the Model 660 copier was the one
used to reproduce our serials, contact was established with three officials of the Xerox
Corporation.224
Despite the Bureau’s best efforts, they could not identify the burglars. The FBI publically
contended that the Citizens’ Commission’s selective release of documents “creat[ed] a distorted
and unfair picture of overall-all bureau activities.”225 Journalists noted that the trickle of
documents “created the impression—whether rightly or wrongly—that the bureau is engaged in
pervasive surveillance of the political Left, just at a time when the Government is under fire for
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alleged overzealous surveillance of political dissenters.”226 They struggled to decipher the
meaning of the articles. Not knowing anything about the Citizens’ Commission, some chose to
remain skeptical of their motives. Fred P. Graham, a reporter for the New York Times, described
the burglars as “anti-war activists, who were probably amateurs at burglary.” He even posited
that they had “deliberately put [the FBI] in a worse light than it deserves.”227 As evidence of his
contention, he elaborated on an anecdote about a professor, whom the Media documents
demonstrated was the target an FBI investigation. The Washington Post’s reporter Betty
Medsger detailed the surveillance by the FBI against a professor at an Eastern college. Medsger
alleged that the FBI surveilled the professor because of his “radical” beliefs.228 Yet, the Justice
Department, in the same day’s paper, claimed that the FBI had investigated the professor because
intelligence suggested he would soon be visited by two fugitives on the FBI’s “ten most wanted”
list. The radicals, Katherine E. Power and Susan E. Saxe, were “wanted for murder in the
slaying of a Boston policeman during a bank holdup by political radicals last September.”229 As
Graham noted, no one knew which side to believe—was the FBI justified in investigating a
professor associating with known fugitives? Or, was the FBI merely excusing its surveillance of
a professor by attempting to tie him to criminals?
The reports surfacing through the Media files painted the FBI in a light similar to that of
the Army a year before with CONUS. People worried about the FBI’s presence on college
campuses; a New York Times article alleged, “There is a new man on campus among the freaks
and fraternity men, the athletes and the esthetes, the bookish types and the bomb throwers. He is
226
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the spy.”230 The article compared the FBI to the Army, noting that the Army, bowing to public
pressure, had “cut back its civilian watching programs in the United States.”231 Unlike the
Army, the FBI had continued and nurtured its program of locating dissent on college campuses.
The attempts at student infiltration sometimes backfired. One of the Media reports alleged that a
University of Illinois student outed an FBI agent at a rally, proclaiming to the audience, “There’s
someone here I think you should meet. That man there, in the blue jacket, with the camera,
works for the FBI.”
The Citizens’ Commission, though remaining anonymous, drafted memos to accompany
their release of information, which they sent to the files’ recipients. On May 3, 1971, they wrote:
Just eight weeks ago, all of the files in the desks and files cabinets were liberated from
the Media, Pa., office of the FBI. Of these, some 30% were manuals, routine forms, and
similar procedural materials. The remainder was as follows:
40% Political surveillance and other investigation of political activity. Of the cases, 2
were right wing, 10 concerned immigrants, and over two hundred were on left or liberal
groups.
25% Bank robberies
20% Murder, rape, and interstate theft
7% Draft resistance, including refusal to submit to military induction
7% leaving the military without government permission
1% organized crime, mostly gambling.232
In a later letter, the Citizens’ Commission would clarify its intent behind the break-in and
dispersal of files. They wrote:
Our purpose is not just to correct the more gross violations of constitutional rights by the
FBI within the framework of its present goals and organization. Nor is it to attack
personally individual informers, agents, or administrators. It is instead to contribute to
the movement for fundamental constructive change in our society, for as we said in our
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initial statement, “ as long as great economic and political power remains concentrated in
the hands of small cliques not subject to democratic control and scrutiny, then repression,
intimidation, and entrapment are to be expected.”233
New Left groups immediately embraced the work of the Citizens’ Commission. The War
Resisters League, in a 1972 issue of WIN Magazine, published the first compendium of all the
political documents taken from the Media office.234 The magazine included myriad Bureau
materials, pertinent to many sorts of matters, some of which were entirely quirky. An internal
bureau memo chided those making hiring decisions, “Please, when interviewing applicants be
alert for long hairs, beards, mustaches, pear shaped heads, truck drivers, etc. We are not that
hard up yet.”235 Apparently, Hoover had a grudge against people with very specific
characteristics; a pear-shaped head was enough of an excuse not to hire someone. Hoover also
had an obsession with agents’ weight, as reflected in a memo dated January 1, 1971 which
advised that “during the months of July, October, January, and April of each year, each Special
Agent must be weighed.”236 It continued with the caveat from a Special Agent in Charge (SAC),
“I expect every Agent and male clerical employee to maintain his weight within the desirable
limits at all times.”237 Amid the more colorful memos were a host of rather routine and boring
communications relating to recruitment programs for agents and educational requirements for
new agent hires.
Aside from internal bureau matters, however, were documents that pertained to the
Bureau’s work against war protesters. One such memo, entitled “Tear Gas—Aerosol Type
233
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Dispensers,” guided agents on how to use the gas, stating “in general, Special Agents are to
follow the same rule concerning the carrying of aerosol type gas dispensers as they follow in
carrying their revolvers.”238 The memo advised that agents should only use tear gas when they
encountered physical resistance or when in high crime areas where citizens were likely to
interfere with arrest or burnish a weapon. It warned, “investigative personnel should never rely
on these devices to subdue assailants armed with a potential lethal weapon.”239
The materials also offered evidence of the Bureau’s wiretaps on protesters, including
summaries of evidence gleaned from the electronic surveillance. One memo, concerning the
Black Panther Party, relayed a string of mundane communications intercepted by the FBI’s bugs.
A log read:
During a conversation between SANDRA and RUSSELL, RUSSELL mentioned that
there was no heat in the office and that they had no money.
During a conversation between DELORES and RUSSELL, DELORES stated that her
baby was due in four months.
RUSSELL reached EILEEN and left a message for her to tell SMITTY to tell MONTAE
to be at staff meeting tonight.
A representative of Western Union called for RUSSELL advising that they had a money
order to him to pick up. 240
Many of the memos pertaining to the activists and radicals were mundane. The entirety of one
memo clarified the difference between Old Left and New Left activists.241 Occasionally,
however, the memos contained revelations, such as one that stated, “the Director has okayed
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PSI’s242 and SI’s243 age 18 to 21. We have been blocked off from this critical age group in the
past. Let us take advantage of this opportunity.” This decision, made by Hoover, came
following the dissolution of the Huston Plan. Though the Plan would have allowed the FBI to
lower its informant age from 21 to 18, Hoover decided to approve the change in age anyway. He
did so despite the Huston Plan’s demise. One memo also specified Bureau protocol upon
learning of a New Left demonstration, stating:
When from reviewing underground newspapers, calls from outsiders, complaints or
informants we know of a demonstration gathering, educational, or similar event planned
by a New Left group, it should be given to SA DAVENPORT who will coordinate this
calendar. He will log it with #4 secretary. This will enable us to project ahead what
manpower needs we will have and enable us to answer all kinds of queries about the date
we know a particular event is scheduled.244 In anticipation of possible demonstrations,
the Bureau maintained a list of colleges and the number of enrollees within the
Philadelphia area as well as instructions for resident agencies supplying the Philadelphia
offices with information regarding their informants.245
Subsequently, the Bureau put together a Philadelphia Red Squad to report to the Bureau on antiwar demonstrations in the area. This squad, including an civil disobedience team, was ironically
created to monitor such organizations as a “Quaker Action Group.” In 1969, Quakers gathered
at the Pentagon to protest the Vietnam War. They read the names of dead of soldiers and handed
out flyers stating, “We Mourn Vietnam War Dead”; “Fight War, Fight Hunger,” and “End the
War and Rebuild Our Cities.”246 FBI agents penned a detailed description of the peaceful
demonstration by Quakers.
organizations with leftist or anarchistic connotations [and includes] such matters as SDS, STAG,
underground newspapers, communes, commune investigations, the Resistance.”
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As the documents discussing Quakers revealed, peaceful activism was no protection
against surveillance by the FBI. There were files on individuals who held viewpoints counter to
that of the federal government. One such file on a student named Mary Jane Lawhon read,
“Subject is believed attending the University of California at Berkeley, and is known to be an
inveterate Marxist revolutionist, and a type of person that should be watched as she will probably
be very active in revolutionary activities.”247 The agent investigating Lawhorn realized that she
was not a threat, writing:
San Francisco indices reflect Subject attended a meeting of the Venceremos Brigade on
7/20/70…during this meeting, there was no discussion of violence or revolution. San
Francisco source personally conversed with Subject and received no indication that she
was anything other than the average liberal minded student that is common in the
Berkeley area.248
Another memo provided detailed information about Daniel Bennett, a Professor of Philosophy at
Swarthmore College. The memo described his wife and children, the family’s house, and the
make and model of Bennett’s car. Bennett incited the attention of the FBI for inviting
“controversial speakers” to Swarthmore.249 The FBI recruited the Chief Switchboard Operator at
Swarthmore College to serve as an informant on Bennett. Though she had “only limited contact
with Bennett,” she told the FBI that the professor was “generally regarded as a ‘radical’ and
promised to “confidentially furnish pertinent information regarding any long distance telephone
calls made or received by Bennett.”250 The Chief of the Swarthmore Police Department also
provided information to the FBI about the Bennetts, stating that they hosted a ‘rock festival’ in
their backyard for students, that they associated with “hippie types,” and that they stored printing
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equipment in their garage, upon which he suspected they published a brochure in support of the
Black Panther Party.251
Some of the documents addressed counterintelligence concerns of the Bureau, revealing
that the Bureau interviewed American citizens who visited the Soviet Union for a month or
more. Bureau leadership explained, “the interviewing agents should discreetly ascertain if any
attempts have been made by the Soviet Intelligence Services to recruit the individual for
intelligence purposes either in the USSR or after his return to the United States.”252
Finally, the documents evinced widespread surveillance by the FBI against the civil
rights movement, the Black Left, and black citizens living in places prone to riots. One memo
revealed coverage of Martin Luther King, Jr., though this information would pale in comparison
to that released by the FBI to the Church Committee in 1975. The Media document read,
“Martin Luther King Jr. will address the 50th Anniversary banquet to be held at the Bellevue
Stratford Hotel in Philadelphia.”253 Other memos documented the business of the Black Panther
Party, demanding that FBI field offices provide the following information on a weekly basis:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

various organizations planning to participate
mode of travel and identities of persons planning to attend
identities of organizers and persons who are to head work shops [sic]
identities of the leading speakers at the convention
agenda of the convention
plans for violence or disruptive demonstrations
plans to carry weapons or explosive devices
convention security precautions to be observed
literature regarding he convention
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10.

details concerning available housing254

Informants reported on meetings and bank accounts such organizations as the National Black
Economic Development Conference and Black/United Liberation Front.255 Other reports
instructed Special Agents to develop informants in ghetto areas. One memo, addressed to “All
Headquarters Agents,” stated:
It is essential that this office develop a large number of additional racial informants at this
time and that we continue to add and develop racial informants and exploit their potential
during the months ahead…whether or not a riot does occur, the Bureau holds us
responsible to keep the Bureau, the Department and the White House advised in advance
of each demonstration.256
The memo further encouraged agents to develop both white and black informants in the ghetto
neighborhoods in order to collect information on extremist organizations operating in the area, as
well as information related to gangs. Bookstores were suspect until proven otherwise; a memo
instructed agents to “visit Afro-American type bookstores for the purpose of determining if
militant extremist literature is available therein, and if so to identify the owners, operators, and
clientele of such stores.”257 The memos show the Bureau’s paranoia that black extremists would
go into poorer neighborhoods and develop a following among its inhabitants, inciting race riots.
Pages of documents analyzed “incidents” involving violence between blacks and local police.
Detailed information appeared in a training bulletin for police officers concerning the events
leading to violence. Although the Bureau did not condone the police officers’ actions, a memo
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noted that the information was relevant to Bureau agents engaged in training local police on riot
control. Finally, the Bureau’s fear of college students and civil rights coalesced in a series of
memos ordering surveillance of black student groups on university campuses. One such memo,
written by Hoover, proclaimed:
Increased campus disorders involving black students pose a definite threat to the Nation’s
stability and security and indicate a need for increase in both quality and quantity of
intelligence information on Black Student Unions (BSU) and similar groups which are
targets for influence and control by violence-prone Black Panther Party (BPP) and other
extremists. The distribution of the BPP and other black extremists groups on campuses
clearly indicate that campuses are targets of extremists…We must target informants and
sources to develop information regarding these groups on a continuing basis to fulfill our
responsibilities and to develop such coverage where non exists.258
The Philadelphia Office of the FBI proceeded to list all the Black Student Unions currently under
surveillance; the list included thirteen institutions within the city. Memos directed to Hoover
listed attendees at Black Student Congress meetings, which the Bureau found “related to the new
Civil Rights Laws of interest to the students. No indications of violence or civil disturbances
proposed by the students.”259 The agents, in their memos, clearly indicated that informants did
not see the Black Student Union groups as violent; they served no threat of militant-type activity.
One memo described an arts and crafts festival hosted by a BSU featuring products made by
grade school-aged black children. The information bore not an ounce of intelligence utility.
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For many years, the story of the Media break-in focused solely on the information
uncovered by the Citizens’ Commission to Investigate the FBI.260 The burglars were never
259
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This information would later become important during a Senate investigation, known as the
Church Committee, in 1975. Senators conducted thorough investigations of FBI operations
uncovered by the Media documents, including COINTELPRO, or “Counterintelligence
Program.” Many of Hoover’s worst indiscretions were revealed before the Church Committee.
The historiography surrounding COINTELPRO is voluminous. Nelson Blackstock’s and Cathy
Perkus’s COINTELPRO: The FBI’s Secret War on Political Freedom argues that the FBI
effectively harassed left-wing political groups and carried out unlawful covert actions similar to
Watergate years before Nixon’s impeachment. In the introduction, Noam Chomsky traces the
origin of COINTELPRO back to the FBI’s earlier Palmer Raids as well as the Alien and
Seditions Act and the explosion of a bomb in Chicago’s Haymarket Square in 1886. See Nelson
Blackstock and Cathy Perkus, COINTELPRO: The FBI’s Secret War On Political Freedom
(New York, Monad Press, 1975). In support of Perkus’s thesis, Kenneth O’Reilly’s Hoover and
the Un-Americans: The FBI, HUAC, and the Red Menace claims the FBI’s impact on Cold War
political attitudes, through such means as propaganda, was “more [important] than the efforts of
any other anticommunist group.” See Kenneth O’Reilly, Hoover and the UnAmericans: The FBI,
HUAC, and the Red Menace, Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1983. O’Reilly’s
tendency to chastise “pseudo” liberals who did not effectively argue for protection of alleged
communists’ rights emerges as a central theme in William W. Keller’s The Liberals and J. Edgar
Hoover. Keller argues that the liberals turned over power, during the Second Red Scare, to
Hoover, thinking he was a better alternative to McCarthy. Rather than create a well-regulated
investigative agency, the Bureau soon exceeded the limits of liberals’ comfort. Though liberals
initially supported the FBI’s investigation of the Ku Klux Klan, they became increasingly uneasy
with the Bureau when it began spying on King. Keller posits that liberals, in creating the FBI,
originally envisioned a bureau of domestic intelligence. Despite the Bureau’s distaste for all
forms of radicalism, either left or right, O’Reilly argues that the agency digressed into a political
police unit and later into an independent security state within a state. Thus, the FBI became the
liberals’ worst nightmare, largely thanks to their earlier support of Hoover. Additionally, Keller
notes the Bureau’s aversion all forms of radicalism, whether the radicalism stemmed from white
hate groups or left-wing subversives. See William W. Keller, The Liberals and J. Edgar Hoover
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).
From the 1950s to the early 1970s, the FBI used covert operations against widely divergent
voices such as Ku Klux Klan, the Students for a Democratic Society, and Martin Luther King, Jr.
Sociologist David Cunningham’s There’s Something Happening Here: The New Left, The Klan,
and FBI Counterintelligence asks why the Bureau’s COINTELPRO-related activities extended
to such a wide array of disparate political groups and finds that the FBI’s repression of such
groups can only be understood within the organizational context of the Bureau. Cunningham
maintains that local FBI field offices routinely reported to FBI Headquarters any issues related to
subversive groups within their jurisdiction; each jurisdiction faced different subversive groups.
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caught, and the FBI closed the case in 1976, once the statute of limitations expired.261 In 2014,
the burglars went public in a book written by Washington Post journalist Betty Medsger, who
published many of their Media documents in 1971. The group of eight, comprised of anti-war
activists, worried that the FBI’s power had grown too large. Led by William Davidon, a physics
professor at Haverford College, the group believed, and wanted to prove to the general public,
that the FBI was infringing upon people’s constitutional rights, particularly their right to dissent
and express free speech.262 The Citizens’ Commission would find that there were “two FBIs—
the public FBI Americans revered as their protector from crime, arbiter of values, and defender
of citizens’ liberties, and the secret FBI.”263 Regarding the “secret” FBI, Medsger wrote:
This FBI, known until the Media burglary only to people inside the bureau, usurped
citizens’ liberties, treated black citizens as if they were a danger to society, and used
deception, disinformation, and violence as tools to harass, damage, and—most
important—silence people whose political opinions the director opposed.264
The Citizens’ Commission’s act of civil disobedience no doubt served as an important act of
resistance against the overreach of the intelligence community and specifically Hoover.
Medsger proclaimed the importance of the activists’ burglary, writing, “this historic act of
resistance—perhaps the most powerful single act of nonviolent resistance in American history—
ignited the first public debate on the proper role of intelligence agencies in a democratic
In turn, headquarters amalgamated the local reports and issued master priority lists to all fifty-six
FBI field offices. Thus, the strange consolidation of activities against disparate groups can be
understood as a collective representation of what individual field offices experienced; not all
offices experienced the same threats. See David Cunningham, There’s Something Happening
Here: The New Left, The Klan, and FBI Counterintelligence (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 2004).
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society.”265 Medsger, however, had the benefit of history and forty years’ worth of insight
regarding the importance of the burglars’ act. In 1971, the meaning behind the disclosure of FBI
files was more diffuse. Because Americans had never before had such solid confirmation of the
FBI’s intelligence gathering capabilities, this was the first time that they came face to face with
FBI documents, and not merely FBI critics, confirming the reach of FBI operations. Historian
Richard Gid Powers wrote of the significance of the break-in, stating:
Hoover’s power to conduct secret operations…depended on the absolute freedom he had
won from any inquiry into the internal operations of the Bureau…except for a remarkably
few breaches of security…Hoover had been able to pick and choose what the public
would learn about the Bureau. He had never suffered the indignity of having an outside,
unsympathetic investigator look into what he had been doing, what the Bureau had
become, and what it looked like from the inside…On the night of March 8, 1971, that
changed forever.266
Though the Media break-in is significant because of the burglary and because of the
attention it brought to the Bureau’s operations, its significance is somewhat misunderstood. In
1971, Elliff would write about the Media break-in that “disclosures like the Media documents
and the Earth Day report267 are distorted because they enter an analytical vacuum.”268 All of a
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sudden, people went from knowing very little about the Bureau, aside from the information
dispersed through the FBI’s public affairs department, to knowing intimate details about the
FBI’s investigations, based upon documents procured and distributed by the Citizens’
Commission. Though the spotlight shifted to Hoover and his “thirst” for power, Elliff saliently
noted in the months following the Media break-in that the operations run by the FBI highlighted
another problem—namely, the relationship between the presidency and the Bureau. He wrote,
“Bureau officials see another, perhaps more fundamental, issue emerging today. The FBI is an
intelligence arm of the President; and the foundation for the Bureau’s domestic intelligence role
rests primarily on a conception of inherent Executive power.”269 Though it was easy to point
fingers at Hoover, and indeed, he certainly served as the point man approving these decisions,
some saw the Media documents as indicative of a larger problem. Even in 1971, Elliff intimated
that the Nixon administration (and, logically, previous administrations like that of Lyndon B.
Johnson) had authorized such operations in the first place. The Huston Plan and subsequent
reveals of FBI operations in the years to follow would certainly support Elliff’s contention.
Thus, the release of FBI files from the Media office represented not just the overreach of the
Bureau into constitutionally protected free speech but also the attempts by a President to control
and silence dissent through the use of intelligence apparatuses.
When the Citizens’ Commission broke into the FBI Media office, the event became a
watershed moment in the Bureau’s history. Throughout Hoover’s tenure as director, he had
Congress create a Domestic Intelligence Review Board to supervise the activities of intelligence
agencies. Though his request would be denied, his suspicion towards the Bureau would continue
to grow throughout the country as more allegations towards Hoover and the FBI became known.
See “Congressional Record—Senate, April 14, 1971, “FBI Surveillance,” Archives and Special
Collections Library, Muskie Archive.
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carefully overseen the Bureau’s public relations, only authorizing the release of information that
made the FBI look good. The Media break-in represented a turning point, as the burglars
managed to procure and place classified information into the Washington Post. The public’s
outrage when confronted with the documents worried Hoover. Americans no longer provided
carte blanche approval for the Bureau’s investigations. The continued threat from the New Left
and Nixon’s immense hatred of the radicals placed Hoover in a tough position. As he carried on
his fight against radicalism, he now faced the judgment of his fellow citizens.
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CHAPTER III
THE FBI UNDER SCRUTINY

After news of the Media break-in by the Citizen’s Commission to Investigate the FBI
became public, the Bureau responded in kind. On April 23, 1971, the Bureau replied with a
“Fact Sheet on the FBI” where it responded to allegations arising from the leaked files, stating,
“It appears that through a careful choice of the bits and pieces of documents released, the
Citizens Commission is contriving to create the impression that the FBI is exceeding the bounds
of its constituted authority.”270 Though the Bureau admitted “no agency should be immune to
criticism,” it alleged the Media allegations went “beyond that which is factual and constructive
and erupt into emotional outbursts which ignore reason.”271 That the Bureau would even
respond to such charges, however, signaled that times had changed. The Bureau worried about
having to shape public opinion in the face of so much criticism, admitting, “some critics are even
questioning the need for such an agency.”272 The FBI refuted allegations that it conducted
surveillance of private citizens, that it investigated members of academe based upon their
political beliefs, and more broadly, that it had become an American Gestapo.273
Despite the Bureau’s best efforts, it was too late to halt the wave of scrutiny. Though the
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Media break-in signaled the newly-realized vulnerability of the Bureau to peace activists and
FBI critics, the fruits of Media would only ripen under the careful scrutiny of a group of scholars
and congressmen, who, upon seeing the evidence of indiscretion carried out by the Bureau in the
Media documents, began to question the legal authority and activities of the agency. The work
of these critical academics and journalists bypassed the public spectacle surrounding the release
of Media documents and paved the way for later Congressional hearings about the FBI in the
mid-1970s. The path to those Congressional hearings, however, was arduous and took years to
develop.
Unlike the frenzy surrounding the release of the Media documents, Congress and scholars
sought to examine the origins and legal basis for FBI authority, interviewing people at the
Department of Justice and searching for legal precedent. They wanted to do more than merely
lambast Hoover for his insatiable control; these findings by Congress and scholars showed that
permission for FBI actions far exceeded Hoover’s public authority, and pointed directly to the
Attorney General and the President.
One such scholar, John Elliff, a young professor at Brandeis University, spent much of
1970 and 1971 researching and writing about the Bureau.274 His work examined the basis for
legal actions of the Bureau and assessed blame on the Department of Justice and the President,
finding them equally, if not more, responsible for the Bureau’s actions by their explicit approval
of the scope of its operations. Elliff eventually joined his research with that of other researchers
at the end of 1971 when Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School for Public Affairs
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hosted the first-ever academic conference examining the FBI. Elliff took what he learned during
his year of research and writing and continued to study the Bureau. In 1975, he took nearly half
a decade of research and become the leading staff member on Congress’s Church Committee
investigation of the FBI. The Media break-ins, and the subsequent scrutiny that followed in
1971, directly influenced the attitude of the Church Committee later that decade. The Princeton
conference, attended by political scientists, lawyers, historians, journalists, and former
government employees, set the tone for a decade’s worth of examination of the Bureau. Many of
the findings stemming from that conference informed the Congressional reformers who would,
in a few short years, oversee change at the Bureau.
Back in 1971, however, Elliff was still attempting to answer the simple question: Where
had the Bureau obtained the legal authority to carry out the actions described in the Media
documents? To gain a better understanding of the FBI, Elliff began by interviewing officials of
the Justice Department. The documents released from the Citizen’s Commission had indeed
angered the public and made them feel like Hoover had far exceeded the bounds of his
constitutional limits. And yet, few people truly understood the legal authority of the Bureau;
they could not answer with certainty exactly how the Bureau had exceeded legal limits. To
better understand how the Bureau justified its actions, Elliff interviewed Department of Justice
officials and visited the presidential archive of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, discovering
surprisingly that the Bureau’s legal authority had precedents in World War II presidential
directives.
Also central to Elliff’s findings was the discovery of a competing intelligence analysis
unit run by the Department of Justice. One of the first distinctions that Elliff made was the
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intersection of the FBI’s Domestic Intelligence Division, headed by William Sullivan, and the
Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Interdivisional Intelligence and Information Unit Civil
Disturbance Group (IDIU). The DOJ’s unit was overseen by then Deputy Attorney General
Richard Kliendienst, although Elliff discovered that many of DOJ’s units, including the
Criminal, Internal Security, Civil Rights Divisions, and Community Relations Service also
participated.275 The intelligence task unit originated in 1969 when the Justice Department
created a “Panther Task Force” to deal with the Black Panther Party. This task force quickly
expanded to include investigations into “all radicals.”276 Elliff surmised at the time that both the
Black Panther Party and the Weather Underground may have been surveilled under the DOJ task
force. That DOJ had set up its own intelligence division to investigate radicals was significant; it
allowed the department to do the work of the FBI, possibly running its own intelligence
surveillance operations against radicals that would potentially lead to prosecution. Elliff
wondered about the FBI’s role within the investigations.
In looking at the FBI’s legal authority, Elliff discovered that its power to investigate
dissent stemmed from very old sources. He found that the Bureau was operating under old
executive authorities dating back to World War II; in 1936 and 1939, President Roosevelt gave
the FBI informal, and later, formal authority to collect information related to subversive
activities.277 On September 6, 1939, Hoover issued a memorandum to all law enforcement
officials, proffering an order issued by President Roosevelt, which read:
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I request all police officers, sheriffs, and all other law enforcement officers in the United
States promptly to turn over to the nearest representative of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation any information obtained by them related to espionage, counterespionage,
sabotage, subversive activities and violations of the neutrality laws.278
In authorizing the FBI to collect information about subversive activities, President Roosevelt laid
the foundation for the Bureau to investigate communists during the Cold War and much later,
during years of Vietnam War protests, any “radicals” deemed subversive. That a huge amount of
the FBI’s legal authority stemmed from World War II executive authority was surprising to
Elliff. So much had changed in the years since Roosevelt’s presidency, and yet, the Bureau
retained authority from its 1930s work on Nazi sabotage.
Later presidents yielded additional authority to the FBI by authorizing the Bureau to
gather intelligence related to civil disorders. President Johnson encouraged Hoover and the FBI
authority to analyze patterns of crime related to urban riots in 1967.279 When the 1967 Kerner
Commission expressed concern that the FBI did not have authority to investigate the riots,
Johnson responded, “the FBI was acting under his ‘standing instructions,’ apparently issued in
1964 when the FBI investigated the Harlem riots and prepared a report on that summer’s
disorders for the White House.”280 Interestingly, Johnson also justified FBI action based upon
military law; federal law allowed the President discretionary power to use armed forces to
FBI to gather information for use by the Attorney General in prosecuting “subversive” groups.
The FBI also had authority to investigate violations of federal law related to the antiriot act.
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protect states against domestic violence in certain circumstances. Elliff found that under such
reasoning and legal authority, “FBI investigations could be justified as necessary to assist the
President in exercising his discretion.”281
Urban riots during Johnson’s term as president not only enhanced the Bureau’s authority
but also supplemented the Department of Justice’s intelligence gathering capabilities. Elliff
wrote, “the Kerner Commission Report urged every police department to establish an
intelligence unit staffed with full-time personnel.” After the police departments assembled
intelligence on possible violent outbreaks, “data from cities across the country was [sic] being
fed into a computer to help determine what federal response, if any, was required to cope with
civil disorders.”282
Even during the 1960s, an issue emerged regarding the role of FBI investigations. Back
then, it appeared that there were two Bureaus—one which ran criminal investigations and one
which ran intelligence. Elliff explained that “experts” on the FBI had considered splitting the
Bureau into two entities, writing, “this would ease the problem of the FBI agent skilled at
catching kidnappers (operations) but wholly untrained to make political distinctions between a
revolutionary terrorist and a fuzzy peace dissenter (intelligence).”283 Even that characterization
of the Bureau as two working units, however, was problematic. Elliff noted that, in theory, the
Bureau should not be dealing with the political issues related to intelligence gathering (i.e.,
monitoring groups of people based upon their political beliefs), and should instead leave the
political business to the Department of Justice. Yet, what should have worked in theory simply
was not working in practice. Elliff wrote:
281
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Perhaps the problem is that the Divisions [of DOJ] are staffed by lawyers and that the
Internal Security Division [of FBI], which logically should be the source of guidance and
evaluation for intelligence operations, is moribund. In organizational terms, what may be
developing is a conflict between the FBI’s Domestic Intelligence Division and the nonFBI intelligence evaluation and analysis agencies that are tied to the Department’s
executives. In short, Hoover listens to Sullivan; Kliendienst [then Attorney General]
listens to [Justice Department official Jim] Devine.284
In other words, both the FBI and the Justice Department were running their own separate
intelligence gathering operations, and worse, the FBI was not carrying anything close to its share
of the load. Althought the FBI officially reported to the Attorney General, the hierarchy simply
failed to work. Even in 1971, Elliff presciently worried about the politicization of intelligence
by the Department of Justice, noting that under previous Attorneys General, removing
intelligence-gathering authority from Hoover in the 1920s had been a good thing. He surmised,
however, that “under Mitchell and Kliendienst it may be a bad thing, since intelligence can be
more easily used by Department executives for their own political aims.”285 Elliff stressed,
above all, a need to produce standards for FBI intelligence operations and analysis. He wrote,
“there is no reason to let the Justice Department become a domestic CIA, free from public and
legislative scrutiny or immune from judicial review.”286 This desire to regulate the FBI’s
intelligence operations through guidelines served as a central theme for Bureau over the next
decade. Time and again, Elliff, the Church Committee, Congress, and new Attorneys General
would revisit exactly how to prescribe through law what the Bureau could and could not do.
After assessing the executive authority allowing the Bureau to conduct intelligence, Elliff
approached attorneys in the Department of Justice to inquire about their understanding of the
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Bureau. He spoke with Kevin Maroney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Internal
Security Division, in July of 1971. Maroney explained the origins of the IDIU, DOJ’s
intelligence gathering apparatus. Maroney explained that the IDIU was originally created to
address “urban ghetto riots.”287 Eventually, the IDIU expanded to also include intelligence
functions related to political demonstrations and terrorist activities, specifically bombings.288
Maroney confimed that DOJ was primarily interested in political demonstrations or acts of
violence fueled by leftist ideology. In addition to collecting their own information, the IDIU also
received reports from the FBI, though Maroney complained about the FBI’s reluctance to collect
some forms of intelligence. He explained to Elliff that the Bureau acted slowly when asked to
investigate persons on university campuses, such as students or professors. Maroney noted,
“usually, he could pick up the phone and ask to have an Agent interview or check out someone.
But if the subject was a student or faculty member, or involved the campus, he would have to
make the request by written memorandum.”289 The FBI’s reticence to investigate students tested
the Department of Justice’s patience. Maroney summarized the issue, stating, “the FBI is torn
between its reluctance to be criticized, and pressure to get intelligence.”290 Despite such
pressure, it failed to complete its intelligence gathering tasks to the satisfaction of Justice. The
Justice Department, however, refused to sit around and wait.
Elliff also interviewed Nathaniel Kossack, formerly Deputy Assistant Attorney General
for the Criminal Justice Division. Kossack justified the origins of the IDIU, stating that the
Justice Department “did not rely on the FBI for intelligence analysis because Bureau channels
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were too slow.”291 During the time of the Johnson administration, Kossack explained that
attorneys in the Justice Department believed civil disorders related to race problems would be
short lived; they never anticipated that the problems would continue for as long as they did. No
one ever guessed that the program would continue under subsequent presidents. Kossack
believed that the “most important element” of the Justice Department’s intelligence scheme was
its ability to place an Assistant U.S. Attorney in each U.S. Attorney’s Office. Chief to that
Assistant Attorney General’s role was a directive to provide intelligence to the IDIU. Kossack
explained that none of this intelligence gathering ever filtered through the Bureau.292 Kossack
apparently justified the need for the Department’s intelligence gathering to Elliff. Elliff’s notes
include an explanation:
Kossack believed intelligence was absolutely necessary to cope with demonstrations
without over or under-reacting. Before the Inauguration protest, they had complete
intelligence as to who would be where. Before the Poor People’s Campaign, they had
CRS intelligence which was often obtained openly.293
Kossack admitted that the successful work of the IDIU “laid the foundation for [Attorney
General] Ramsey Clark’s instructions to the FBI to amp up its intelligence gathering. He, like
Maroney, explained that the FBI was “always reluctant, careful, cautious about its intelligence
memoranda and reports. It wanted to avoid saying things that would be embarrassing.”294 It
would take an Attorney General demanding that the FBI increase its intelligence-gathering
capabilities for it to actually do so. Though Hoover contended that the Department of Justice
(DOJ) approved all of the Bureau’s intelligence gathering capabilities, the reality was more
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complicated.295 Not only did Justice approve such actions as wiretapping by the FBI, but,
according to Kossack, it demanded that the FBI carry out such intelligence gathering in the first
place. His assertion made the Bureau sound like a victim of DOJ’s investigatory whims. And
yet, he also acknowledged that the Bureau’s domestic intelligence gathering, carried out by the
Domestic Intelligence Division under Sullivan, had less supervision, “largely because the FBI’s
activity is not tied to prosecutive decisions by the lawyers.”296
Elliff’s interviews with attorneys at the Department of Justice served as evidence of the
Bureau’s frayed and tense relationship with the office. DOJ had the ability not merely to
approve but to demand that the FBI increase its intelligence gathering capabilities. Such insight
into the workings of DOJ and the FBI reflects a more complicated relationship between the two
entities than the Media documents initially revealed. Hoover and the FBI bore the brunt of
criticism for the Media documents, and indeed, the Bureau was carrying out highly controversial
acts, investigating people without reasonable suspicion and for constitutionally-protected
reasons. Yet, the interviews with Kossack and Maroney illuminated a different dimension of the
problem, namely that the Department of Justice was so hungry for intelligence on political
dissenters that it set up its own intelligence-gathering unit. When DOJ’s intelligence gathering
unit proved successful, DOJ forced the Bureau to expand the work of the Domestic Intelligence
Division under Sullivan. Whatever Hoover’s feelings might have been towards the issue of
intelligence collection, particularly related to political activists, he found himself in a difficult
position with a Department of Justice eager to receive intelligence and an Internal Security
Division head, Sullivan, equally eager to provide it.
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Congress Looks at the FBI
Perhaps one of the more damaging things the Bureau did to itself was to send agents to
monitor an Earth Day Rally attended by Senator Edmund Muskie (D-Maine). In April of 1971,
Muskie issued a press release about the Bureau’s surveillance at the April 1970 gathering. He
asked, “If anti-pollution rallies are a subject of intelligence concern, is anything immune? Is
there any citizen involved in politics who is not a potential subject for an FBI dossier?”297 When
Muskie discovered that the FBI had written a report about his participation in the rally, he was
outraged. He penned a letter to Nixon stating, “I have recently read an FBI intelligence report
written by an agent assigned to cover the Earth Day Rally in Washington last year. Among those
whose political actions were reported…was myself.”298
The report also detailed activities of the Students for a Democratic Society and the
Progressive Labor Party. It portrayed them as dangerous organizations worthy of government
surveillance; Muskie was furious with the gross mischaracterization. The FBI dispersed its
report to other intelligence agencies and police departments across the country, urging them to
beware of environmental radicals.299 Muskie refused to believe that the Bureau had any
legitimate reason for monitoring the event. He publically questioned the Bureau’s intent:
What possible legitimate use could this report serve? Why does the FBI need to know
who attended and what was said at Earth Day rallies across the nation? Even if our
intelligence agencies believed that Earth Day might turn into a threat to our national
security or a scene of violence requiring Federal troops, that would not justify a report on
the rallies afterwards—when it was clear that no threat to our government did occur.300
Muskie was so angered by the FBI’s actions that he called for the creation of a Congressional
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entity, the Domestic Intelligence Review Board, to investigate the FBI. He justified its creation,
explaining:
I believe our government has reached a critical juncture in its intelligence activities.
There is no justification for any part of the Federal intelligence community surreptitiously
observing and reporting on legitimate political events which do not affect our national
security or which do not involve a potential crime.301
Muskie alleged that the report that detailed his own involvement at the rally was merely one of
forty to sixty FBI reports on Earth Day rallies.302 Such extensive surveillance signaled to him
that the FBI had far overreached its constitutional limits, leading him to ask, “if there was
widespread surveillance over Earth Day last year, is there any political activity in the country
which the FBI doesn’t consider a legitimate subject for watching?”303
Because there was no violence at the Earth Day Rally, or even a threat of violence,
Muskie argued that the FBI should not have had any presence there. He alleged that until
Congress carried out a full investigation of the intelligence community, there was no telling the
extent to which the FBI and other intelligence agencies had spied on political activists. He
wrote, “All of us will live with the uneasiness that our actions and words, plus unsubstantiated or
inaccurate reports about our lives and characters, are filling a secret file in Washington. That
uneasiness is intolerable in a free society.”304 He compared the United States to a totalitarian
government, arguing that surveillance of such magnitude was the work of dictators, not
democracy. He voiced his concerns about the “chilling” of free speech. Most of all, he worried
about the fear prevalent among those with political beliefs antithetical to the current
administration.
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Just a few months later, Senator Ervin urged a ban on the use of federal funds to support
the Subversive Activities Control Board, a group established by an act of Congress in the 1950s
to detect Communists. When Ervin proposed eliminating the board, his action signaled a new
era for the government—a shift away from its obsession with Communists to a growing unease
surrounding the implications of labeling an American citizen a “subversive.” Fresh from
hearings on the Army’s CONUS program, Ervin believed that the Subversive Activities Control
Board allowed for persecution of citizens with unfavorable political beliefs. He wrote, “it does
not take much to realize that this Army view of ‘civil disturbance subversives’ inevitably might
include every single citizen in the United States who expressed a view on these great issues of
our time so long as that view differed from what the Army thought was the proper “American”
position.”305 He listed egregious examples of people who had been mistakenly labeled
subversives, stating:
In one city, it meant every person who had a peace symbol on his car. In another, every
black person seen walking on the highway in a suspicious manner. It included those who
signed petitions, those who gave speeches, those who listened to speeches, those filed
lawsuits, those who bought or merely read certain newspapers. Only in the rarest case
was there some indication—but never proof—that the person had engaged in some
violent or otherwise illegal act. In the greatest majority of cases these citizens were only
exercising their constitutionally guaranteed right of free speech. Their only sin—but it
was sin enough—was to disagree with the Administration.
Who were these people? There were not only the names we have come to learn from
television and the newspapers. They included church groups, ministers, college
professors, students, labor unions, the Quakers, the Unitarians, Methodists, Jews, the
NAACP, the Urban League, the John Birch Society, movie stars, poets, philosophers,
Senators, Congressmen, mayors, city councilmen, human rights commissions, reporters,
housewives, high school students, taxi drivers.
And, of course, it included the ordinary American citizen, whose only crime was to
express his views in public, and sometimes even in private, on these great public issues
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that divide our country.306
Ervin’s calls to limit the scope of the intelligence community resonated within Congress. Soon,
other members began to call for an investigation of the intelligence community and the FBI.
Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-Wisconsin), the founder of Earth Day and a cosponsor of the 1970
rally, also introduced legislation to allow a special commission to investigate the FBI, CIA, and
Army. Nelson questioned the Justice Department’s reading of FDR’s executive authorization
allowing the FBI to combat subversives.307 In his mind, the Army’s CONUS and the FBI’s Earth
Day Rally surveillance showed that Justice had widely interpreted wartime legislation beyond its
original intent. He wrote:
To my mind the Justice Department’s reading of President Roosevelt’s 1940
memorandum to his Attorney General is fallacious. There is no justification for extensive
government snooping into domestic political activities based on this 1940 order. In the
first paragraph of his order, President Roosevelt recognized the danger of widespread
government spying when he agreed with the Supreme Court that it was ‘also right in its
opinion that under ordinary and normal circumstances wire-tapping by government
agents should not be carried on for the excellent reason that it is almost bound to lead to
abuse of civil rights.308
Nelson believed Roosevelt’s wartime approach to national security applied only to that time. He
did not believe the government should be using wartime legislation thirty years later to authorize
Bureau actions.
The Congressional scrutiny towards the Bureau marked a turning point in the FBI’s
popularity. Although none of the proposed Congressional investigations into the Bureau would
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materialize at the time, the multiple calls for such scrutiny were a turning point. Indeed,
members of Congress were turning on the Bureau and calling upon others in Congress to do the
same. It was one thing to have liberal activists such as those involved in the break-in of the
Media office question what the Bureau was doing; it was another thing entirely to have Congress
scrutinizing and threatening limits to the Bureau’s power. That Hoover might finally answer to
Congress about his actions seemed inevitable.
The Justice Department
In the midst of the investigation into the Army’s CONUS operation, Senator Ervin also
requested from Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian a description of the Justice
Department’s intelligence gathering operations. In response, Mardian turned over past letters
exchanged between DOJ staff and the Attorney General. The collections of letters began with
correspondence from John Doar,309 one of the Justice Department’s great civil rights attorneys,
and Attorney General Ramsey Clark. In his letter to Clarke, Doar explained, “You asked me to
determine the available facilities for keeping abreast of information we receive about
organizations and individuals who may or may not be a force to be taken into account in
evaluating the causes of civil disorders in urban areas.”310 Doar summarized the problem facing
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the Department of Justice, explaining, “no one has a broad, complete knowledge of all the groups
and individuals that are active in the urban areas.”311
Protests and alliances between activists could harm urban areas and lead to ghetto riots.
Doar believed that the DOJ needed a single intelligence unit to analyze the FBI’s intelligence
regarding activist groups, since the Bureau was incapable of providing the analysis that DOJ
wanted. Doar supported the creation of such a unit within the DOJ, and in his letter he described
precisely how the unit might function. He proposed that the intelligence unit, created in the
Justice Department, would better analyze intelligence than the FBI. Upon creation, the unit
became familiar with radical literature, leading to a catalogue of all the organizations. Written
on myriad index cards, the intelligence unit included information pertaining to a group’s
“finances, its organizational structure, its program, its ideology, and its relations with other
groups.” 312 Interestingly, Doar saw the supervisor’s role in overseeing this index as a position
that would allow for “imagination and initiative” in developing the source material on
organizations functioning in urban areas.313 Doar’s passion for civil rights is apparent in his
recommendations to Attorney General Clark, with this description of a supervisor. He wrote:
He must also like and respect Negroes as individuals, be in tune with them and have a
feeling of sympathy and understanding for their situation. Beyond all this, he had to be
dedicated to law enforcement and believe that unlawful activities of individuals, groups,
or organizations, who organize, instigate or participate actively during a riot will do
serious damage to the chance for progress by Negro Americans.314
Doar was the “top civil rights attorney” at the Justice Department. His involvement in creating
this intelligence unit provides an interesting supplement to his historical legacy, as he helped to
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collect intelligence on activists that the FBI could not assemble. When he died in 2014,
obituaries praised his “extensive work fighting discrimination and working for racial equality
during the 1960s and 70s” and his stature as a “figure of trust for black students and leaders”
during the 1960s.315 Doar was heroic in his involvement with the Civil Rights movement. In
1962, he escorted James Meredith, the first African American to attend the University of
Mississippi, to his classes. He protected Meredith amid a riot that resulted in the deaths of three
people. He also served as the lead prosecutor in the murders of James Chaney, Michael
Schwerner, and Andrew Goodman. His work resulted in a guilty verdict for white defendants,
handed down from an all-white jury.316 During his career, he both furthered civil rights and set
up an intelligence unit within the DOJ to monitor political activists. These apparently
contradictory priorities illustrate the difficulties faced by government in the 1960s, that even
those fighting most arduously for civil rights would find a need to monitor political speech. Yet,
his method of securing such civil rights risked chilling the exercise of First Amendment rights of
activist groups that also sought to secure civil rights for themselves and others. Any chill in
speech, however, was unintended by Doar or the Justice Department. Rather, Doar sought to
help the Justice Department conduct intelligence analysis that the Bureau was incapable of
providing. Using raw information collected by the FBI, the Justice Department, under Doar’s
leadership, hoped to process the data into useful information in order to prevent any future urban
riots.
Doar’s plan reflected the mission of the Department’s Community Relations Service
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which had been established to conciliate racial conflicts between civil rights groups and white
segregationists in the South. The CRS hoped to use its mediation skills to resolve urban conflicts
between blacks and the police that could lead to violence. CRS officials could benefit from
knowing more about the black community groups with whom they would try to work. It was as
much an idealistic “hope” as it was fear that led Justice Department officials to seek domestic
“political intelligence.” Another rationale was the Attorney General’s need for good
information and analysis to advise the President whether the dispatch of federal troops was
needed to control civil disorders.317
Part of the problem leading the Justice Department to establish an intelligence unit in the
first place stemmed from the FBI’s inability to produce good intelligence analysis, particularly
related to African Americans. Because the Bureau did not have many black agents, their ability
to run operations and gather information in heavily populated black urban areas was
compromised. Doar noted that his proposed unit would take raw FBI intelligence and analyze or
make sense of it. A later letter from Attorney General Ramsey Clark to several of his assistant
attorney generals confirmed that the Bureau’s intelligence was not useful to the DOJ. Clarke
wrote:
It is imperative that the Department seek and obtain the most comprehensive intelligence
possible regarding organized or other purposeful stimulation of domestic dissention, civil
disorders, and riots. To carry out these responsibilities we must take the full use of, and
constantly endeavor to increase and refine, the intelligence available to us, both from
internal and external sources, concerning organizations and individuals throughout this
country who may play a role either in instigating or spreading disorders or in preventing
or checking them. However, we do not now adequately use such intelligence or develop
and implement methods of improving intelligence. Thus, we do not have any systematic
means at present of compiling and analyzing the voluminous information about various
316
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persons or organizations furnished to us by the FBI, and we make very little effort to
obtain information elsewhere.318
Furthermore, Clarke elaborated upon Doar’s earlier proposal to create an intelligence unit in the
first place, explaining that such a division would analyze the FBI’s reports. Sullivan’s
complaints, voiced during the controversy surrounding the Huston Plan, that the Bureau was not
creating good intelligence were confirmed by the Justice Department’s creation of IDIU. In the
late 1960s, the Bureau simply was not providing good intelligence. The Justice Department felt
ill equipped to carry out its functions related to civil disorders based upon FBI intelligence alone.
The dysfunction evident in the relationship between the FBI and Justice spoke to the need for
greater intelligence, and yet, the intelligence came at the cost of chilling the exercise of citizens’
First Amendment rights to express whatever political beliefs they desired. In short, the Bureau
was in a bind. It was damned if it did create the intelligence that the Department of Justice
demanded, as it gathered such intelligence using questionable means (demonstrated in the Media
files), and it was damned if it did not, as the Department of Justice would simply set up its own
intelligence analysis unit, thereby supplementing if not replacing the Bureau. Hoover found
himself in a difficult place.
A memorandum to Attorney General Clark spelled out the mission of the IDIU. It
explained first the need for such a unit, stating, “more than 150 FBI memoranda and
reports relating to this area of interest are received in the Department on an average day.
Each of these memoranda and investigative reports would have to be reviewed and the
important information abstracted on index cards which would be prepared in three sets so
as to constitute a master index on individuals, or organizations, and by cities.319
The letter went on to explain that the intelligence unit would be responsible for gathering facts
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about organizations and individuals planning to participate in civil disturbances, evaluating and
recording information related to such possible disturbances, preparing intelligence summaries,
and reporting to the Attorney General about any such plans while providing recommendations
for how his office might proceed in handling any disorder. In short, the Justice Department
recommended a plan to eliminate any need for Bureau intelligence analysis. Rather, it would
simply take raw, collected data and make sense of it on its own.
On December 18, 1967, Attorney General Clark sent a letter to his assistant attorneys
general establishing the Justice Department’s intelligence unit. He wrote, “I have determined to
establish a permanent unit, staffed with full-time personnel, to take over and extend the activities
of the so-called Summer Project of the past two years. The new organization shall be known as
the Interdivision Information Unit.”320 The plan to create an intelligence division within the
Justice Department had become a reality.
While the Department of Justice continued to operate its Interdivision Intelligence Unit
well into the 1970s, the Bureau bore immense amounts of public criticism from liberals who
believed that Hoover and his salacious need for power had turned the United States into a
totalitarian state. In May of 1971, the New Republic wrote,
[The FBI] is the nearest thing America has to a secret police. During the past 50 years
Presidents and Congresses of both parties have given the FBI and its director ever-wider
responsibilities, powers and discretion. Yet no matter where their sympathies lie, few
will deny that the Bureau is undergoing the most serious and sustained attack in its
history…Practically every politician in Washington more liberal than a right-wing
Republican feels that the FBI has him under constant surveillance, and that the director
has a dossier filled with all his peccadilloes. The Bureau’s competitor agencies, such as
the CIA, the IRS, the Secret Service, military intelligence, and state and local police
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forces have also had much reason over the past 25 years to develop a healthy respect for
and jealousy of the power, effectiveness, and political strength of the Bureau. There are
hints and rumors that even Mr. Hoover’s superiors in the Justice Department are looking
for a graceful way to ease him into retirement. Against this background, it was only
natural that the recent outrage over the revelations of Army political spying should have
so quickly shifted and broadened to focus on the FBI and its activities. Without at all
minimizing the seriousness of the Army’s spying, it was short-lived, amateurish, small
potatoes compared to what the FBI has been doing for decades.321
The Bureau bore the brunt of the criticism, despite everything happening in the Department of
Justice and in the Nixon Administration. The New Republic, along with congressmen and
activists, called for a congressional investigation of the FBI. No one, however, pointed fingers at
the Justice Department for encouraging the collection and analysis of such intelligence in the
first place.
Scholars and the FBI
As talk of Congressional investigations waned, the Bureau faced an investigation by
liberal academics at a conference hosted by Princeton University in the fall of 1971. These
scholars had been captivated by the release of the Media documents. Several were starting to
respond by writing pieces critiquing the work of the Bureau. Central to their critiques was the
message that Hoover was getting older and would soon be replaced. They pondered what sort of
person might replace him. One such scholar, H.H. Wilson, wrote an article for the The Nation
entitled “The FBI Today: The Case For Effective Control.” Wilson wrote:
One may assume that even J. Edgar Hoover is mortal and that therefore before very long
there will be an opportunity to appoint a new director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. This means that, for the first time since 1924, we have an urgent reason for
thorough public discussion and debate on the role of the Bureau itself, effective methods
of controlling and supervising its operations, and the qualifications to be looked for in a
new director.322
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Like many of the more liberal scholars inspired to take a look at the Bureau, Wilson saw the FBI
as a “secret police” agency that challenged democracy. He asserted a need for balance between
“police agencies and security procedures that do not jeopardize essential political freedoms, or
infringe on such freedoms as little as possible.”323 To achieve equilibrium, he recommended that
the FBI undergo a review by an independent authority.324
While the country waited for Congress to formally convene the sort of hearing called for
by Senators Muskie and Nelson, the academic community converged to hold its own review in
the form of a conference taking place at Princeton University in October 1971. The Committee
for Public Justice and the Woodrow Wilson School hosted the event. Burke Marshall, deputy
Dean of the Yale Law School, Duane Lockard, chairman of the Princeton Politics Department,
and Norman Dorsen, Professor of Law at New York University Law School organized the
proceedings.325 The conference resulted in the publication of a book, Investigating the FBI: A
Tough Fair Look at the Powerful Bureau, Its Present, and Its Future.326 Several themes emerged
from presentations at the conference. The presenters questioned the expenditures of the Bureau,
criticizing Hoover’s budget. National security reporter for the Washington Post, Walter Pincus,
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alleged that the Bureau spent $30,000 each year on a new limousine for Hoover. He was
appalled by the size of the Bureau in relation to the secrecy of its budget, stating:
If the FBI were a small agency or if its activities were non-controversial, the budgetary
short cuts and special treatment would be understandable if not totally acceptable. But
the Bureau is big and growing bigger. The $334 million it received for the 1971 fiscal
year makes it nearly as large in terms of budget and personnel as the Department of State.
And this figure is almost double the FBI budget of just four years ago. By the end of
fiscal 1972 there will be a programmed 8,900 special agents, an increase of 30 per cent
over the number just three years ago.327
Other presenters focused on the Bureau’s obsession with its image. One presenter noted:
This fixation on image has spawned serious problems. For one thing the public has been
lulled into a false sense of security. For another, the mass acceptance of the mythology
has created a megalomania in the leadership, reflected in internal aberrations. The
cardinal sin in the FBI is anything that detracts from the image. It is called,
“embarrassment to the Bureau.”328
As a part of maintaining the image of the Bureau, Hoover limited the number of minority agents.
The typical profile of an agent was described as such:
The two largest blocs were Protestants from southern and Midwestern universities and
Irish Catholics from Fordham, Boston College, and similar sectarian institutions. The Ivy
League had only token representation. The Mormon complement far exceeded its
population ratio. As a group, the agents were what is now called Middle American—
firmly anti-Communist, politically conservative, illiberal regarding subcultures and
minorities and slightly anti-intellectual.329
Not included in that description of Bureau agents were minorities, whom the presenter alleged
were given at best token acknowledgement. The panelist contended that until the early sixties,
black agents did not attend the mandatory agents’ training at the FBI Academy in Quantico,
Virginia. They were agents in name only, lacking the credentials of their peers. Additionally,
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women were prohibited from becoming anything more than typists. Though a twenty-eight year
old lawyer, Sandra Rothenberg, attempted to obtain a position as agent in 1970, the Bureau
refused to consider her application, explaining that “women were unacceptable because of the
‘hazardous nature’ and ‘strenuous physical exertion’ involved.”330
Conference attendees also discussed the Bureau’s refusal to work with the CIA, noting:
After the Bay of Pigs, [Hoover] spread the word around official Washington that the FBI
should take over the bumbling CIA. At Langley, Hoover was known as ‘that cop,’ while
at 9th and Pennsylvania the CIA Director Richard Helms is disparaged as ‘Princeton
Ought-Ought’ and his brain trust as ‘high-domed theoreticians.’331
Most of all, the conference questioned Hoover’s ability to direct the FBI. Investigative
journalist Fred J. Cook examined Hoover’s reluctance to investigate the Mafia, stating:
J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI on the one hand, and the Mafia on the other, grew and
prospered together, neither causing the other the slightest anguish. This has been the
great, most obvious and most inexplicable failure of the FBI. For decades the Bureau and
its Director made no move to combat the underworld crime cartels; in fact, Hoover
himself insisted that the menace didn’t even exist, that the Mafia was a figment of
journalistic imagination.332
As conference attendees waged discussions about the Bureau following presentations, Pincus
took an opportunity to attack Hoover. His attack perpetuated the image of Hoover as
uncontrollable and unanswerable to anyone within government. He stated:
Both Mr. Hoover and the Bureau are political forces unto themselves. And the fact that
they’ve become that is attributable in part to Mr. Hoover. He has done extraordinary
things with the assets he’s had. Some of these, people would approve of. Some of them
people would not. And a great many things he’s done, only a few people know of. But
another reason Hoover, with the agency, has risen to his present position of power is that
Presidents have left him alone. Attorneys Genearl have left him alone. Congress has left
him alone. And, I should add, the press, in most cases, has left him alone—except when
he helped them achieve some notoriety.
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I think these overseer groups, particularly the government in Washington, have permitted
Hoover to reach his unique position—and the Bureau with him—out of both myth and
practical political fear.
I don’t think you can judge his power or his lack of power without feeling the impact the
Bureau itself has through threat of action. Politicians have drawn back from attacking the
Bureau for years. It is very much like the telephone tapping business; everybody seems
to be fearful of what Mr. Hoover may know. And what Mr. Hoover may know is not an
abstract fear. Mr. Hoover, on occasion, does pass around information—personal
information, damaging information—about his enemies. He does it when he feels it
would do him the most good.333
Pincus perpetuated the myth of Hoover as all-seeing, all powerful, and consumed with his ability
to maneuver Washington players, including the President, like chess pieces. This was the
Hoover that the liberals feared.
Only political scientist Elliff, who had been interviewing attorneys at the Department of
Justice, followed the line of power extending from Hoover towards its ultimate progenitors, the
President and the Attorney General. Significantly, Elliff saw in 1971 what others would take
several more years to discern. Rather than being the all-powerful living legend, Hoover was one
power-hungry figure in a pool of power-hungry bureaucrats, acting according to the intelligence
needs of Presidents. In his conference paper, Elliff wrote:
Over the years…succeeding Presidents and Attorneys General have placed increasingly
greater responsibility on the Bureau to obtain information they think they need….If fault
is to be found, it would not be sought in the Bureau and its former or current Director, but
in the long line of Attorneys General, Presidents and Congresses who have given power
and responsibility to the FBI, but have failed to give it direction, guidance, and control.334
Elliff’s solution to the problem was simple—“a firm, constitutional foundation should be
established for domestic intelligence.” Former Attorneys General, however, placed blame on
Hoover for his immense authority over intelligence gathering. Former Attorney General Francis
333
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Biddle had noted the great power Hoover had amassed throughout his nearly half-century reign
over the FBI. Elliff wrote of Biddle’s concern, stating:
Although Biddle believed this delegation of power to Hoover was “justified by the
record,” he raised a disturbing question about “the future use of this great machine of
detection, with its ten million personal files, its reputation grown sacrosanct…its obvious
possibilities of misusing the power it has won. When Hoover resigns or retires or dies,
what will happen—can the same freedom be given to another man, the virtual freedom
from control? I do not believe it can.335
Despite Biddle’s “concern” for the FBI’s amassment of power, his office bore the ultimate
responsibility for the Bureau’s authority. Elliff noted:
The FBI is an intelligence arm of the President. The primary foundation for the Bureau’s
domestic intelligence role is inherent executive power. Only recently have Congress and
the courts begun to explore the ramifications of that power and to require the Justice
Department to articulate a constitutional rationale.336
The legal justification for the Justice Department’s intelligence delegation to the Bureau was
shaky. In support of President Nixon’s authority to order Hoover to collect intelligence, the
Justice Department cited Totten v. United States, a Civil War case brought by the estate of
William A. Lloyd, a Union spy hired by President Lincoln.337 In the dicta of the court’s decision
was an acknowledgement of a President’s authority to hire spies. The court wrote:
We have no difficulty as to the authority of the President in the matter. He was
undoubtedly authorized during the war, as commander-in-chief of the armies of the
United States, to employ secret agents to enter the rebel lines and obtain information
respecting the strength, resources, and movements of the enemy…338
That language, the Justice Department argued, allowed for the FBI’s collection regarding
political dissidents. In addition to seeking authority from a Civil War case, the Justice
Department also sought to use In re Neagle, another nineteenth century case which found that the
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Attorney General had the authority to appoint U.S. marshals to guard members of the Supreme
Court, as authority for the Executive Branch to render whatever means necessary to collect any
needed intelligence.339 Referring to Neagle, Elliff wrote:
Department executives have asserted that the government may collect any information
which is “legitimately related to the statutory or constitutional authority of the Executive
branch to enforce the laws.” In effect this view gives the President the constitutional
power to authorize intelligence coverage of any subject upon which he needs information
for carrying out his governmental responsibilities.340
Thus, in the early 1970s, the legal authority for the Bureau’s intelligence collection seemed at
best antiquated. At worst, it was premised upon the whims of the Justice Department, acting
under a president intent upon collecting information related to political dissidents. Elliff cited a
statement from Attorney General John Mitchell, which allowed for the FBI and Department of
Justice to gather intelligence about organizations “simply because they are expressing—by
means of a demonstration—their disagreement with government policies.”341 The statement
read:
Accurate and complete information is essential for the planning necessary to achieve
peaceful demonstrations and for dealing with disorders. It is not only important to know
how many are coming at a particular time, but who they might be and why they are
coming. This kind of relevant information is freely available to anyone; it is only
necessary to collect it in one place and, having collected it, to evaluate it in order to make
value judgments and to formulate a plan of action. To provide the concerned
departments and agencies with reliable information there has been established within the
Department of Justice an Interdivisional Information Unit (IDIU) and an Intelligence
Evaluation Committee. Whenever the information indicates a large demonstration may
occur, all intelligence concerning that potential demonstration is reviewed by the
Intelligence Evaluation Committee…[which] weighs all of the available information and
reports its conclusions regarding the potential for disorder to the Attorney General.342
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The Justice Department based the authority of its intelligence collection upon the premise that
such information was “freely available to anyone.” That premise was false. Using raw
information collected by the Bureau through wiretap surveillance and the use of informants, the
Justice Department analyzed and produced its own intelligence. Not for a second, however, was
such information publicly available to everyone. Elliff’s presentation at the Princeton
conference would highlight the complexity of issues pertaining to the Bureau. Certainly, the
Media documents had illuminated the extent of the Bureau’s illegal intelligence gathering
capabilities. As Attorney General Francis Biddle had voiced years prior, Hoover had amassed a
great deal of power related to intelligence collection. Yet, Elliff’s presentation pushed the
narrative surrounding the Bureau’s flaws beyond an ad hominem attack on Hoover and followed
the string of authority straight to the Attorney General and the President. That the Bureau had
amassed so much power in the first place could be attributed to previous administrations’ thirst
for information in the face of first, war (hearkening back to President Roosevelt’s delegation of
intelligence authority to the Bureau during World War II), and later, political dissidence and
urban unrest (seen under Johnson and Nixon’s request for intelligence related to protesters and
the black community). For Elliff, a critique of the Bureau constituted a critique of the Executive
Branch.
Though the Princeton conference had invited Hoover to attend, or to send a FBI
representative on his behalf, he declined. In a long-winded, seven-page letter, Hoover declined
the invitation, stating:
We acknowledge and appreciate your invitation to “defend,” but we are declining in view
of our serious doubt that any worthwhile purpose could be served by an FBI
representative attending an inquiry casting him in the role of defendant before even the
first fact is brought out, and condemned by the “judges” before trial begins. It simply is
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asking too much that any FBI representative appear personally under those
circumstances.343
Perhaps Hoover should have attended, as he would have found support in Elliff’s presentation
for his contention that, “Our investigative duties are not of our own choosing. They were
delivered to us, with the requirement that we take all necessary action, by laws passed by the
Congress and by rules and regulations laid down by the President and the Attorney General.”344
Hoover believed that the Princeton Conference was a “kangaroo court,” and expressed his
opinion in a letter to Nixon’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs, John Ehrlichman.345 Despite his
absence, perhaps he would have been surprised to find that the discussion of the Princeton
conference, in addition to critiquing his performance, also at times focused on the extent to
which Hoover carried out the wishes of his bosses, the Attorney General and the President.
United States v. United States District Court (Keith)
Though the FBI, Department of Justice, and the Nixon Administration justified their
intelligence gathering activities based upon presidential directives issued by President Roosevelt
during World War II, the days of relying upon such legal relics were coming to a close. In
February of 1972, the Supreme Court heard a case that examined whether the Attorney General
could authorize warrantless wiretaps in domestic cases related to national security. The case,
officially known as United States v. United States District Court and popularly known as the
“Keith” case, asked the courts to rule on the Executive Branch’s ability to use national security
as justification for warrantless wiretaps of domestic subjects. The case brought into question
everything that the FBI and the Attorney General’s office had been doing in relation to
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intelligence collection of leftwing radicals. Justice Powell, writing the final opinion, stated that
the case “involves the delicate question of the President’s power, acting through the Attorney
General, to authorize electronic surveillance in internal security matters without prior judicial
approval.”346
The facts of the case were absurd. Legal proceedings involved the prosecution of
Lawrence “Pun” Plamondon, John Sinclair, and John Waterhouse Forrest, three members of the
White Panther Party who had bombed a CIA recruitment office in Ann Arbor, Michigan in
1968.347 Prior to the bombing, the three defendants lived in a commune in Ann Arbor, engaging
in a hippie lifestyle where they “dropped acid, smoked pot and ate hallucinogenic mushrooms
while listening to the MC5, The Doors, and Iggy and the Stooges.”348 Inspired by a newspaper
article featuring Huey P. Newton, a leader of the Black Panther Party, the defendants decided to
form a White Panther Party to advocate for black rights. Sinclair defined his party’s mission in
1968, writing:
Our program is Cultural Revolution through a total assault on the culture, which makes
us use every tool, every energy and any media we can get our collective hands on….Our
culture, our art, the music, newspapers, books, posters, our clothing, our homes, the way
we walk and talk, the way our hair grows, the way we smoke dope and fuck and eat and
sleep—it is all one message, and the message is FREEDOM!...We demand total freedom
for everybody! And we will not be stopped until we get it…ROCK AND ROLL music is
the spearhead of our attack because it is so effective and so much fun…With our music
and our economic genius we plunder the unsuspecting straight world for money and the
means to carry out our program, and revolutionize its children at the same time.349
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Not surprisingly, their rhetoric caught the attention of the federal government, and particularly
the FBI, which added Plamondon to its “Ten Most Wanted” list.350 To escape prosecution,
Plamondon went underground and travelled the world, spending time with exiled Black Panther
Party members. His journey took him to Canada, Germany, Italy, and Algeria.351
When Plamondon’s case went to trial, his attorneys requested that the prosecution turn
over all evidence, including electronic wiretaps. Attorney General John Mitchell rebuffed such
attempts, explaining, “Plamondon has participated in conversations which were overheard by
Government agents who were monitoring wiretaps which were being employed to gather
intelligence information deemed necessary to protect the nation from attempts of domestic
organizations to attack and subvert the existing structure of the Government.”352 Mitchell
himself had authorized the wiretaps without seeking the approval of any court. He argued that
his authority alone was sufficient to justify such intelligence collection, and he refused to turn
over the content of the wiretaps to the defense.353
The district court, presided over by Judge Keith, found in favor of the defendants,
arguing that in domestic situations, there was no exemption from the Fourth Amendment’s
requirement of a warrant.354 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling, writing “in
dealing with the threat of domestic subversion, the Executive Branch of our government…is
350
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subject to the limitations of the Fourth Amendment…when undertaking searches and seizures for
oral communications by wire.”355 When the government appealed, the Supreme Court granted
certiori and affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. Justice Powell stated:
We conclude that the Government’s concerns do not justify departure in this case from
the customary Fourth Amendment requirement of judicial approval prior to initiation of a
search or surveillance. Although some added burden will be imposed upon the Attorney
General, this inconvenience is justified in a free society to protect constitutional values.
Nor do we think the Government’s domestic surveillance powers will be impaired to any
significant degree. A prior warrant establishes presumptive validity of the surveillance
and will minimize the burden of justification in post-surveillance judicial review. By no
means of least importance will be the reassurance of the public generally that
indiscriminate wiretapping and bugging of law-abiding citizens cannot occur.356
Thus, the government’s justification for its warrantless collection of intelligence, through
electronic surveillance, crumbled. After the Keith decision, the Executive Branch had no legal
grounds upon which to claim executive privilege for indiscriminate and warrantless collection of
domestic intelligence. It could no longer evade the constitution in the name of national security,
and the Attorney General could no longer order the FBI to carry out collection without a warrant.
Alternatively, the FBI could no longer hide behind the all-powerful authority of the Justice
Department, as Keith stripped such power, making clear that any such intelligence actions would
be illegal. The Keith case, perhaps as much as anything that happened up to that point, signified
that the tide was changing for the FBI and for the Nixon Administration.357
The Media break-in became a turning point for the FBI. For liberals it confirmed the
extent to which the FBI was conducting illegal surveillance of political dissent. It would take
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members of Congress, scholars such as those at the Princeton conference, and the Supreme
Court’s decision in Keith to unravel the Bureau and the Executive Branch’s tangled web of selfmade legal justifications, paving the way for a broader attack against the FBI’s intelligence
efforts. By eliminating the legal premises upon which the Bureau and the Executive Branch
carried out their intelligence gathering actions, those scholars and the courts allowed for change
sought by activists such as the Media burglars. The sweeping change, however, came at a cost,
most of all for Hoover. Following the Princeton conference and the deluge of liberal criticism
against Hoover, Nixon resented the scrutiny that Hoover’s actions directed towards him. He
began to plot Hoover’s retirement. Thus, what should have been a happy ending for the Bureau,
seen in the decision of Keith, instead, culminated in a new and unprecedented tension between
the Bureau and the President. At stake would be the legacy of Hoover and the directorship he
had closely guarded for nearly half a century.

foreign intelligence. This distinction was later clarified by the creation of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in 1978.
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CHAPTER IV
HOOVER’S RETIREMENT

After the Huston plan fell apart, Nixon’s staff began to wonder whether it was time to
replace Hoover with a new FBI director. On April 12, 1971, White House advisor Pat Buchanan
wrote to John Dean, Nixon’s White House Counsel, requesting some insight into the
repercussions of firing Hoover. He wrote:
Can you tell me offhand the status of the Director of the FBI—is he, now an appointive
figure, who can be shifted out by the party in power. [sic] In other words, were we to
replace Hoover now—could the Democrats waltz in and throw our guy out and put their
guy in—in 19 months?358
Four days later, Dean replied:
The Director now serves at the pleasure of the Attorney General. He is appointed by the
Attorney General and, therefore, can be removed by the Attorney General. Effective as
of the day in which the present incumbent Director ceases to serve as Director, the
Director of the FBI will be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate.359
Dean confirmed Buchanan’s fear of Democrats replacing Hoover with their own nominee. He
stated that if Nixon replaced Hoover and the Democrats later came to power, they could replace
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him with one of their own.360 Inherent in his answer was an assumption that subsequent
directors, appointed at the will of the president, would become partisan appointees. Hoover’s
ability to withstand his tenure under both Democratic and Republican presidents would become a
thing of the past.
Dean was familiar with the status of Hoover’s job, as he had earlier answered a similar
question from John Ehrlichman, Nixon’s counsel and Assistant to the President for Domestic
Affairs. In a memo written in December 1970, Dean outlined the legal basis for Hoover’s job,
referring to the Executive Order signed by former President Johnson, which allowed Hoover to
retain his position even after he attained the age of mandatory retirement as prescribed by federal
law.361 Dean concluded that although Johnson had signed an Executive Order on Hoover’s
behalf, subsequent presidents could elect to follow or not follow the order. Dean wrote, “In
brief, the Director of the FBI continues to serve at the pleasure of the President, despite his
exceeding the 70 year old retirement requirement.362 It is interesting to note the contrast in
Dean’s responses to Ehrlichman and Buchanan. With Ehrlichman, Dean tied Hoover’s tenure to
the will of President Nixon—as he read the law, Hoover continued to serve only at the
President’s behest. With Buchanan, however, Dean, without legal explanation, placed the
responsibility for Hoover solely with the Attorney General. Comparing the two documents, it
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seems that Dean wished to pass along responsibility for Hoover from the White House to the
Department of Justice. Although Hoover was appointed as Director in 1924 by the Attorney
General, Congress had revised the future procedure for appointing an FBI director which would
give the President sole responsibility to do so, effective upon Hoover’s retirement.363 Yet, Dean
still used political leverage as an excuse for keeping Hoover in office, explaining that any of
Hoover’s replacements could be easily replaced once Democrats took office.
By October of 1971, White House memorandum regarding Hoover’s retirement was sent
directly to Nixon. On October 27, 1971, Ehrlichman sent a memo to Nixon that included an
attachment drafted by the Attorney General John Mitchell containing a script to fire Hoover; the
attachment came at the President’s request.364 The script read:
Edgar, as you can imagine I’ve been giving your situation a great deal of thought. I am
absolutely delighted that you have weathered the attacks upon you and the Bureau so
well. The Princeton symposium, the various articles and stories that have run have only
scratched you in minor ways.
In thinking through your future I have concluded that you must stay as Director of the
Bureau through November of 1972. I hope you will agree to do so because I think it’s
very unrealistic to even contemplate your replacement in the meantime. Anyone who is
selected as your replacement would immediately become a political issue, would undergo
a bruising confirmation process and both he and the Bureau would be hurt in the process.
This next year is going to be a highly political year. We must figure out some way to
keep the FBI out of the political crossfire. I have concluded that the best way to do this is
for you to say right now, publicly, that you have decided to serve one more year, until
363
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just after the inauguration in January of 1973, and that then you will retire on “senior
status”. You would obviously be available to the Bureau and the government as a special
consultant, and could provide for an orderly transition for the new Director.
The timing would permit whoever is elected President in November to announce your
replacement, thereby taking your replacement’s identity out of the political campaign.
Between now and November you can be thinking about who a replacement might be. If
we can agree on a replacement we can keep it a secret, and begin to prepare the way for
the new man. Obviously, if I am reelected, your replacement would be someone who
would carry on your tradition. On the other hand, if the Democrats were to prevail in
November of 1972, the Bureau would be subject to some Director that neither of us
would like.
I sincerely think that it is in our mutual best interests and in the best interest of the
Bureau. I’ve sifted through every conceivable alternative and option and I know that you
should and must do it this way.365
The script sought to conciliate Hoover, lauding him for weathering Bureau criticism. Yet,
Nixon’s order that Hoover retire was undeniable. On Nixon’s orders, Hoover would have to step
down and train his replacement. It was a bold suggestion sure to elicit an angry response from
the director.
Ehrlichman apparently did not find the script helpful. Upon noting the attachment in his
memo to President Nixon, he remarked that none of Mitchell’s suggestions were “particularly
novel.”366 The script went to great lengths to appease Hoover, allowing him to stay on until the
election. Perhaps the reason for Nixon’s reluctance to fire Hoover before the upcoming election
had something to do with Hoover’s popularity among the public. Though Hoover was indeed
attracting his fair share of criticism from reporters and liberals, the general public, by and large,
365
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still believed he was a good director, as evidenced by Gallop polls taken in 1970, which found 71
percent of those polled viewed the Bureau “highly favorably.”367
And yet, despite public affirmation, the attacks against Hoover were mounting. By
October 1971, the White House, particularly Ehrlichman, worried that Hoover could not
withstand impending criticism. In another memorandum to President Nixon, (issued at Nixon’s
request), Ehrlichman noted several upcoming issues related to the FBI. He worried that William
Sullivan, recently fired by Hoover, would retaliate by “[blasting] Hoover”—his “inspired attacks
in the media [could] literally destroy Hoover.”368 He also attached a memo written by one of
Nixon’s staffers, G. Gordon Liddy, who had been a former FBI agent.
In twelve pages, Liddy provided a background to the FBI and berated Hoover’s decline in
leadership. His opening sentence, “the FBI was born in another age,” sought to immediately
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establish the antiquation of the Bureau, having been under the leadership of one man for 47
years. He gave a history of the bureau, which came to prominence after World War I, having
been established in 1908. In the early days, Liddy maintained that it was “incompetent and
corrupt,” until Hoover was appointed by Attorney General Harlan F. Fiske to serve as the fifth
director of the FBI.369 In the early days of his tenure, Liddy maintained that Hoover did a fine
job as director, using technology to fight crime.370 The FBI hired young lawyers and accountants
as Special Agents, and “by the late 1930’s, skill and dedication brought success and with success
spread the fame of Hoover and his ‘G-men.’”371 Yet, even in the early days, Hoover’s ego stood
in the way of agents becoming overly successful in their own right. Liddy wrote about one such
agent, Melvin Purvis, who fought against the gangster and bank robber John Dillinger. In the
mid 1930’s, Purvis became more famous than Hoover, with children’s cereal boxes containing
“Junior G-Man” badges modeled after Purvis.372 Hoover could not stand the amount of attention
Purvis received. Liddy wrote, “Hoover crushed [Purvis]. FBI history was rewritten, giving the
credit to agent Samuel P. Crowley. Years later, Purvis died a suicide.”373
Hoover’s great successes within the Bureau, however, overshadowed any excessive
power he wielded during those days. Unlike the sabotage carried out by Germans within the
United States during World War I, the country saw “not one successful act of enemy sabotage
368
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carried out” within its borders.374 Clearly, Hoover did something right, as the FBI flourished
during World War II. Following its success during the war, the FBI shifted its focus to
communism and the burgeoning Cold War. Though Liddy maintained, “the cold war was made
to order for Hoover and the FBI,”375 the Bureau also saw its personnel languish in the late 1940s
as “the cult of Hoover had begun to flower,” and many of its best agents left for other career
opportunities.376 Liddy nonetheless argued that during this time, agents still “knew in their
hearts ‘We’re Number One,’” over other government services, such as the U.S. Marines.377
Liddy believed that the moment when things started to go wrong for the Bureau occurred in the
early 1950s with the emergence of the “Bureau clerk.”378 He wrote, “these were young men
without the education prerequisites brought in to the Identification Division for the most part as
clerks and sent off to earn an accounting degree from such dubious institutions as Southeastern
University in Washington, D.C.”379 Hoover appointed these men, with their dubious degrees, as
Special Agents, giving them a salary they could not demand in the private sector. Liddy wrote,
“They became true believers in the cult of Hoover. Jealous of the more competent professionals,
and unwilling to disagree with Hoover on anything, as they rose administratively by currying
favor through flattery, the Bureau started to decline.”380
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By the time he wrote the memo in 1971, Liddy wrote that agents could no longer say
“We’re Number One.”381 Because Hoover became so concerned with his image and the
“cultism” of the Bureau, he had stifled all outside criticism. Liddy found that the greatest decline
took place in the Domestic Intelligence Division, echoing Sullivan and Brennan’s perspective of
the Bureau. Any agents who dared to speak out against Hoover (i.e., Sullivan) were “forced out
or relegated to posts where their skills cannot be exploited.”382 It was as if Hoover was applying
on a larger scale the tactics he used against Melvin Purvis in the 1930s. Any staffer who
threatened Hoover faced punishment.
Hoover’s behavior not only infiltrated the FBI, but bled outside of his organization as
well. Liddy described Hoover’s deteriorating relationships with those in the Department of
Justice and the White House, writing:
Hoover refers openly to Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian as (inaccurately)
‘that Lebanese Jew.’ He has reportedly threatened the President. Recently there have
been articles in The Washington Post, The New York Times, Time, and Life, which
indicate that officials and/or former officials at the highest level of the FBI are now
divulging to the press the serious shortcomings of Hoover and the Bureau.383
Despite his apparently vicious attempts at hanging on to his directorship, Hoover also knew that
his tenure was coming to an end. Liddy alleged that Hoover told Clyde Tolson, his second-incommand Associate Director of the FBI, that he knew, no matter who won the election in the
1972, he was done.384 Liddy concluded, “J. Edgar Hoover should be replaced as Director of the
FBI. The question is when?”385
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Liddy discussed the timing of when Nixon should “remove” Hoover. He warned that his
removal should not look as if it were inspired by partisan politics. Time and again, he compared
the appointment of an FBI director to the confirmation of a Supreme Court appointment,
stressing its importance. He noted that 1972 would see trials for both the Berrigan brothers and
Daniel Ellsberg. He worried that removing Hoover from his position as director could bolster
the defense of the Berrigans and Ellsberg, as he believed they would use Hoover’s indiscretions
as a defense in their trials. He stated, “the most compelling reason against taking action in 1972
is the probability that issue-starved Democrats can be counted upon to exploit the matter even to
the point of irresponsibility.”386
Despite his many reasons supporting removing Hoover from his directorship, Liddy also
had several reasons for Nixon to wait. First, he argued that Hoover could “make good on his
threat against the President.”387 He admitted, however, that he did not know the “nature of the
threat” and therefore could not provide analysis on the nature of the risk. Sullivan corroborated
the notion that Hoover had something blackmail-worthy on Nixon. He wrote in his
autobiography that Nixon and a friend had taken two trips to Hong Kong in 1966 and 1968 while
Nixon was working for John Mitchell’s law firm. While there, Nixon struck up a friendship with
a Chinese woman named Marianna Liu. Sullivan wrote that an FBI legal attaché office in Hong
Kong found out about Nixon’s friendship with the woman and passed along the information to
Hoover. Sullivan wrote, “our men were always on the lookout for anything they could dig up on
the personal lives of public figures to send to Hoover, and even though Nixon was a private
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citizen at that time, he was still very much a public figure.”388 According to Sullivan, Hoover
“gleefully” accepted the intelligence on Nixon and then went to the future president to present it
to him directly. Sullivan argued that Hoover used this tactic frequently against politicians. Once
he had disgraceful information on politicians, he would show them his intelligence, tell them that
he knew there was no truth to the allegations and promise never to let the information see the
light of day.389 A year after Nixon became president, Ms. Liu and her Chinese husband
immigrated to the United States. A newspaper article explained that Ms. Liu’s immigration “had
been given top priority.”390 The article featured a photo of her shaking hands with President
Nixon.391
Aside from possible blackmail scenarios, Liddy also believed that firing Hoover would
not win Nixon any votes from the left. Furthermore, he worried that Nixon would alienate some
of his supporters, who liked Hoover as director. Also tricky was the fact that firing Hoover
would make it necessary to find a suitable replacement who would satisfy both the left and the
right.392
After providing a terse list of reasons against Hoover’s immediate removal, Liddy recited
a laundry list of reasons to fire him immediately. Central to his reasoning was Sullivan. By the
time Liddy wrote his memo to Nixon in October 1971, Hoover had fired Sullivan. Sullivan,
angry as ever, decided to go to the press and leak information about the Bureau. According to
Liddy, the negative information Sullivan provided to the press about the FBI was “accurate,
388
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substantive, and damaging.”393 He cited a recent Washington Post article that had alleged
Sullivan took enough Bureau records with him after he left the FBI to publish an entire book.394
He downplayed the amount of upheaval that would exist within the Bureau upon Hoover’s firing,
reasoning that with the exception of a few old cronies, most of the agents would embrace, and
even welcome, a new director. He argued that the damage risked by keeping Hoover would
outweigh any possible risks by letting him go, concluding by saying, “Hoover is in his 55th year
with the Department of Justice. Even his secretary dates from the first world war. There is no
dishonor, express or implied in asking a man in such circumstances to give up the burden of
office.”395
Liddy, in addition to being a former agent with the FBI, had insider’s access to
information about the bureau through Sullivan. In his autobiography, Liddy bragged about his
ability to go around Hoover by speaking directly to Sullivan in order to carry out the President’s
wishes for better intelligence. In August of 1971, Liddy wrote a memo to the White House
summarizing a conversation he had with Sullivan. Around that time, Nixon was worried about
leaks to the press, particularly regarding the Pentagon Papers, which had been leaked recently to
the Soviet Embassy, prior to their publication in the New York Times.396 Nixon and Liddy
believed that the FBI was not giving a sufficient amount of attention to the source of the
Pentagon Paper’s leak, Daniel Ellsberg. Sullivan, ever the eager Bureau employee, shared with
Liddy about Hoover’s decision to cut ties with the CIA. He also demonstrated the extent of
Hoover’s vindictiveness by sharing with Liddy that the “top FBI expert on Soviet espionage”
393
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was currently reassigned to chasing non-Soviet fugitives after making the mistake of leaving a
safe drawer open in his office.397 Liddy described Sullivan as “very insecure in his position,
almost frightened. He gave the impression of a man doing his utmost to do his duty as he saw it,
but under attack from above and below.”398 Sullivan asked Liddy to have lunch with Charles
Brennan, his Assistant Director for Domestic Intelligence. Brennan conveyed to Liddy that
Hoover wished to remove both himself and Sullivan, having threatened to reassign them. Liddy
was irate to learn that the Bureau was not investigating the Ellsberg leak in the elevated status of
“Bureau Special” and also was not pursuing leads on any other major leaks. Brennan believed
that in order for the FBI to pursue the intelligence leaks for which Nixon sought sources, Nixon
would have to specifically order him to do so.399
Liddy also spoke to those working with the FBI in the Department of Justice to determine
their stance on the work of the Bureau. Mardian, Assistant Attorney General, saw Liddy’s memo
about his conversation with Brennan and Sullivan. He confided to Liddy about a special study of
the Bureau conducted by the Directors of the CIA, DIA, NSA, and the Secret Service that
highlighted “the serious deterioration of the FBI capability and performance.”400 According to
Mardian, Hoover had gone so far as to threaten President Nixon. When the Assistant Attorney
General Richard Kleindienst said that he would welcome a Congressional investigation of the
FBI, Hoover allegedly called him and said that if such an investigation took place, he would
“have to tell all that I know about this matter.”401 Liddy writes, “Mardian stated that he knows
what Hoover was referring to and recognized the implied threat to the President in the
397
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remark.”402 According to Mardian, the President recognized the threat inherent in Hoover’s
remark. That rumors abounded within the Nixon White House about Hoover and his potential
threats against Hoover is certain; that Hoover actually had anything on Nixon is less than certain.
Historical documents do not corroborate exactly what, if anything, that Hoover had on Nixon.
Nonetheless, the talk about Hoover and his declining bureau, coupled with Nixon’s insatiable
need for control of domestic intelligence led him to discuss with his staff whether or not to fire
Hoover. Though he had received memos from Ehrlichman and Liddy discussing how and
whether to fire Hoover, he still wrestled with what he should do, and what decision would cost
him the least amount of strife.
Nixon’s White House Tape Log records two discussions about Hoover’s tenure. Once
again, supporting the notion that in October of 1971, the discussion about Hoover’s tenure
reached an apex, there is recorded conversation between Nixon, Attorney General John Mitchell,
Domestic Affairs counsel John D. Ehrlichman, and Stephen B. Bull in the Oval Office. Mitchell
approached Nixon about a series of tapes that were housed in Mardian’s safe. The tapes
contained information related to the White House’s background investigations, wiretapping done
on Kissinger’s staff, and wiretaps conducted on newspaper reporters. According to Mitchell,
Sullivan gave those tapes to Mardian before Hoover fired him.403
In July 1971, Sullivan knew that Hoover would likely fire him, and he wanted to give the
Nixon administration leverage against the ailing director. To do so, Sullivan contacted Mardian,
expressing an urgency to pass along the FBI’s tapes. Sullivan had overseen a series of secret
wiretaps on Nixon’s staff and on newspaper reporters. Nixon demanded that Hoover conduct the
401
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taps; Hoover assigned the covert operation to Sullivan, who retained all records. Sullivan
worried that Hoover’s past behavior strongly suggested he would use the tapes from the wiretap
to blackmail Nixon; as an angry employee on his way out, Sullivan saw a chance for revenge.
An FBI report detailing an interview with Mardian reflected this reasoning, explaining, “Mr.
Hoover had used wiretap information to blackmail other Presidents of the United States and
[Sullivan] was afraid that he could blackmail Mr. Nixon with this information.”404 Mardian
recounted that Sullivan sent Charles Brennan, Assistant Director of the FBI, to his office “with
an ‘old beat up’ satchel, as best he could recall olive drab in color.” The satchel bore Sullivan’s
initials and contained the tapes procured from the wiretap.405 After Hoover fired Sullivan, he
discovered, to his great shock and dismay, that all of the tapes from the wiretaps were missing.
An FBI report stated:
Following departure of former Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan, it was
discovered that all records he had maintained in his office concerning special highly
sensitive coverage the Bureau maintained at request of the White House were missing.
Due to the extremely sensitive nature of these records, Sullivan maintained the only copy
of all records concerning this coverage. It was subsequently established beyond a
reasonable doubt that prior to his departure, Sullivan turned all of these records over to
Robert C. Mardian, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division of the
Department. Maridan allegedly destroyed these records.406
And yet, though FBI personnel believed at the time that Mardian had destroyed the
records of the tapes, White House records suggest otherwise. The tapes continued to sit in
403
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Mardian’s safe at the Department of Justice. Attorney General Mitchell worried that Hoover,
who was “tearing the place up over there trying to get at ‘em”407 would figure out they were in
Mardian’s office and “[blow] the safe.”408 Ehrlichman acknowledged that Hoover only wanted
to get at the tapes because they covered illegal conduct and because without having his own
copies of the tapes, he had no leverage with Mitchell. According to Ehrlichman, Hoover had his
own copies of the tapes, but Sullivan sneaked them out and gave them to the Attorney General.
Nixon was none too happy to hear that the tapes resided in the Department of Justice. He stated,
“Mardian’s in Justice, you’ve gotta get them out of there. Do we have them in my hands, then?”
Mitchell assured him that he could get the copy of the tapes into the President’s hands.409
The tapes contained information related to wiretaps carried out by the FBI and Nixon.
Even though Hoover had drawn the line at participating in the Huston Plan, he had no hesitation
in helping the President directly to collect intelligence on his own cabinet and staff. Rumblings
of these wiretaps surfaced as early as 1969. In a press conference on June 19, 1969, a journalist
asked Nixon about “controversy” surrounding Hoover and his collection of electronic
surveillance.410 At the time, journalists had no reason to suspect the extent of Nixon’s
involvement in intelligence collection; instead, they placed the majority of their suspicion on
Hoover, as evidenced by the journalist asking Nixon whether Hoover “enjoy[ed] your complete
confidence,” and whether Nixon had any plans to relieve Hoover of his position.411 Nixon
assured the press that “Mr. Hoover does enjoy my complete confidence, and there has been no
407
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discussion with regard to his tenure as far as the future is concerned.”412 Then, Nixon began a
spin on the facts, assuring the press that Hoover had sought the approval of the attorney general
when carrying out electronic surveillance, forgetting to add that Nixon had originated the idea of
the taps and encouraged them profusely. Nixon then proclaimed his administration’s great
respect for civil liberties, explaining, “as far as this Administration is concerned, our attitude
toward electronic surveillance is that it should be used very sparingly, very carefully, having in
mind the rights of those who might be involved, but very effectively to protect the internal and
external security of the United States.”413
Despite his assurances, Nixon was lying. His administration was using wiretaps as no
other president before him. No one in the Nixon administration was immune from Nixon’s
suspicion or his attempts at investigation. By April of 1971, the chatter regarding the wiretaps
became louder. By then, journalists had gotten wind of Hoover possibly tapping the telephones
of members of Congress. In yet another press conference, this time with the White House Press
Secretary Ron Ziegler, a journalist asked, “does the President believe that the FBI should tap
telephones of Members of the House or any Member of the House and Senate?”414 Ziegler
denied that the White House had authorized any phone tappings in Congress. A few days later,
Ziegler would clarify, “I can tell you this: that the President’s view on this is quite clear;
snooping or surveillance of private citizens is totally repugnant to the President and to this
Administration.”415 He was lying. Two days later, the New York Times ran a front-page story
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entitled, “FBI Said to Bug a House Member.”416 The article claimed that the FBI sent an
informer to Representative John Dowdy’s Capitol Hill office with “a hidden tape recorder
strapped to his back.”417 In addition to recording conversations, the informant also monitored
and recorded phone conversations with the congressman. Though the article noted that,
technically, the Bureau had not placed recording devices on the congressman, as all the recording
devices resided on or with the informant, it nevertheless signaled an unprecedented move at
attacking corruption within the government. Even worse, the Department of Justice had lied
about the Bureau’s involvement in investigations of congressmen. The New York Times article
noted, “these steps by the bureau do contradict recent statements by officials of the Department
of Justice that the bureau has never engaged in electronic surveillance of Congressmen, even in
investigating specific illegal acts.”418
By the time Ziegler attended his morning press conference, journalists barraged him with
questions about the New York Times article. One proclaimed, “we have been told consistently by
this Administration that the FBI has not been doing this…Did [the claims in the article regarding
the FBI] happen and, if it didn’t, how do we reconcile that with the consistent denials of Mr.
Kleindienst [the Assistant Attorney General] and others that that has not happened?”419 Ziegler
played dumb, claiming he had not seen the article and knew nothing about it claims.
Furthermore, he reiterated the party line, saying that the White House’s policy was against any
wiretaps of congressmen and senators. At that point, the press had nowhere to go but to point
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fingers at the Bureau. One of the journalists stated, “My question, Ron, went not to the story
itself, but to the apparent conflicts between the actions of the FBI and the stated policy of the
Administration. My question was, has the President initiated any kind of investigation?”420
Another journalist said, “Ron, there have been times in the history of this country when the FBI
was doing things that even the Justice Department didn’t know about. Could it be that these
things are going on now without being in accordance with your policy?”421 The implication at
this point was that the FBI had been acting as a rogue agency, carrying out dirty work behind the
Nixon’s administration’s back. That Hoover would do such a thing, coupled with the constant
denials by the Nixon Administration of having anything to do with the Bureau’s behavior, led
journalists to believe that Nixon needed to reign Hoover in and let him go. Ziegler danced a
careful jig in his replies. Admitting the Administration’s guilt would have instantly shifted
attention from the Bureau to the White House. And yet, placing the blame fully on the FBI and
buying into the implications of the journalists would have evoked the wrath and possible
retaliation of Hoover. So, Ziegler continued to deny everything. He stated, “It is not an
investigation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation by this Administration. If I would suggest
that, I think it would suggest that I am concurring in many of the charges that have been made
against the Federal Bureau of Investigation.”422
It would not be long before the President himself would come to the defense of the FBI,
as news of the wiretaps called into question the FBI’s seemingly unrestrained power. On May 1,
1971, in a press conference, Nixon fielded a question from a journalist who asked whether or not
the United States was becoming a police state, thanks to the FBI. Nixon underplayed public
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concern, stating, “all of this hysteria—and it is hysteria, and much of it, of course, is political
demagoguery to the effect that the FBI is tapping my telephone and the rest—simply doesn’t
serve the public purpose.”423 He justified the wiretaps conducted by the FBI, explaining that
they were approved by the Attorney General and were only used in limited instances to prevent
violence or to stop an overthrow of the government.424 Moreover, he assured the journalists,
“This is not a police state. I have been to police states. I know what they are….This isn’t a
police state and isn’t going to become one.”425
Nixon had plenty of reasons, however, to be worried. Though the information regarding
the taps would remain a secret for a couple more years, eventually news of the taps would reach
the public, including the identities of those under suspicion. On February 27, 1973, Time
released a story alleging the that the White House ordered the FBI to tap the telephones of six or
seven journalists and to also tap the phones of “a number of white house [sic] aides” to
determine the source of leaks to the press.426 According to the article, “Hoover initially balked at
the White House directive to install the wiretaps, but was ordered by Mitchell to follow it.”427 In
the coming months, more details would emerge, along with the identities of those tapped by the
FBI. One of the persons was William Safire, a Nixon speechwriter. The FBI installed the taps
sometime between May 1969 and February 1971, with a total of “13 ‘national security’
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surveillances on administration officials authorized by Nixon.”428 Along with Safire, the Nixon
administration solicited names from Henry A. Kissinger, Nixon’s national security advisor, and
built a list of White House employees suspected of leaks. The program was ultimately
coordinated by Kissinger, Hoover, and Mitchell, as they compiled a list of names on which to
apply the taps; Mitchell signed each and every one of the seventeen forms allowing the FBI to
conduct the electronic surveillance.429 In addition to the 13 White House employees, the FBI also
installed wiretaps on at least four journalists, including two New York Times reporters. The
article stated, “logs of the overheard conversations compiled by the FBI were sent routinely to
Kissinger’s office.”430 Most of the White House employees monitored did not divulge any
classified or sensitive information to journalists, though the article noted “at least three of the
government officials were found to be ‘Blabbermouths’ and were eventually eased out of their
positions.”431 When interviewed about why he might have been targeted for the taps, Safire
admitted that he had seen classified information related to national security. Nonetheless, he was
outraged upon learning about the taps and came out swinging in an article he penned for the
Washington Star. He disparaged his colleagues who were wiretapped and excused the behavior
by saying “men who deal in secret matters [have] to expect constant surveillance.”432 To those
people, Safire chided, “frankly, men who expect constant surveillance handling our national
428
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security betray a certain lack of understanding about our national traditions.”433 Safire, however,
saved the majority of his wrath for Nixon. He ranted:
For myself, I cannot go along with this fraternal silence of the suspicious 17. I did not
knock myself loose for Nixon in 1959 and 1960, and then cast my lot with him through
the long arid comeback years of 1965 through 1968, to have him—or some lizard-lidded
paranoid acting in his name without his approval—eavesdrop on my conversations.
“National security,” my eye—during the 37 days in July and August of 1969 that some
agent in earphones was illegally (as the Supreme Court later found) listening to my every
word, I was writing the (sh!) President’s message and speech on welfare reform.434
Informants from the White House substantiated Safire’s claim that Nixon had no business
suspecting him for security leaks. An article from the New York Times alleged that Nixon began
the taps in an effort to pursue leaks related to a “secret bombing in Cambodia in 1969 and details
of the American negotiating position at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks With the Soviet
Union.”435 That Nixon had superseded his original intent for the electronic surveillance was
evident in the selection of such targets as Safire.
On an autumn day in October, when Nixon met with members of his staff to discuss
Hoover’s retirement, he knew that a lot was at stake with the existence of tapes stemming from
the wiretaps. Because Sullivan had stolen the tapes from the FBI, Hoover no longer had his own
leverage in the event that word leaked about the wiretaps.436 Nixon was at an advantage, and he
planned to keep it that way. In his memoir, Nixon recalled the conversation with Mitchell about
Hoover and the tapes. He explained that Mardian had warned that Hoover would likely use the
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tapes’ evidence of wiretaps on the seventeen individuals with as “blackmail leverage in order to
retain his position at the Bureau.”437 Nixon later alleged, “I did not believe that he would ever do
such a thing. There had long been rumors that Hoover kept his position because of threats and
subtle blackmail of various Presidents, but I had always regarded them with skepticism.”438 That
the tapes ended up with Mardian came from a direct order on behalf of Nixon. He wrote,
“Sullivan had the FBI’s copies of the wiretap reports, so I told Mardian to get them from him so
that all copies would be kept at the White House…That was the last I heard of any supposed
threat from Hoover. I never said anything to him about it.”439
Though Nixon’s memoir recorded his involvement and interest in Hoover and the tapes
as relatively benign, the recordings of Nixon’s conversations in the Oval Office revealed a man
concerned with Hoover’s possible next moves. Nixon and Mitchell, in a plan to get Hoover to
stop searching for the tapes, agreed to tell him that the tapes resided at both the Department of
Justice and at the White House, to which Mitchell remarked, “[telling him that] will turn him
off.”440 Yet, as Mitchell thought about it, he realized that more needed to be done. He explained
to Nixon that “I’ve got to get [Hoover] straightened out which may lead to a hell of a
confrontation.”441 His urgency, however, stemmed from the fact that Hoover had cut Mardian
off from all Bureau investigations. Mitchell wondered aloud if Nixon should get rid of Hoover
or simply “bear down on him.”442 Nixon answered, mumbling about Hoover offering to resign if
he felt like it would help Nixon get reelected. He stated, “[Hoover] says I know whenever you—
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you’ve gotta get re-elected [unintelligible]. If you think that my presence is going to be really
harmful, he says, I will resign. That’s a pretty, pretty nice way of saying I don’t think I am
harmful.”443 Then President Nixon revealed his own feelings on the matter, exclaiming:
Nixon: Uh, as of the moment that is true that he oughta resign, for a lot of reasons he
oughta resign, in my view is he oughta resign while he’s on top, before he becomes an
issue in the current, the least of it is he’s too old.
Mitchell: He’s getting senile, actually.444
Nixon: He should get the hell out of there. Now it may be, which I kind of doubt, I don’t
know, maybe, maybe I could just call him in and talk him into resigning…if I fired
Hoover, if you think we’ve got an uprising and a riot now [unintelligible] would be
terrific Edgar Hoover has got to go. If he does go, he’s got to go of his own volition—
that’s what we get down to, and that’s why we’re in a hell of a problem. And at the
present time, I don’t think, John, I think he’ll stay until he’s 100 years old. I think he
loves it…I’m willing to fight him, but I don’t. You see, I think we’ve got to avoid the
situation where he—he could leave with a blast that is [unintelligible]. I don’t think he
will. I think he’s so damn patriotic and he knows very well that [unintelligible]…I sorta,
I went all ‘round with him…Just couldn’t run the risks with the election.445
After Nixon’s rants about whether or not to let Hoover go, Ehrlichman brought the discussion
back to Sullivan, reminding everyone that time was ticking and that Sullivan had a lot of
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information that he would leak to the press. Clearly, the problems with Hoover were mounting,
and the White House did not quite know how to proceed forward.
Several weeks later, after reading Liddy’s memo analyzing Hoover, Nixon and
Ehrlichman resumed their discussion of Hoover’s retirement. On October 25, 1971, Nixon’s
recordings captured a conversation between the President and Ehrlichman regarding whether
Nixon should heed Liddy’s advice. Upon reading Liddy’s memo, Nixon first asked why he had
ever worked in the Bureau in the first place. Interestingly, Nixon himself had first applied to be
an agent in the FBI in 1937 and did not receive a job offer.446 Ehrlichman explained that Liddy
had been Hoover’s ghostwriter, crafting the director’s speeches. He left when he became
“disillusioned.”447 Nixon was extremely impressed with Liddy’s insight into Hoover. He
remarked to Ehrlichman, “His analysis of Hoover from a psychological standpoint is
tremendously perceptive. We may have on our hands here a man who will pull down the temple
with him, including me.”448 After reading the entire piece, Nixon concluded that Liddy’s
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analysis made a far greater case for not doing anything to Hoover.449 Nixon worried that Hoover
would “piss on” anyone that Nixon appointed as a new director, mentioning a man by the name
of Pat Gray as a possible successor to Hoover.450 What befuddled Nixon most of all, based upon
his comments that day to Ehrlichman, were Hoover’s remarks that he knew he would be replaced
following the 1972 election, and yet, much to Nixon’s chagrin, Hoover refused to resign. Nixon
worried about the effects of having to deal with an “inefficient FBI” over the next year. Nixon
remarked, “[Hoover] just, he has to realize that he can’t stay forever.”451
After remarking that Hoover could not stay in the position, Nixon swung back to talk
about forcing Hoover to resign, stating, “I think I could get Hoover to resign if I put it to him
directly that without it he’s going to be hurt politically.”452 Based upon his tapes, Nixon
vacillated on what to do about Hoover. One minute, he seemed confident that firing Hoover
would lead to him losing the 1972 presidential election; the next, he seemed certain that he could
force Hoover to resign and that his decision would be the end it.
During the course of the conversation, Nixon wove his way back to a discussion of
Sullivan, whose ability to reveal Bureau revelations clearly worried the White House.
Ehrlichman reminded Nixon of Sullivan’s importance to the White House, stating, “Sullivan was
the man who executed all of your instructions for the secret taps.”453 To Nixon, the bottom line
came down to this: “Will he rat on us?”, he asked Ehrlichman candidly.454 Ehrlichman replied,
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“it depends on how he’s treated.”455 He reminded Nixon that Sullivan had inside information on
the Nixon administration, saying, “Sullivan has delivered the papers to [AAG] Mardian that are
unbelievable what I’ve got up in my safe.”456 Nixon wanted to know what his Administration
could do to appease Sullivan; Ehrlichman responded that Sullivan merely wanted to be
vindicated, after having been fired by Hoover. And yet, Ehrlichman noted that doing anything
for Sullivan would offend Hoover, something that he and Nixon were clearly opposed to
doing.457 The discussions of how to “help” Sullivan never went anywhere.
Later that day, Nixon again rehearsed his script for firing Hoover, telling Ehrlichman:
I’d like to think about the proposition of my saying, ‘Edgar, I think what you should do,
that you should get out now, because I don’t want to be in the position of trying to pick a
successor now. I think you should say this is a matter which should be handled by
whoever is the next President in the next election and I do not want to be an issue and so I
have submitted my resignation effective then.458
Storms converged around Hoover. Not only was Nixon brainstorming ways to remove him from
his directorship, but he also had the upcoming Princeton conference to worry about. For the first
time ever, Princeton planned to host a conference in October 1971 to provide an academic
critique of the FBI. Nixon worried about the effects of the conference on his administration’s
reputation. Ehrlichman talked up the importance of the conference, stating, “this Princeton thing
is gonna get into the folklore and it’s gonna become a part of the givens. It’s gonna be a part of
the, of the established findings.”459 True to form, Nixon worried about the political leanings of
the conference attendees, stating, “They told me that—well, it’s a very leftish group.”
Ehrlichman agreed, stating, “Oh, it is, it’s stacked, just stacked.” Ever the political strategist,
455
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Nixon proclaimed, “So we let a man be crucified by a stacked jury.”460 Ehrlichman agreed. He
said, “I think if his resignation were in hand you could afford to defend him. And I think you
can afford to do a lot of things for him as a lame duck as you get into the campaign which will be
appreciated by his friends and will be virtually uncriticizable.”461
For the remainder of the conversation, Nixon and Ehrlichman continued to ponder aloud
how to coerce Hoover to resign his directorship. By forcing Hoover to make the move of
announcing his resignation, Nixon avoided a controversial confirmation hearing, which he
professed had “ a lot of merit.”462 Nixon rehearsed another possible conversation with Hoover,
stating:
But I think what he could, I really think a lot, it makes a lot of sense, he says I’m
resigning at the end of this year—this is my last year and I’ve, uh, talked to the President
and submit…I wanta, because of the Bureau, I will not have the Bureau become an issue
in the campaign. I’ve noted it, and I, and I, I think what I will do is just call him in and
say, ‘Edgar, I think you ought to resign and, and, January 1st, 1973.”463
Nixon and Ehrlichman tossed around names to serve as possible replacements to Hoover, noting
with disdain any liberal leanings among the discussed candidates.464 One thing was certain—
Nixon wanted a new Director with contacts in Congress and public relations savvy; he refused to
entertain the idea that “a cop should run the Bureau.”465
Despite the time, energy, and attention spent by Nixon on the issue of Hoover’s
resignation, he never forced him to retire. Nixon recalled in his memoirs a conversation with
Mitchell. As Attorney General, Mitchell should have been the person to force Hoover’s
459
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departure, since Hoover had been hired by the Attorney General to serve as director in the first
place. Yet, Mitchell balked at the idea of having to fire Hoover, telling Nixon, “Mr. President,
both you and I know that Edgar Hoover isn’t about to listen to anyone other than the President of
the United States when it comes to this question.”466 Nixon agreed. He wrote, “I decided to
invite Hoover to have breakfast with me at the White House and to raise the subject with him
then.”467 The breakfast, however, did not turn out as Nixon hoped it would. Hoover arrived,
bringing his best behavior. Nixon notes, “at our breakfast, Hoover was as alert, articulate, and
decisive as I had ever seen him. It was obvious that he was trying to demonstrate that despite his
age he was still physically, mentally, and emotionally equipped to carry on.”468 Nixon discussed
the recent negative attacks on Hoover, particularly referring to those in Congress and at the
Princeton conference. Nixon recalled:
I tried to point out as gently and subtly as I could that as an astute politician he must
recognize that the attacks were going to mount in number and intensity in the years
ahead. It would be a great tragedy if he ended his career while under sustained attack
from his long-time critics instead of in the glow of national respect that he so rightly
deserved.469
But, Hoover refused to take the hint. He responded heartily to Nixon, stating:
More than anything else, I want to see you re-elected in 1972. If you feel that my staying
on as head of the Bureau hurts your chances for re-election, just let me know. As far as
these present attacks are concerned, and the ones that are planned for the future, they
don’t make any difference to me. I think you know that the tougher the attacks get, the
tougher I get.470
Nixon brusquely recalled, “it was obvious that he was not going to take the initiative in offering
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his resignation.”471 The obvious question, then, was why Nixon never asserted his power as
President and fired Hoover. Nixon wanted Hoover gone and plotted ways to remove Hoover
from his position. Nixon later explained his decision, proffering, “my personal feelings played a
part in my decision [not to fire Hoover], but equally important was my conclusion that Hoover’s
resignation before the election would raise more political problems than it would solve.”472
As to Nixon’s “personal feelings,” he proclaimed, “I would never desert a great man, and
an old and loyal friend, just because he was coming under attack.”473 Nixon certainly had his
own interests at heart—he was worried about his reelection and also worried that Hoover’s
continued notoriety as a “folk hero”474 would make any decision by his administration to sack
him publically unpopular. And yet, the historical record also supports Nixon’s claims that his
relationship with Hoover were important to him. Boxes of correspondence between Nixon and
Hoover confirm a relationship that burgeoned from 1949 to the mid 1960s. The two initially
connected over the counterintelligence case involving Alger Hiss; Nixon, as a “cold warrior” in
the height of the Cold War attracted attention and respect from Hoover, who was consumed at
the time with locating and prosecuting Communists. Nixon’s reticence to stand up to Hoover is
less perplexing, seen in the context of their decades-long friendship. Hundreds of letters,
notecards, and intelligence memos from Hoover to Nixon confirm that their relationship was
once much more than the one-dimensional schema evident by the 1970s. They vacationed at
each other’s houses. Hoover knew Nixon’s wife, Patricia, and his daughters. They sent each
other birthday cards, hospital “get-well” flowers, and intelligence on their respective units—the
471
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Bureau, for Hoover, and Congress, for Nixon.475 Nixon was more than his political, conniving
persona; likewise, Hoover was more than the egotistical, power-hungry caricature that the media
portrayed him to be. The correspondence reflects who they were as people, and as friends.
Though Hoover apparently knew the gavel was about to fall on his tenure, he outlived the
threat of his directorship coming to an end at the hand of Nixon. Instead, Hoover died in his
sleep one morning before work, on May 2, 1972, still director of the FBI. He fulfilled Nixon’s
prediction that Hoover would remain director of the FBI until his end, and indeed, his death
signaled the end of a long era—48 years, to be exact—for the FBI.476 His death immediately
resolved many outstanding issues for Nixon; no longer would Nixon have to plot and scheme
with his staff about how to get Hoover out of office without hurting his presidential campaign.
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Most importantly for Hoover, he died without having been forced into retirement. Nixon wrote
in his diary, “He died at the right time; fortunately, he died in office. It would have killed him
had he been forced out of office or had he resigned even voluntarily.”477 He died a month and
half before the Watergate break-in, which would embroil Nixon’s remaining presidency and take
down Hoover’s successor, FBI Interim Director Pat Gray. And most importantly, Hoover
avoided the spectacle that would become a Congressional investigation into the Bureau
following Nixon’s resignation. Things were about to get dirty; on the morning of Hoover’s
death, the FBI sat on the cusp of an incredibly difficult time period.
Whatever issues Hoover might have had with Nixon, and however unfavorably his most
vocal critics felt, Hoover’s death elicited a swell of support from Congress and from Nixon
himself. It was as if all dissatisfaction with the director was forgotten. Instead, people in
Washington rushed to commemorate a legend. Hoover had served as director the Bureau for
nearly 48 years, “[carrying] out his duties under eight presidents and 16 Attorneys General.”478
Congressman Gerald R. Ford gave tribute to Hoover on the day of his death, stating:
He took over the direction of the FBI in 1924 when it was a scandal-ridden and
ineffective bureaucracy. Since Mr. Hoover’s tenure as FBI Director began, not one FBI
agent has been charged with wrongdoing. Himself, an “honest cop,” Mr. Hoover set for
the FBI the highest standards and those standards have never been lowered…He was a
leader of an organization whose crime-fighting record is unsurpassed. Mr. Hoover
almost singlehandedly transformed the FBI into the superlative law enforcement agency
it became in the thirties and forties and is today.479
Included in the Congressional eulogies of Hoover’s life, spoken in Congress on the day
of his death, were echoes of an American fable regarding Hoover’s life and work—namely, that
477
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he “created the FBI,”480 that “J. Edgar Hoover was the length, breadth, and shadow of the
FBI…their only Director.”481 Though he neither created the FBI nor served as its only director
(indeed, there were five directors prior to Hoover’s tenure),482 people had a difficult time
remembering an FBI before J. Edgar Hoover because he had dominated the image of the Bureau
for so long.
In the days after his death, Americans pondered what the FBI would be without the
overshadowing presence of its leader for the past forty-eight years. Hoover began working for
the Bureau in 1917, during World War I.483 In his earliest days on the job, he fought against the
“Red Scare” under Attorney General Mitchell Palmer, having a hand in deporting such wellknown socialist figures as Emma Goldblum.484 He became known for his work against gangsters
in the 1930s,485 capturing or killing “such notorious criminals as John Dillinger, George “Baby
Face” Nelson, Charles “Pretty Boy” Floyd and “Ma” and Fred Barker out of operation.486 One
Congressman, Lawrence Hogan, noted that Hoover’s greatest accomplishment was that he
“transferred hero worship from the criminal element to the law enforcement officer.”487 Before
Hoover’s tenure as director, many had admired the lawlessness of gangsters. After Hoover’s
great struggle against the criminal element, however, the country aspired to a new admiration,
and from the 1930s onwards, “the idol of the American boy and girl was the ‘fighting G-man,
479
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destroying the forces of crime and evil.’”488
Appointed as director at the young age of twenty-nine under Calvin Coolidge,489 he
guarded the Bureau through nearly half a century of historical progression: the Great Depression,
World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. He was largely remembered as the person
who saved the Bureau from its own bumbling weakness. Following his death, Congressmen
touted time and again his contribution to law and order within the United States, stating,
“Through his skills and his ability, J. Edgar Hoover built the FBI from a disorganized, inefficient
section of the Justice Department to one of the most widely respected organizations in the
world.”490
Not only was he credited with creating the nation’s crime-fighting apparatus, but he also
received credit for creating the nation’s first intelligence organization. Congressman George E.
Danielson remarked, “At the beginning of World War II, the United States had no intelligence
system whatsoever, and no counterintelligence system. At the direction of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, J. Edgar Hoover immediately set about filling this need.”491
On the day of his death, the House of Representatives passed a resolution ordering that
the Hoover’s body lie in state in the United States Capitol.492 They praised him for never
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allowing the Bureau to become embroiled in politics.493 Nixon ordered that the flag be flown at
half mast.494 At his funeral, Nixon gave Hoover’s eulogy, praising him, saying, “J. Edgar
Hoover was one of the giants. His long life brimmed over with magnificent achievement and
dedicated service to this country which he loved so well.”495
Hoover’s death signaled an important end for Nixon, but more importantly, it signaled
the end of an era for the Bureau. After 48 years as director, Hoover was gone. Agents recalled
that for three or four years after Hoover’s death, no one would go near his office. They simply
could not believe he was really, truly dead.496 Though controversy swirled regarding Hoover’s
positions towards the end of his life, his presence served to shore up a flood of controversy that
would erupt following his death. After a prolonged saga of trying to keep his job under Nixon,
Hoover found himself successful. However, his beloved Bureau spent the next few years
wavering under an uneasy leadership, succumbing to Nixon’s full political control, and finding
itself out from under both the shadow and the protection of its long-held leader.

493

“Proceedings in the House,” 116.
Nixon, 599.
495
J. Edgar Hoover: Memorial Tributes in the Congress of the United States and Various Articles
and Editorials Relating to his Life and Work, Washington: US Government Printing Office, xxiv.
494

151

CHAPTER V
HOOVER’S SUCCESSOR, NIXON’S CHOICE

In February and March of 1973, the Senate’s Committee on the Judiciary held hearings to
confirm L. Patrick Gray as Hoover’s successor. The committee, chaired by Mississippi
Democratic Senator James O. Eastland, spent nine days listening to testimony from Gray and
others. On its face, the hearing sought to determine if Gray was a worthy successor to Hoover.
In practice, it became a cross examination of Gray’s political ties to the Administration, his
handling of Watergate, and the FBI itself. Senators wondered aloud if Nixon had appointed
Gray in order to have one of his own leading the FBI. The confirmation hearing resided in the
penumbras of Watergate.
By March of 1973, Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward had spilled myriad administrative
secrets through the Washington Post, partly in thanks to their infamous source, Deep Throat. At
the time of Gray’s hearing, the American public knew several things. First, they knew that the
Watergate bugging of the Democratic National Headquarters on June 17, 1972, in the words of
Bernstein and Woodward, “stemmed from a massive campaign of political spying and sabotage
conducted on behalf of President Nixon’s re-election and directed by officials of the White
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House and the Committee for the Re-election of the President.”497 They knew that “hundreds of
thousands of dollars in Nixon campaign contributions had been set aside to pay for an extensive
undercover campaign aimed at discrediting individual Democratic presidential candidates.”498
They knew that Nixon operatives had tried to sabotage Democratic candidate Edward S.
Muskie’s presidential campaign by forging a letter in his name that “condoned a racial slur on
Americans of French-Canadian descent as ‘Canucks.’”499 The FBI investigation uncovered
former Attorney General John Mitchell’s role in the orchestration of a plot to upend Democratic
campaign efforts; he controlled the secret campaign fund that made everything possible. Still,
President Nixon had won his reelection campaign in 1972. Though the FBI continued its
Watergate investigation, the public, and the Senate, were unsure if any of its discoveries might
implicate anyone else in the Nixon administration.
Gray had been an acquaintance of Nixon’s prior to his appointment as interim director.
A graduate of the Naval Academy and George Washington University Law School, he
commanded submarine patrols during the Korean War.500 In 1960, he left the Navy to work for
Nixon’s campaign as a military advisor. In 1969, he worked for Nixon in the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare. A year later, he acquired a position in the Attorney General’s
office.501 As early as 1971, Nixon’s staff had intimated to Gray that he would become Hoover’s
successor, and soon. At one point, Attorney General John Mitchell asked Gray if he would like
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to serve as director; Gray replied that he would “serve in whatever capacity . . . the president
may desire.”502 On the morning of Hoover’s death, Nixon called Gray to offer him the interim
director position; Gray readily accepted.503 Though he was appointed interim director
immediately following Hoover’s death in May, Gray did not receive word about his nomination
as permanent director until February 1973.
According to Gray, Nixon worried that the confirmation hearing would lead to
revelations concerning Watergate. Gray recalled that the Senate committee was “controlled by
the Democrats [who] were out to get the hated Nixon, if they could.”504 At the time, Gray
believed that Nixon was concerned for him and his ability to withstand an onslaught of liberal
cross examination. Only later did he realize the truth. Years later, he recalled in his memoir,
“Of course, he was not concerned for me, he was concerned for Nixon. He wanted to learn how
much, if anything, I knew about the [Watergate] cover-up and if that knowledge could hurt him
through my answers to the senators’ questions. Neither of us could know on that date how well
founded that fear was.”505 Whatever fears or concerns he might have had, Nixon allayed them
and formally nominated Gray to become the director of the FBI. On the first morning of Gray’s
hearings, Senator Lowell P. Weicker, Jr. (Connecticut) noted the controversy surrounding his
confirmation. He referenced a Time magazine article which heeded:
Much of the Senate opposition to Gray is rooted in his lack of law enforcement
experience. Gray, who became a lawyer while on active duty with the Navy in 1949,
retired after 20 years military service in 1960. He was nominated for a federal judgeship
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but because of his meager qualifications the nomination was withdrawn before the
American Bar Association could officially act upon it…He and [Richard] Nixon met at a
Washington cocktail party in 1947 and the two have been on friendly terms ever since.506
The article listed questions concerning Gray’s activity which it suggested should, if present,
disqualify him from serving as director. The article urged the senators to determine Gray’s
political ties to Nixon. At the time of Gray’s hearing, seven of Nixon’s aides had plead guilty or
been found guilty at trial; senators had good reason to be suspicious of any of Nixon’s friends.507
Some congressmen saw Gray as a political affiliate of the president and an arm of his
administration. Tantamount to the political concerns was the FBI’s involvement in the
Watergate investigation—from the time of the Watergate break-in, Gray had overseen the
investigation. Concerned that Nixon had appointed Gray in order to protect himself and his staff,
the Time article urged the Senate committee to ask Gray:
Who asked you to campaign actively for President Nixon when you were acting director
of the FBI? Why did you use the FBI to gather campaign material for Nixon? Why did
the FBI do so little investigating of the Watergate political bugging conspiracy? Why did
the FBI bug White House officials? Why did the FBI bug Washington news reporters?508
For Gray, the hearings in 1973 were a long-awaited opportunity. Having been appointed the
interim director on the day of Hoover’s death (May 2, 1972), Gray had waited in limbo for some
months, wondering if he would permanently assume directorship of the Bureau or be cast quietly
into the basement of the organization’s long history. On the first day of his hearing, Gray arrived
ready to defend his leadership of the FBI. He began by reading a prepared statement, which he
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used as an opportunity to highlight his successes. He began by commenting on the difficult task
of succeeding Hoover, stating:
No one can doubt the tremendous challenge inherent in following the footsteps and
building on the legacy of John Edgar Hoover, whose personal vision and ideals, and
whose leadership, made the FBI an institution respected and honored by millions of our
fellow citizens. Thomas Jefferson said of Benjamin Franklin, “I succeed him; no one
could replace him.509
Despite his professed reverence for Hoover, he also emphasized his departure, explaining:
When I became Acting Director, I made a key decision. I decided that I would not be a
mere caretaker, making no waves and taking no actions. Rather, as Acting Director, I
would not only make those decisions necessary for the day-to-day conduct of FBI
operations but also those long-term decisions essential to the continued effectiveness and
efficiency of the organization.510
Gray testified that when Nixon appointed him interim director, he gave him one order: remain
apolitical.511 Gray hoisted before the committee his undying loyalty to the United States.
Wallowing in self-righteousness, Gray pledged to Senator Eastland (D-Mississippi), “If, Mr.
Chairman, I am unable to persevere in this determination for any reason, if my loyalties to the
Nation’s elected leadership, to the Constitution, and to my job, ever come into conflict, I will
resign at once and return to my beloved law firm in southeastern Connecticut.”512 Lastly, in his
opening statement, Gray portrayed himself as a critical mediator prepared to reason with the
longsuffering critics of the FBI, stating, “I believe in personal dialog, in person-to-person
discussions, where there is some chance, however slight, of correcting misunderstandings.”513
Leave it to me to sway the naysayers, he pleaded. Gray made every effort to portray himself as
the worthy successor to Hoover’s kingdom.
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To distinguish his strategic vision for the Bureau, Gray drew the committee’s attention to
the changes he had made since assuming his interim role. Gray argued that the changes were
much needed and entirely absent during Hoover’s tenure. He lauded his appointment of female
agents, explaining that during his very first month on the job as interim director, he allowed the
FBI to accept applications from women aspiring to become special agents. At the time of the
hearing in 1973, the FBI had seven female agents stationed in offices around the country and
eight female agents in training at the FBI Academy in Quantico.514 Gray had relaxed “grooming
standards” for agents. Under Hoover’s watchful eye, agents had been routinely weighed and
subject to strict grooming standards and dress code. Gray allowed agents to wear their hair
slightly longer, to don facial hair, and expanded the dress code beyond black suits and ties.515
He made changes that encouraged the hiring of more diverse agents. Though agents under
Hoover had been largely white males, Gray established an Office of Equal Employment
Opportunity Affairs to “recruit more black Americans, Asian-Americans, Spanish-speaking
Americans, and American Indians.”516 By discussing achievements in Bureau investigations into
organized crime and narcotics, he created a portrait of a Bureau that clung steadfast to Hoover’s
highest qualities while discarding his worst anachronisms and prejudices.
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Despite his efforts to draw attention to his successes, the Senate committee moved
immediately to questions surrounding his political affiliations. Senator Eastland began, asking
Gray, “well, in fact, have you stayed out of politics?”517 When Gray responded, “I have done my
very level best to stay out, Mr. Chairman, and I believe—“, Eastland interrupted, “Well, have
you stayed out?” Gray replied, “Yes, sir.” But despite Gray’s assurance, Eastland insisted upon
digging into the issue further. He asked Gray about a speech he had made to the City Club in
Cleveland, Ohio, a speaking engagement allegedly requested by the White House. Gray
provided to the committee his invitation to the event. The solicitation, sent to Gray from the
White House, explained:
Since its founding fifty years ago, Cleveland’s City Club has been a focus and one of the
bulwarks of freedom of speech in one of America’s great cities. The Club maintains a
deep interest in affairs of government, economics, and politics, both national and
international. It offers a prestigious meeting place for the open discussion of important
social, political and economic problems.518
The invitation’s apolitical overtones shifted as it read, “With Ohio being crucially vital to our
hopes in November, we would hope you will assign this forum some priority in planning your
schedule.”519 Gray claimed that his reasons for giving the speech had nothing to do with politics.
He added, defensively, that the FBI’s legal counsel reviewed the invitation and approved it.
Despite his explanation, the committee expressed their disapproval. Senator Bayh commented,
“I just hope in the future that perhaps when this White House, which is said to be the ultimate in
political acumen, assesses a speech to be of political value to them, maybe someone who is not
involved in politics, the FBI, will take their word for it and say, ‘No thanks, I will do that next
516
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year.’”520
The Senators had good reason to worry about Gray’s political affiliation with the Nixon
White House, as Gray had worked for Nixon prior to assuming the Interim Directorship. In his
testimony, Gray explained that he met Nixon in 1968 in the future president’s New York law
office. During that meeting, Gray told Nixon “that I hoped that he was going to run for the
Presidency.”521 Following Nixon’s election, Gray admitted to Nixon’s staff that he “really
want[ed] a place in this administration.”522 Despite his self-professed desire to serve Nixon,
however, Gray downplayed his relationship to the President, explaining, “if I am such a big
friend of the President and such a partisan politician, how come I am outside looking in and
trying real hard to get in?”523 His self-professed yearning to join the administration did not help
his case. Gray’s efforts to join the president’s administration in 1969 were successful. Nixon
appointed Gray to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) as the Executive
Assistant to the Secretary, where he gave a partisan speech to his own staff, stating:
I want to drive home hard the emphasis on loyalty. I do not speak of blind, automatic
loyalty. I speak of a sincere, an intelligent, a freely made decision to join President
Nixon and Secretary Fitch because we believe in them, trust them, understand the goals
and objectives they hold, and desire to support them with the deepest sense of dedication
and total commitment…Our Nation has elected a Republican President. We have a
Republican Administration. We have Republican approaches to the problems of our
people. We have the knowledge of the President’s goals. We have the common sense to
know the desires and objectives of the President and the Secretary—we must have the
loyalty, the courage, and the commitment to do their will—not our will. This means,
plainly and simply, that we get on the track with the President and the Secretary and that
we stay there and track with them. You may say, “I am not political”—“I am an
Independent”—“I do not care what party is involved, I vote for the man”—“Politics is a
dirty business”—an so on. From the vantage point of my ancient age, let me assure you
that no American can afford to ignore politics, to ignore the machinery of government, to
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adopt an attitude of “Let George do it.” This attitude is guaranteed to ensure the demise
of the two party system—our form of democracy. No American can afford to avoid
involvement, particularly in today’s world, when the thing to do is to become involved, to
participate, to take a position.524
Gray’s insistence that no one in the HEW could ignore politics was troubling, as he called upon
the staff to become political and to commit their loyalty to Nixon. The speech caused senators at
his hearing to question whether he could truly be apolitical while serving under Nixon. Had
Gray not given such explicitly political speeches as a government servant, perhaps his political
leanings would not have been called into question. Unfortunately for him, the political tone of
his past speech was undeniable. Eastland continued his investigation into Gray’s political support
for the Nixon White House, asking Gray whether there was truth to accusations that he had fired
FBI personnel for political reasons. Again, Gray denied any such action,525 so Eastland delved
into Watergate.
Gray told the committee that he first heard of the Watergate break-in the morning after it
occurred. He was in Los Angeles to deliver the commencement address at Pepperdine
University Law School.526 Gray assured Eastland that when he learned of the matter, he
contacted his second in command, Associate Director Mark Felt, and told him to “go to the hilt
and spare no horses.”527
Gray’s connections to the Nixon White House were the subject of suspicion by the Senate
committee, with good reason. Senator Philip A. Hart (Michigan) raised the issue of whether
524
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Gray’s FBI provided information to Nixon to support his campaign efforts. Indeed, Gray
supplied a memorandum substantiating the accusation. On September 8, 1972, Gray wrote to 21
special agents in charge (the heads of major FBI field offices) demanding on behalf of the White
House:
In order for John Ehrlichman to give President maximum support during campaign trips
over the next several weeks, the following information is required for each of the states listed.
(1)

Identification of the substantive issue problem areas in the criminal justice field
for that particular state. Please limit yourself to problems of sufficient magnitude that
the President or John Ehrlichman might be expected to be aware of them. Brevity is
the key, and often all that is necessary is to flag a sensitive problem so it can be
avoided or more extensive preparation can be undertaken should we choose to speak
about it.
(2)
A list of events relating to the criminal justice area that would be good for John
Ehrlichman to consider doing. For each suggested event, the following items should
be indicated:
a.
Purpose of the event.
b.
The nature of the group or institutions involved.
c.
The content of the event.
d.
Names of specific people who can be contacted for the purpose of setting
it up (together with titles, addresses, telephone numbers, etc.)…
In accordance with above, you should submit by immediate teletype to be received by the
Bureau no later than eight A.M., Monday, September eleventh pertinent material which
should include matters pertaining to gun control legislation, corruption in police
departments, probation and parole, etc. Deadline must be met.528
In his testimony, Gray explained that he had been out of town when the White House sent the
memo to the FBI; he claimed not to know about it until the offices had already supplied the
requested information. An assistant director from the Crime Research Division answered the
request and supplied the White House with the requested information. By the time Gray was
informed of the Bureau’s response, he could only be angry. The damage had been done.
527
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According to Gray, he recognized immediately that his office had made a mistake. In his
testimony, he admitted that the Bureau had behaved incorrectly; following the incident, he said
that he was “steaming around there raising a lot of cain [sic] and doing some things to make sure
that this kind of nonsense did not occur again.”529
The questions surrounding Gray’s confirmation centered upon the issue of to whom Gray
felt that he, as director, reported. At one point, Senator Bayh said, “I am concerned, Mr. Gray,
about your interpretation of the role of the FBI Director as far as to whom you are ultimately
responsible. It is sort of a strange breed of cat, isn’t it, where you are responsible to the whole
country, to the Commander-in-Chief, to the Congress, to each individual citizen.”530 When he
asked Gray “to whom does loyalty flow from the FBI Director,” Gray faltered, stating, “that is a
tough question.”531 He opined that the FBI director was responsible to the President, as head of
the Executive Branch, to the Department of Justice, as an extension of the Executive Branch, and
finally, his own conscience.
The fears of Gray’s politicization spread to the other senators on the committee. Senator
Robert Byrd of West Virginia532 explained his fear of politicization of the FBI directorship,
stating:
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I fear that the FBI could, under a politically oriented Director, become the political arm
of the White House—whether it be a Democrat in the White House or a Republican in the
White House. I think this would be a danger to the protection of the constitutional
liberties of all our people. I think that the politicization of the FBI could—I am not
saying it would happen at all—but it could be the first step toward the conversion of the
FBI into a sort of American Gestapo.533
He proceeded to question Gray about the FBI’s investigation of the Watergate case.
Gray testified that his initial concern, upon hearing about the break-in, was whether the
FBI had jurisdiction over the case. Had the break-in remained a mere burglary, the case would
have passed to the DC Metropolitan Police Department. Because the case involved bugging of
an office, however, it incited a federal statute, thereby invoking the FBI’s authority.534 Gray
suffered many questions about the FBI’s investigation into Watergate. Had he prevented agents
from investigating leads? Had he prevented agents from investigating leads that included higherup officials in the Nixon Administration? Had he fired, demoted, or transferred agents who
investigated Watergate too enthusiastically?535 Gray droned on with interminable answers. He
had not precluded the FBI’s investigation into Watergate, he claimed, but he had cautioned
agents that any prodding into Nixon’s staff was extremely sensitive and subsequently, intoned
that they had better have foolproof evidentiary ground before pursuing any lead.
At one point, Senator Byrd asked about the original seven defendants—those investigated
for the Watergate burglary in June 1972. Byrd had heard rumors that one of the defendants,
James McCord, a former FBI agent and security officer for the Committee to Re-Elect the
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President was “’plugged’ into the FBI.536 Gray downplayed McCord’s affiliation; he had merely
been an FBI Agent “from October 25, 1948, until he voluntarily resigned to enter private
business February 18, 1951.”537 Furthermore, Gray assured the committee that McCord was not
receiving classified information from FBI agents.
During his questioning, Senator Byrd continued to explore the FBI’s investigation into
the Watergate case. At the time, Richard Nixon was still in office. Yet, at the time of Gray’s
hearing, Byrd’s suspicion towards the administration was apparent and he focused a significant
amount of his questioning on the investigation, asking which members of CREEP the FBI had
interviewed, bringing up such subjects as Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy, part of the
original break-in. Gray, in an effort to please Byrd and the other senators on the committee,
offered to open the raw files of the FBI for all senators to view. Gray said, “I will make these
files available to the members of the committee and [I] will put two experienced agents with
each member to assist the member, to respond to any questions. We have a task force set up in
the FBI to crank out answers and we will deliver the product to the Senators.”538
It was Gray’s eager willingness to open the files of the FBI that caught some of the
senators by surprise. Senator Tunney wanted to know everyone to whom Gray might make the
files available. He asked:
Senator Tunney: I believe that you testified yesterday that as you perceived your
responsibilities as Director of the FBI, you report to the Attorney General?
Mr. Gray: That is right.
Senator Tunney: And you report to the President of the United States?
536
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Mr. Gray: That is correct.
Senator Tunney: And anything that you have available to you should be made available
to them?
Mr. Gray: That is correct. But I have judgment, too, you know. They are not going to let
me sit in that position, Senator, if I go running with every item over to them.
Senator Tunney: I understand that. Now, insofar as presidential surrogates are
concerned, do you have a responsibility, as you perceive it, to make available FBI
investigative reports to White House assistants?
Mr. Gray: I don’t know about—you are using surrogates now and White House
assistants. Who are we talking about? Are we talking about those people who went out
on campaign trails?
Senator Tunney: No.
Mr. Gray: Are we talking of men like Mr. Dean539 and Mr. Haldeman540 and Mr.
Ehrlichman?541
Senator Tunney: I am talking about men who work in the White House.
Mr. Gray: I am not going to make those available to everybody who works in the White
House but if you are talking about counsel to the President, if you are talking about Mr.
Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, the answer to your question is “Yes.”
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Senator Tunney: Do you make any file available to them that the FBI has?
Mr. Gray: Upon specific request from one of those individuals acting as the agent of the
United States, I would, and I engage in the presumption of regularity which I think all of
us have to engage in. I can’t be the head of a bureau in a department of the executive
branch and say, no, I am not going to do this.542
The hypothetical question—would you give FBI investigatory materials to the president and his
staff—was already being answered in real life. Gray had provided Dean, Ehrlichman, and
Haldeman with the materials they requested. His careful attention to the question by specifying
staff members related directly to his past actions. He was allowing Dean unfettered access to his
investigation, and he did so because he felt beholden to the president’s authority. Later in the
questioning, Senator Fong asked Gray about the President’s ability to request information from
the FBI. He asked, “if the President of the United States wishes to have an FBI file delivered to
him, would it be delivered to him?” to which Gray answered, “That would be delivered to
him.”543 Gray admitted such openness of the Bureau with its files was not standard practice;
nonetheless, he felt an obligation to the President, as his boss, to supply whatever information he
requested on behalf of any investigation.
Though he admitted his loyalty to the president, he had a more difficult time admitting
past FBI indiscretions. In a heated exchange, Senator Ted Kennedy asked Gray whether there
was any validity to media reports about the FBI’s wiretaps on journalists and White House staff.
Though the FBI had indeed carried out such wiretaps under Hoover, Gray either was not
informed of such actions or knowingly denied that such actions happened. To Senator
Kennedy’s prodding, Gray retorted, “there is no record of any such business here of bugging
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news reporters and White House people.”544 Senator Kennedy, however, was not satisfied with
Gray’s answer. He refused to dismiss the Time article’s allegations that the FBI, under Gray, had
illegally wiretapped American citizens. He did not believe that Gray had done the work
necessary to say with certainty that the FBI had not conducted the wiretapping. He continued his
questioning:
Senator Kennedy: So do I gather the extent of your investigation is a review of your own
files, and a telephone call to the public information officer of the Justice Department, and
no one in the White House, about the allegations and charges by Time magazine?
Mr. Gray: That is correct, because I had no formal complaint there had been any—
Senator Kennedy: I was listening to you earlier when you were talking about how your
Inspection Division follows up every single complaint that comes on out when it affects
the FBI.
Mr. Gray: On one of us.
Senator Kennedy: But when a crime like this, and it is a crime. Would it not be a crime?
Mr. Gray: If these acts were committed, certainly it is a felony, no question about it,
certainly.
Senator Kennedy: But the extent of your investigation is, as I stated, just a review of your
own files, the files of the FBI, on what wiretaps had been authorized, and since you
didn’t see any approval there, and after a routine call from the public information officer
from the Justice Department, you let that drop; is that correct?
Mr. Gray: I would not classify it as just a routine call. He was quite upset when he read
this article to me, and I am sure he was speaking for the Attorney General. I am sure that
there had been discussion between the Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the Internal Security Division where those reports are made. I have
to assume this—this is a normal type of procedure—and I did what I would do under
these circumstances—I checked our records and indexes.
Senator Kennedy: That is the sole extent of what you did?
Mr. Gray: That is correct, Senator Kennedy, that is exactly what my testimony is.545
544
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After decades of Hoover’s unrelenting thoroughness to gather evidence, Gray’s cursory search
seemed strikingly inadequate. The Bureau’s job was to go beyond face value and to investigate
every lead thoroughly. Yet, Gray did not practice the FBI’s most important practices. He took
Nixon’s administration at their word. Even though the crimes, if committed, would have been
felonies, Gray seemed content to put his hands over his eyes and ears, thereby precluding himself
from seeing or hearing anything that might upset the situation.
Though Kennedy was relentless in his questioning about the wiretaps, things only
intensified once the committee moved to the topic of Watergate. Paramount to their questioning
was an effort to determine whether Gray had effectively overseen the FBI’s investigation of the
break-in, or whether he had hindered it with his close relationship to the White House. Senators
raised rumor after rumor. Had the White House requested files on Presidential candidates from
the FBI? Gray insisted that no, the FBI had not supplied such files. Gray did, however, confirm
that he regularly sent Watergate files to John Dean. This alarmed the senators, as rumors had
circulated that Dean had passed along FBI files to other persons of interest. Tunney raised his
opposition to this practice, saying, “I am shocked, quite frankly, at the possibility that something
that you, as Director of the FBI, send to the White House could be used by White House
counselors to disseminate to [persons of interest].”546
It seemed that each time Gray opened his mouth to testify, he made the situation worse
for himself. One of his gravest missteps during the hearing was his generous offer to open the
FBI’s Watergate investigation files to every senator. Several days into the hearing, the ACLU
sent a letter to the committee chair, Senator Eastland, expressing concern about Gray’s offer.
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The letter stated, “these files undoubtedly contain information about individuals which should
not be disclosed without careful consideration of their rights.”547 Senator Hruska agreed with the
letter, and he scolded Gray, saying “I want to say to you that I suffered quite a setback in my
thinking and felt that you made a very dramatic and radical decision in making these
available.”548 Gray held his own, maintaining that he had weighed the level of controversy
stemming from his decision prior to making such a generous offer; his rationale, however, was
that he intended to uphold the FBI’s credibility in the investigation and the only way to do so
would be to make such files available for examination.549
Senator Hruska found Gray’s answer acceptable. He encouraged the committee to
remember:
That the people involved in the Watergate investigation have not been nominated to be
FBI Director; Louis Patrick Gray III has. We ought to talk about Mr. Louis Patrick Gray
III, his accomplishments, his integrity, his record, and what he has done since he has been
Acting Director. We ought to leave other inquiries for other occasions, other committees,
and other authorities.550
His admonition highlighted the real challenge of Gray’s hearing. The senators were not only
assessing his fitness for the position of FBI director, but they were also trying to determine just
how much of a Nixon supporter he was. The president and his administration were already
547
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under scrutiny for Watergate. In the midst of Watergate, Nixon had nominated a personal friend
who had given politically tinged speeches in favor of the Republican party and Nixon both
before and after being appointed Interim Director. His speeches encouraged loyalty to the
administration on behalf of government employees. Thus, his confirmation hearing and its many
forays into his political affiliations represented a moment in time when the Senate worried less
about the FBI itself and more about what the FBI might be capable of when working exclusively
in support of a president.551 They worried that the FBI, under Gray’s leadership, would function
less like a federal law enforcement agency and more like a state police.
One of the justifications that Patrick Gray used when asked about supplying information
to the White House included a legal memo written by the Bureau’s legal counsel merely three
days after the Watergate break in took place. The memo, addressed to Assistant Director Mark
Felt, stated:
You advised me that the Acting Director desires an opinion on the legal basis for
dissemination by the FBI to the White House of information concerning a criminal case
being investigated. More specifically, if I understand the situation, he means a case being
investigated as a criminal case for prosecution involving a violation of Title 18, United
States Code, and which does, or may, implicate Federal employees as subjects. Our reply
is limited to such a situation.
For reasons shown below, we conclude that the FBI has no authority, or duty, to initiate
dissemination of information to the White House concerning the criminal investigation in
progress. Note that we use the word “initiate.” We did not consider the matter of
disseminating such information to the White House on specific White House request. In
this latter situation we assume that since the President is the top boss of the Executive
Branch he can obtain from that branch any information that he wishes. This is a different
matter, legally and otherwise, from the one in which we would on our own decision
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initiate dissemination of the information.552
Towards the end of the memo, the legal counsel addressed past actions of the Bureau, writing:
This discussion raises the question of legality of dissemination to the White House in the
past. It is my understanding under Mr. Hoover we disseminated information on criminal
cases to the White House when, as, and if Mr. Hoover directed that we do so, and this
was done on Mr. Hoover’s instructions without reference to the matter of whether we did
or did not have the authority. The practice apparently had the sanction, grudgingly or
otherwise, of the Attorney General and apparently was at least condoned by the White
House. This is not to say either that it was right or it was wrong. Our only position is
that from a strict legal standpoint, there was no specific authority for it. The authority
and the obligation of the FBI are to keep the Attorney General fully informed and to
leave the rest to him.553
But the kicker came when Gray admitted to Senator Kennedy that he had allowed White House
staffer Dean to sit in on FBI interviews concerning the Watergate investigation. Not only had
Gray allowed one of Nixon’s staffers to witness the FBI”s questioning of White House staff, but
he also failed to follow up on important investigatory leads involving the White House. During
the hearing, Senator Ervin referenced a Washington Post article that stated a person of interest in
the Watergate case, Donald Segretti:
had been subpoenaed to testify in the Watergate criminal prosecution, that he had been
interviewed by the FBI, and that 2 days before the convening of the Republican National
Convention he was in Miami, and that a White House aide showed him statements which
he said had been made to the FBI, and was told about giving some kind of suggestions
from the White House aid as to how he should testify in case he were called as a witness
in the criminal prosecution.554
Senator Ervin was accusing Dean of showing Segretti the FBI files passed along to him by Gray.
Segretti was key to the Watergate investigation, as he led FBI agents into the twisted accounting
supporting the Committee to Re Elect the President (CREEP). He hired undercover agents to
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carry out CREEP’s dirty work, including break-ins. In exchange for the recruits’ loyalty and
work, Segretti promised them high profile jobs within the Nixon administration following the
president’s reelection.555 During their investigation into Watergate, Bob Woodward and Carl
Bernstein wrote that Segretti assured his undercover agents that Nixon knew about the work they
were doing for him and that they would be rewarded accordingly.556 His involvement in the
Watergate break-in was crucial to understanding the incident’s connections to the White House.
So, the possibility that Segretti was receiving insider information from the White House about
the FBI’s investigation was serious business. Senator Ervin asked Gray if the FBI had
interviewed Segretti in order to determine whether he was receiving such information from the
White House. Gray replied that he was never interviewed as such; he said:
The only thing that was ever done was the call that I made to Mr. Dean when I saw this
article in the newspaper. Because, the only individual who had these from me was Mr.
Dean, and in point of fact, you know, Mr. Segretti would have been entitled to look at
these had he asked to look at them. This is the law of the case.557
That Gray had not ordered the FBI to follow up on the leak was bad enough; that the Interim
Director of the FBI believed that anyone on the White House’s payroll could look at the FBI’s
Watergate investigation files was astounding. Gray had interpreted the legal opinion from FBI
counsel to mean that the White House could look at documents related to any investigation, and
furthermore, it could allow any individual, including those currently under investigation by the
FBI to see such files. He was not worried about the possibility that Dean would allow Segretti to
see FBI files prior to being interviewed by FBI agents; in fact, he legally justified such action by
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Dean.
Gray’s actions in the Watergate investigation became central to his confirmation hearing.
Senator Byrd acknowledged that the confirmation hearing was taking place at an unfortunate
time and lamented his inability to separate Gray’s confirmation from the Watergate case. Had
the investigation ended before the confirmation, then the senators would have had an easier time
deciding whether, in retrospect, the FBI had carried out a thorough investigation. But, since they
were assessing the FBI’s ability to look into Watergate while also assessing the FBI’s leader, it
made for complicated hearing. Senator Byrd stated:
If we start with the premise, as I think I have to, that there is something about the
Watergate that has not yet been brought to light, and then if we go to the next premise,
that being that the investigative agency, the FBI, did not in fact investigate and probe in
depth, and with absolute thoroughness and with absolute objectivity—which premise I
have to accept at this moment—then when we consider that you were the Acting Director
for 10 months during this investigation, I have no alternative but to vote against the
confirmation. I wish that it were possible for us to be able to delay this vote on the
confirmation until we knew what really took place with respect to the Watergate incident
and how well the FBI really conducted the investigation.558
Of all the senators on the committee, only Senator Hruska took advantage of Gray’s offer to
review the FBI’s Watergate files. He recounted that he was “impressed by the absolute
thoroughness and the painstaking detail in which all of the aspects were pursued.”559 Despite
Senator Hruska’s favorable review, the committee as a whole found Gray’s prowess as lead
investigator seriously lacking. For the remainder of Gray’s time before the committee, he
received hours upon hours of questions relating to the case. Senator Byrd continued to press
upon Gray’s allowance to Dean to sit in on FBI interviews of White House personnel. Gray
defended himself, saying:
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Mr. Gray: No, I was not really in a position to object. I saw nothing wrong with it. If the
counsel to the President of the United States tells me that he wants to attend interviews of
individuals who are members of the President’s staff—including some highly placed
ones—and that he is charged with conducting an inquiry by the President to determine
whether any of these fellows are involved, I am not going to question that, Senator.
Senator Byrd: What kind of answers to questions do you think you will get in that kind of
situation?
Mr. Gray: I have no idea.
Senator Byrd: Do you not think the White House personnel are going to be intimidated
by the presence of Mr. Dean?
Mr. Gray: If they had any involvement, I would say perhaps they would be intimidated.
That really depends upon their involvement. 560
Based upon his answers, it appeared that Gray seemed unaware or indifferent to the idea that
Dean might be the one who, all along, was the one with the involvement. Only in an exchange
with Senator Gurney did Gray publically own up to this possibility. When Senator Gurney asked
if there was anything unusual about Dean being present when White House staff were
interrogated, Gray replied no. He once again stressed that Dean served as counsel to the
president and that his attorney-client privilege allowed him to be there. Senator Gurney retorted:
Isn’t there another reason why he would want to be present? Certainly it occurs to me
that any investigator or lawyer charged with an investigation would want to be present
when a witness testified or was interrogated so that he could not only hear the answers
but also to get an impression of the demeanor of the witness; isn’t this a fair thing to
say?561
Gray responded that he could conceive of that being a reason, but Dean had never mentioned it
to him. Senator Tunney challenged Gray by asking him how much of the Watergate files Dean
had actually seen. Gray defended himself, saying he had only allowed Dean to see the files he
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himself had seen. Dean only saw 82 of the 186 reports.562 But Senator Tunney continued
prodding. “Let’s just say that he made a request for all the reports?” he asked. Gray responded,
“In a situation like this where he is charged by the President to conduct an inquiry, yes, I
probably would have made them available to him.”563 At one point, Senator Kennedy asked
Gray whether he ever considered “the possibility that Mr. Dean was more involved in this
Watergate affair than otherwise might have been thought, and whether, on the basis of
‘regularity,’ access to the files and interviews should have been extended?”564 His question led
to the following exchange:
Gray: I feel quite certain that my memory is good on this, is that we had no indications
whatsoever that Mr. Dean was involved in any way, where he might have been asked to
represent anybody. This just never did come up. I knew, of course, that he was counsel
to the President, and I knew that the President had named him to conduct this inquiry. I
did not at any time believe that he was compromised nor did I believe at any time that,
had there been any reason to consider that he was compromised in any way by Watergate,
the President would have designated him as the individual to conduct the—
Senator Kennedy: Perhaps the President didn’t know.
Mr. Gray: This could be a possibility, Senator. Really, that would be a very, very remote
possibility. We really had no information on the basis of the reports coming in to us from
all kinds of sources that Mr. Dean was involved in any way.565
Kennedy continued to question Gray, asking if he had spoken with John Mitchell when he
learned about the Watergate incident. Though Mitchell and Gray stayed in Los Angeles at the
same hotel on the date of the break-in, Gray maintained that they had not spoken. He asked
specifics about persons that the FBI had interviewed; Gray referenced informational sheets
assembled for him by FBI personnel, seemingly detached from the case itself. After days of
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testimony, the senators had heard enough. They turned their questions over to outside experts,
and Gray, war-weary and defeated, concluded his testimony.
The committee called John Elliff to testify. Elliff, a political scientist and Brandeis
University professor who had studied the FBI since the Princeton Conference of 1971, was wellversed in the history of the Bureau. When he heard Gray’s offer on the first day of his hearing to
make available to the entire Senate the FBI’s Watergate files, Elliff was concerned enough to
write the Attorney General, Richard Kleindienst, to emphasize the unprecedented (and absurd)
nature of such an offer. Elliff argued that Gray’s offer of the Watergate files had been presented
independent of any approval on behalf of the Attorney General. He had singlehandedly decided
to open the files. Second, he argued that Elliff’s offer had contradicted the legal opinion of his
own Bureau counsel. Though the FBI counsel had said that Gray was not to initiate any offer of
files to the White House, he had a duty to supply them when asked to do so. With the Senate,
however, Gray volunteered the files upon his own volition. Elliff wrote in his statement to the
committee, “it is not clear why there is a difference between the two situations and why the
Acting FBI Director should be able [to] go beyond the bounds of the explicit request made by the
Senate”566 in offering the files. Elliff’s testimony highlighted the tension inherent in allowing
the FBI Director to report to both the President and the Attorney General, and how Gray, in some
instances, bypassed the Attorney General completely to adhere to the President’s interests.
But Elliff’s testimony also drew attention to another problem tangential to Gray’s
confirmation. He gave a long exposition on the many problems inherent in the FBI. He
discussed his concern that the FBI had no legislative charter and therefore its intelligence
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gathering had largely been directed by the executive orders of past presidents.567 He referenced
Gray’s continuance of previous policies and programs related to collection on so-called “radical”
groups.568 Most concerning, as technology increased, so did the ability to collect surveillance.569
And finally, he declared “the FBI’s intelligence system appears to be founded on out-of-date
assumptions.”570 Elliff’s testimony concentrated not on Gray, but rather on all the problems
inherent in the Bureau. He remained fixated on the lack of a legislative charter for the agency,
reminding the senators that the Bureau’s intelligence capabilities stemmed wholly from
presidents’ whims. The irony of that allowance was not yet known to the committee. They had
no idea the depths to which Nixon had already gone to protect himself and to secure his chances
for reelection. The Watergate investigation had progressed to a significant extent at this point.
The senators knew that Watergate had implicated those working for CREEP; what they did not
yet know was that it would also implicate Nixon. When he was asked about whether Gray had
politicized the position of director by carrying out the Watergate investigation while working
with Dean, he replied:
My personal impression is that if it was a sin, it was a sin of transition. He was a man
new to his job, new to his responsibilities, an Acting Director and not a full-fledged
permanent Director of the FBI, and that perhaps as permanent Director he would have
said, ‘Mr. President, I will conduct this investigation, I advise you not to have an inhouse investigation on your own. That will only tend to politicize an investigation which
ought to be an objective, neutral investigation.’571
Elliff generously gave Gray an allowance. Had he politicized the role of director? Perhaps; but
if he did, Elliff reasoned, it was only because he was new to the job. Finally, Elliff expressed his
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hope that Gray and future presidents had learned, following the Watergate investigation, that
when an investigation leads close to the White House, the President:
ought to exercise the self-restraint himself not to duplicate the investigation being
conducted by the FBI. He should not attempt to inject into the investigative process a
man of his own as was done in this case; and if future occasions such as this do arise,
when the temptation is there to have a Presidential aide conduct an investigation that
ought to be in the hands of the FBI, both sides should resist that temptation.572
Elliff’s testimony was compelling, in that he identified many issues that needed to be addressed
by Congress concerning the FBI—namely the lack of a charter. Yet, he did not add anything
noteworthy to the discussion on Gray.
One of the most poignant testimonies in the hearing came from Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., a past
chairman of the Americans for Democratic Action.573 His testimony, unlike Elliff’s, spoke to
Gray’s fitness as director. Rauh opposed Gray’s confirmation. In his prepared statement, he
elucidated an interesting personal history with the FBI. In 1950, he wrote a favorable review of
a book that had attacked the FBI and Hoover.574 He said, “The review appeared in the
Washington Post on a Sunday morning. When the Senate met on Monday noon, Senator Bourke
Hickenlooper, who I had never met, took the floor to denounce me with a speech prepared from
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my dossier at the FBI.”575 He later summarized, “what happened was this: FBI materials were
used to silence or attempt to silence a critic.”576 Despite his negative encounter with the Bureau,
he also had a very favorable one. He described a situation that occurred in 1969 when his client,
Joseph A. Yablonski, was murdered. He said, “it seemed certain that the murder was unionconnected and union-directed. But I was helpless to prove this important fact myself.”577
Initially, Attorney General John Mitchell and Secretary of Labor George P. Shultz refused to
take the case, but eventually, public criticism forced Mitchell to order the FBI to investigate.
Rauh testified, “”the Bureau’s determination, thoroughness, and ability obtained overwhelming
evidence of the involvement of the United Mine Workers officials and made possible the
cleaning up of one of the country’s greatest trade unions.”578
Having seen both the good and the bad that the Bureau was capable of doing, Rauh
served as a credible and rational voice when he expressed his disdain at the prospect of Gray
becoming the permanent director. He said:
I have been an FBI watcher for 30 years, and I want to say for Mr. Hoover that I do not
believe he did a partisan political act in those 30 years. I am not defending the use of
FBI materials to discredit critics, and as one who was subjected to that treatment, it is not
a very happy treatment. But it is different; there is not the same degree of danger that the
use of FBI files in politics would be.
I never thought I would be saying that I was thinking of the good old days of J. Edgar
Hoover. [Laughter.]
But I want to make my point clear: Mr. Hoover would not let politics get in there. He did
some other things that we are all worried about, but on this item he was a giant, and that
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is what we must never forget. And it was because, through my personal experience, I
could explain the difference between using FBI files in a partisan way and using them
against your critics, whether you like that or not, that I referred to this incident [involving
Rauh’s Washington Post review].
Now, both for the good the FBI has done—its magnificent police work—and for the
dangers of the dossiers, surveillance, wiretapping, and bugging, there is no place for a
partisan political figure at the head of the FBI.
Its whole moral depends upon being nonpolitical, and the dangers in the use of its great
power now are really beyond description. So the question is, is that danger there? We
believe it is…
And everything that has happened in the last 10 months confirms the worst fears that one
would have of taking a political appointee and putting him into this job that requires a
giant to stand against political pressures.579
Rauh’s testimony hit straight at the issue. He was not a fan of Hoover, but he worried that even
with Hoover’s mistakes, he was a better director than Gray because he did not let himself
succumb to partisanship. Rauh was clear in saying that Hoover brought his own set of issues to
bear. Hoover had virulently attacked the Bureau’s critics (including Rauh). His anti-communist
ideology had diverged into paranoia, something Rauh, as former chairman of the Americans for
Democratic Action knew well. Rauh, however, praised Hoover for avoiding partisanship. His
testimony was powerful. He had neither blind affection nor blind hatred for the Bureau. He had
experienced Hoover’s wrath for his review and had also witnessed the Hoover’s propensity to
toss aside politics when investigating a crime, no matter the victim. Rauh believed that Gray, as
a political appointee, did not have the stature to be a “giant” against political pressures, and he
was right. Gray, an interim director of the FBI and an ambitious people pleaser, sought Nixon’s
approval in everything he did. He did whatever Nixon told him to do. While Hoover made
Nixon angry in order to preserve his control of the Bureau, Gray offered the Bureau to Nixon on
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a silver platter.
Gray’s automaton-like desire to please surfaced yet again in a final exchange with
Senator Kennedy. On the final day of the hearing, Gray had been called to the stand to testify
one last time. Senator Kennedy asked Gray about when he learned of a work relationship
between Gordon Liddy, one of the Watergate burglars, and Nixon’s counsel, Dean. His question
led to the following exchange:
Senator Kennedy: When you saw Mr. Dean’s name mentioned and the name of one of the
defendants mentioned, what sort of antenna went up?
Mr. Gray: No antenna went up. I couldn’t make that kind of jump at that point in time,
that because he had recommended Liddy as a counsel to the committee he had to be
involved. And as I testified this morning, Senator, I don’t think the President is going to
name his counsel to conduct an inquiry of White House involvement if he has any reason
to believe the counsel is involved.
Senator Kennedy: How is the President going to determine this?
Mr. Gray: I think the President knows perhaps even more than the FBI Director about
things that go on within the entire Nation. I don’t have the picture on the White House
staff.
Senator Kennedy: Why is he requesting that information from you if he already knows?
Mr. Gray: That is the President I am talking about, Senator.
Senator Kennedy: That is the one I am talking about. If you say on the one hand he
knows more about it than you people, yet he has requested you people to look into it, then
he is relying upon you, isn’t he?
Mr. Gray: He knows more about his own staff and certainly he is not going to have a man
there as his counsel who is involved in any way.580
Gray simply could not fathom that Dean or Nixon would be involved in Watergate. He held the
President in such high regard that he was above reproach. Gray anchored the entire FBI
investigation of Watergate on the assumption that Nixon and his innermost staff, including Dean,
were innocent. His inoculation to their possible guilt became an issue for Senator Byrd on the
final day of Gray’s confirmation hearing. Byrd marveled at Gray’s baseless trust of the Nixon
administration, stating:
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Senator Byrd: You have known of Presidents being betrayed, have you not, by a
confidant?
Mr. Gray: I think there may have been some Presidents in our history who have found
themselves in this situation, yes, sir.
Senator Byrd: And surely Senators have been betrayed?
Mr. Gray: Yes, sir.
Senator Byrd: Governors betrayed?
Mr. Gray: Yes, sir.
Senator Byrd: Even Christ was betrayed by one of His chosen few. What I can’t
understand, this presumption of regularity goes so far and so deep that everything is
accepted at face value, without question, without the slightest iota of suspicion.581
The exchange continued, with Senator Byrd becoming increasingly angry. Byrd was especially
frustrated to learn that the FBI contacted Dean on June 22 to ask if Howard Hunt, one of the
Watergate burglars, had an office in the White House. Gray testified that when asked on the 22nd
if Hunt had an office, Dean said he would have to check. Yet, Gray also indicated that Hunt’s
possessions from his office were removed from his office on June 19 and placed in Dean’s office
on the 20.582 In other words, Byrd caught Dean’s “contradiction.” He stated:
Senator Byrd: You indicated that Mr. Dean probably lied to the FBI agnets as you now
look back, yet yesterday you said you would continue to send to him raw FBI files if he
requested them. Why would you now continue to send raw FBI files to an individual
who probably lied, to use your words, to an FBI agent?
Mr. Gray: Well, Senator Byrd, I think that you have got to realize once again that I am a
Bureau Chief in an executive department of the Government, that I have to take orders
from somebody, that I do report to somebody, that I am just not out there in the open, you
know, independent and doing exactly as I please, and that man is Counsel to the President
of the United States.583
Senator Byrd continued his questioning of Gray. He asked:
Senator Byrd: Mr. Gray, where does your first duty lie, to the President of the United
States or to the FBI?
Mr. Gray: I’m sorry, sir?
Senator Byrd: Where does your first duty lie, to the President of the United States or to
the FBI?
Mr. Gray: I think that that is a tough question and I have said that before. I am a Bureau
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Chief in an executive department of the Government. I take orders from the President of
the United States and, as I think I previously testified, if the Congress wants to put this
FBI out into independent orbit and let its Director operate the FBI as he sees fit, we may
indeed be creating a situation in which we are going to develop a national police force.
This is a very real risk. It is a very serious question. It is not a light question. But at this
time, by virtue of congressional enactment, I am in the position of Acting Director at the
pleasure of the President of the United States. I do take my orders from the President of
the United States. I can’t evade that.584
By the end of the hearing, Senator Byrd declared that he could not vote in favor of Gray’s
confirmation. He cited a long list of indiscretions on the part of Gray: he had made political
speeches on behalf of Nixon (including at the City Club of Cleveland); he supplied information
from FBI field offices to assist Nixon’s presidential campaign; having visited 58 of 59 FBI field
offices during his ten months as interim director, he was out of the office too frequently; his
dealings with Dean regarding the Watergate investigation demonstrated a lack of independence
in the investigation; he had taken Dean’s suspicious answers at face value and had not
investigated them further; he had stated in his confirmation hearing that he would continue to
turn over raw files to Dean. 585 He concluded that he could not vote to confirm Gray’s
appointment as director, explaining:
I think that the image of the FBI has suffered, in view of all the developments which
occurred during his acting directorship, and I think that the professionalism, morale, and
efficiency of the FBI have likewise suffered, as has public confidence in the FBI. There
is too much evidence of political activity on the part of the Acting Director; there is too
much subservience to the White House; there are too many unanswered questions with
respect to the possible misuse of FBI files in connection with the Watergate
investigation—all of these, together with the foregoing detailed reasons, are sufficient to
justify a fear that the FBI could, in the future, become a White House national police
force to be used in political campaigns, thus endangering the constitutional liberties of all
Americans.586
By the end of the hearing, Gray’s ability to serve as director had been called into question; he
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had been berated, prodded, and deflated with the senators’ many questions. All that remained
was the committee’s final decision.
Before the committee made its final decision, Gray became compelled to confess an
indiscretion. Although he initially denied disposing of any FBI files on behalf of the Nixon
Administration, he recanted his story after a sleepless night. After the hearings had ended, Gray
called Assistant Attorney General Henry Peterson and admitted, “[John] Dean did give me two
files. I wasn’t ready to admit that to you yesterday and I’m sorry.” When Peterson asked to see
the files, Gray stated, “I burned them.”587
Gray explained to Attorney General Kleindienst that the files had come from the White
House safe of one of the Watergate burglars, E. Howard Hunt. Gray maintained that the
documents were not connected to Watergate but rather included some top-secret State
Department cables and documents about Senator Ted Kennedy’s car accident at Cappaquiddick
in 1969.588 He recalled that John Dean had given him the files in the presence of John
Ehrlichman and declared, “these should never see the light of day.”589 Gray recalled, “I took
their statements at face value.”590 He took the documents home, where he stored them in his
closet. Six months later, he burned them along with his discarded Christmas wrapping paper.
When Kleindienst heard Gray’s confession, he alerted Nixon, who withdrew his nomination
from Gray. His tenure as FBI director was done.
Three days before Nixon’s resignation in 1974, the tapes subpoenaed from Nixon’s office
confirmed what prosecutors involved in the Watergate investigation had suspected. A recording
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on June 23, 1972—six days after the Watergate burglary—revealed Nixon’s involvement in the
cover-up of the break-in during the earliest days of the investigation. When the tape became
public, it would be the tipping point that led to Nixon’s resignation.591 That summer morning,
Nixon and his chief of staff, Bob Haldeman, brainstormed a way to derail the FBI’s investigation
into the burglary. Haldeman briefed Nixon on the Bureau’s progress, explaining, “their
investigation is now leading into some productive areas, because they’ve been able to trace the
money . . . and it goes in some directions we don’t want it to go.”592 Haldeman proposed a
solution. He explained, “the way to handle this now is for us to have [CIA director Vernon]
Walters call Pat Gray and just say, “Stay the hell out of this. This is—there’s some business here
we don’t want you going any further on.”593 Journalist Rick Perlstein contextualized this
conversation, writing that John Mitchell (former Attorney General and director of the Committee
to Re-Elect the President) and Dean had come up with the plan the evening before. They
believed they could put an end to the FBI’s investigation by “simply [telling] the FBI that, yes,
this whole break-in was part of a CIA operation. A secret CIA operation that the FBI had no
business looking into.594 The CIA and FBI had an agreement not to meddle with each others’
sources. Nixon’s staff believed they could end the FBI’s investigation by convincing the CIA
director to claim CIA sources were involved. In doing so, the FBI would have to back away.
Walters did approach Gray and ask him to back off. The FBI temporarily redirected its
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investigation, only to meander eventually back towards evidence suggesting White House
involvement.
Following his resignation as interim director, Gray was suicidal.595 He recalled:
Until that moment I had total faith and belief in the government of the United States and
in the office of the presidency. I could not accept the fact that we in the FBI—and the
American people—had been lied to so blithely by the president and the top officials of
our government. The destruction of the two Hunt files, the lies of Dean and Ehrlichman
about Dean conducting an investigation for the president and reporting directly to the
president, and my resulting cooperation with Dean and the fulfillment of his requests in
the name of the president were just too much for me to reconcile.596
In that moment, the Senate confirmation committee’s fears were confirmed. Gray had allowed
himself to be used by the president in an effort to hinder the FBI’s investigation into Watergate.
He had allowed Nixon’s men to meddle in the investigation, and though he could not imagine at
the time that they were involved in any wrongdoing, it turned out that they very much were
guilty. Gray would continue to face hardship long after his tenure as director ended. Though the
Watergate special prosecutor decided not to prosecute Gray for his destruction of Hunt’s files,
the Attorney General’s office later indicted Gray and his Associate Director, Felt, for a black bag
job that the FBI ran against Weather Underground. Gray spent years and all of his personal
savings on a defense team. Eventually, the Attorney General’s office dropped the charges
against Gray. In the preface to his memoir, Gray’s son recounted the toll that Watergate and the
subsequent charges took on his father. He wrote:
Watergate was his undoing. Though he had not been part of any of the conspiracies, it
would take him the next eight years to prove it. Five federal grand juries, four
committees of Congress, dozens of magazine articles, hundreds of newspaper accounts.
The cover of Time magazine. The dust jack of All The President’s Men. All of them
lumping him in with the actual criminals, all of them assuming his guilt. None offering
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any proof.597
Gray is a tragic figure in the history of the FBI. It is difficult to imagine who could have
adequately filled the gaping hole in leadership left after Hoover’s death. It is also difficult to
imagine that anyone short of Hoover could have withstood the onslaught of intervention and
deceit the Nixon White House hurled at Gray. From the beginning of his tenure as interim
director, it seemed that circumstances did not stand in his favor. Although Hoover was
vulnerable towards the end of his life, Nixon could not penetrate the Bureau’s political
impartiality. Nixon could not make the FBI work for him. With Gray, however, Nixon
handpicked a man who demonstrated blind loyalty towards him. Gray was loyal first to Nixon
and second to the Bureau. Even during the Watergate investigation, he could not fathom that the
president and his men could be capable of committing crimes. Gray learned the extent of the
corruption the hard way.
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CONCLUSION

The FBI under Nixon faced its most tumultuous days. For nearly half a century, the
Bureau resided under the protection of a stalwart leader, Hoover. Though historians viewed his
authority over the Bureau as impenetrable, his final days in office speak otherwise. At the end of
his life, Hoover was stuck in a machine of his own making. He had led the Bureau to implement
effective intelligence gathering policies. Under his leadership, agents carried out black bag jobs
at his behest, collecting multitudes of useful information to prosecute criminals. When Hoover
felt the public’s approval shift against him, he struggled to quell his agent’s eagerness to
continue collecting intelligence. His rogue assistant director, William Sullivan, did everything in
his power to assist the Nixon Administration’s efforts to collect political intelligence. Hoover’s
firing of Sullivan was seen, at the time, as the action of a zealous and territorial leader. This
work, however, argues for a more complicated examination into Hoover’s actions. Hoover’s
firing of Sullivan and his sabotage of the Huston Plan was a last-ditch effort to save himself from
the wrath of a growing chorus of critics. The Princeton Conference of 1971 was a public ridicule
of Hoover. The nation’s brightest academics converged on an Ivy League campus to critically
assess the Bureau’s recent actions. For years, Hoover and the Bureau had been one and the
same; thus, Hoover saw the conference as nothing more than a critique of himself.
President Richard Nixon never had to fire Hoover. When Hoover passed away
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unexpectedly in May 1972, Nixon was able to appoint Hoover’s successor. L. Patrick Gray, a
loyal acquaintance of Nixon, assumed the position of interim director a mere six weeks before
the Watergate break-in. Gray never had the gravitas to fill the enormous void that Hoover left
behind. His inadequacy became even starker in light of Watergate. Prior to his position at the
FBI, Gray had been a senior bureaucrat in the Department of Justice. He served his superiors
with blind obedience. He was excited at the prospect of becoming the permanent director of the
Bureau. He was no match, however, for Hoover, who had spent decades standing toe to toe with
presidents throughout multiple wars, both hot and cold. Hoover’s absence and the weak leader
that Nixon chose to replace him both represented a crisis for the Bureau.
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AFTERWORD

In the days and months following Gray’s resignation, the FBI received fresh attention
from Congress. Watergate had revealed new depths of corruption within the government.
Congress decided to look deeper and see how far wrongdoing had extended throughout the
government.
In 1975, Senator Frank Church, a Democrat from Indiana, chaired a Senate Committee to
investigate the intelligence community. Though the committee would be mostly remembered for
its unveiling of CIA abuse, it also investigated the FBI’s COINTELPRO, the counterintelligence
operation unearthed in the Media, Pennsylvania FBI documents. The attention would shift back
to Hoover, and because the committee looked at Hoover at the apex of his career, his final days
as a vulnerable director would be forgotten. Hoover as he was under Nixon became a distant
memory. When the Freedom of Information Act became law in 1974, intelligence agencies were
forced to release previously classified documents to the public. Historians and journalists, eager
to examine the depth of Hoover’s wrongdoing, rushed to procure the newly released files. They
were eager to examine the depth of Hoover’s wrongdoing. His reluctance to collect intelligence
at the end of his life fell by the wayside.
Gray would also be forgotten. Nixon appointed Clarence Kelley, a former FBI agent and
police chief from Kansas City, Missouri. Kelley worked to reform the Bureau in the aftermath of
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the Church Committee’s examination of the Bureau. Keenly aware of Hoover’s misdeeds,
Kelley repaired relations with the CIA and worked to improve the American public’s deeply
negative perception of the Bureau. Unfortunately, he was ousted from office after allowing
Bureau repairmen perform light carpentry work on his home, paid for Bureau funds. Kelley’s
wife was dying of cancer at the time, and Kelley claimed he had not the time nor energy to worry
about his house. He promised he would reimburse the Bureau. To his dismay, neither Congress
nor President Jimmy Carter had any patience for an FBI director’s wrongdoings. Kelley retired
from office in 1977, and Carter replaced him with Judge William Webster, a federal judge who
led the Bureau into the 1980s with a fierce attention to the rule of law.
Yet, the Bureau’s time under Nixon would remain crucial days that redefined the
relationship between FBI director and the president.

191

BIBLIOGRAPHY

192

PRIMARY SOURCES
Archives
Richard Nixon Presidential Papers, Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda,
California
Edmund S. Muskie Archive, Bates College, Lewiston, Maine
Eleanor Roosevelt Papers Project, George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
James O. Eastland Collection, University of Mississippi, University, Mississippi
Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia
Robert Byrd Archives, Robert C. Byrd Center for Legislative Studies, Shepherdstown, West
Virginia
FBI Vault, Fbi.gov
Personal Papers of John Elliff, Alexandria, VA
Interviews
W. Dennis Aiken, June 22, 2015.
John Elliff, March 9-13, 2015.
Christopher Pyle, August 20, 2015.
Government Documents
US Congress. Senate. Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary: Nomination of Louis
Patrick Gray, III. 93rd Cong., 1st sess., February-March 1973.
US Congress. Senate. The Huston Plan: Hearing before the Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the United States. 94th Cong.,
1st sess., September 23-25, 1975.
US Congress, Senate. Memorial Tributes to J. Edgar Hoover in the Congress of the United
States and Various Articles and Editorials Relating to His Life and Work. 93d Cong., 2d sess.,
1974.

US Congress. House of Representatives. Inquiry Into the Destruction of Former FBI Director J.
Edgar Hoover’s Files and FBI Recordkeeping: hearing before a subcommittee of the Committee
on Government Operations. 94th Cong., 1st sess., December 1, 1975.
Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (The Kerner Commission).
New York: Bantam Books, 1968.
The Complete Collection of Political Documents Ripped-Off From the FBI Office in Media, PA.,
March 8, 1971. WIN Peace and Freedom Through Nonviolent Action. Liberty Publications:
Media, PA. Vol. VIII, Numbers 4 & 5, March 1, 1972.
Vivian S. Chu and Henry B. Hogue, “FBI Director: Appointment and Tenure,” Congressional
Research Service, February 19, 2014.
Court Cases
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
U.S. v. Totten, 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
U.S. v. United States District Court, 444 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1971).
U.S. v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Monographs
Gray, L. Patrick and Ed Gray. In Nixon’s Web: A Year in the Crosshairs of Watergate, New
York: Times Books, 2008.
Hoffman, Abbie. Steal This Book. New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1971, reprinted 1996.
Liddy, G. Gordon. Will: The Autobiography of G. Gordon Liddy. New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1996.
Nixon, Richard. RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978.
Sullivan, William. The Bureau: My Thirty Years in Hoover’s FBI. New York: Pinnacle Books,
194

1979.
News Articles
Chicago Tribune
Daily News
Los Angeles Times
National Public Radio
NBC News
The Nation
The New Republic
New York Times
Providence Journal
Time Magazine
Washington Monthly
Washington Post
Washington Evening Star
Washington Star

195

SECONDARY SOURCES
Monographs
Austin, Curtis J. Up Against the Wall: Violence in the Making and Unmaking of the Black
Panther Party. Fayetteville, AR: University of Arkansas Press, 2006.
Batvinis, Ray. The Origins of FBI Counterintelligence. Lawrence, KS: University Press of
Kansas, 2007.
Blackstock, Nelson and Cathy Perkus. COINTELPRO: The FBI’s Secret War on Political
Freedom. New York: Pathfinder Press, 1976.
Burroughs, Bryan. Days of Rage: America’s Radical Underground, The FBI, and the Forgotten
Age of Revolutionary Violence. New York: Penguin Press, 2015.
Cook, Fred J. The FBI Nobody Knows. New York: Macmillan, 1964.
Cooper, Courtney Ryley. Ten Thousand Enemies. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1935.
Cunningham, David. There’s Something Happening Here: The New Left, The Klan, and FBI
Counterintelligence. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004.
Darden, Joe T. and Richard W. Thomas, Detroit: Race Riots, Racial Conflicts, and Efforts to
Bridge the Racial Divide. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2013.
Elliff, John T. Crime, Dissent, and the Attorney General: The Justice Department in the 1960s.
Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971.
Felt, Mark and John O’Connor. A G-Man’s Life: The FBI, Being “Deep Throat,” and the
Struggle for Honor in Washington. New York: PublicAffairs, 2006.
Finan, Christopher. From the Palmer Raids to the Patriot Act: A History of the Fight for Free
Speech in America. Boston: Beacon Press, 2007.
Garrow, David. Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1986.
Gentry, Curt. J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Inc.,
1991.
Gitlin, Todd. The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage. Rev. ed. New York: Bantam, 1993.
Isserman, Maurice. If I Had a Hammer…: The Death of the Old Left and the Birth of the New
196

Left. New York: Basic Books, 1987.
Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri. The FBI: A History. Hartford, CT: Yale University Press, 2008.
Jensen, Carl J., David H. McElreath and Melissa Graves. Introduction to Intelligence Studies.
Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2012.
Joseph, Peniel. Stokely: A Life. New York: Basic Civitas, 2014.
Joseph, Peniel. Waiting ‘Til the Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of Black Power in America.
New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2006.
Keller, William W. The Liberals and J. Edgar Hoover: Rise and Fall of a Domestic Intelligence
State. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989.
Kissinger, Henry. Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America’s Involvement In and
Extraction From the Vietnam War. New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 2003.
Lassiter, Matthew D. The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2006.
Lowenthal, Max. The Federal Bureau of Investigation. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1950.
Matusow, Allen. The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s. New York:
Harper & Row, 1984.
McMillan, John and Paul Buhle, eds. The New Left Revisited. Philadelphia, PA: Temple
University Press, 2003.
Medsger, Betty. The Burglary: The Discovery of J. Edgar Hoover’s Secret FBI. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 2014.
Miller, James. “Democracy is in the Streets”: From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago. Boston:
Harvard University Press, 1994.
Moran, Christopher K. and Christopher J. Murphy, eds. Intelligence Studies in Britain and the
US: Historiography Since 1946. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013.
Nixon, Richard. RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. New York: Simon & Schuster Inc., 1978.
O’Reilly, Kenneth. Hoover and the UnAmericans: The FBI, HUAC, and the Red Menace.
Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1983.
Perlstein, Rick. Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America, New York:
197

Scribner, 2008.
Powers, Richard Gid. Broken: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the FBI. New York:
Free Press, 2004.
Powers, Richard Gid. Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover. New York: The Free
Press, 1987.
Rosenfeld, Seth. Subversives: The FBI’s War on Student Radicals and Reagan’s Rise to Power.
New York: Picador, 2012.
Sugrue, Thomas J. The Origins of Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996.
Summers, Anthony. Official and Confidential: The Secret Life of J. Edgar Hoover, New York:
Putnam, 1993.
Theoharis, Athan G. J. Edgar Hoover, Sex, and Crime: An Historical Antidote. Chicago, IL: Ivan
R. Dee, 1995.
Theoharis, Athan G. and John Stuart Cox. The Boss: J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American
Inquisition. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1988.
Watters, Pat and Stephen Gillers, eds. Investigating the FBI: A Tough, Fair Look At The
Powerful Bureau, Its Present, and Its Future. New York: Doubleday, 1972.
Weiner, Tim. One Man Against the World: The Tragedy of Richard Nixon. New York: Henry
Holt and Company, 2015.
Whitehead, Don. The FBI Story: A Report to the People. New York: Random House, 1956.
Woodward, Bob and Carl Bernstein. The Secret Man: The Story of Watergate’s Deep Throat.
New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005.
Articles
Chomsky, Noam. “Domestic Terrorism: Notes on the State System of Oppression,” New
Political Science 21, no. 3 (September 1999), 303-324.
Feldstein, Mark. “Wallowing in Watergate: Historiography, Methodology, and Mythology in
Journalism’s Celebrated Moment.” American Journalism 31, no. 4 (2014): 550-570.
Gotham, Kevin. “A Study in American Agitation: J. Edgar Hoover’s Symbolic Construction of
the Communist Menace,” Mid-American Review of Sociology, 16, no. 2 (1992): 57-70.
198

Joseph, Peniel. “The Black Panther Movement: A State of the Field.” The Journal of American
History (December 2009), 751-776.
Morrison, Trevor W. “The Story of United States v. United States District Court (Keith): The
Surveillance Power” (2008). Columbia Public Law & Legal Theory Working Papers. Paper
08155.

199

VITA
MELISSA GRAVES
EDUCATION
Ph.D.

University of Mississippi
Oxford, Mississippi
ABD, Ph.D. Candidate
History, expected May 2016
Dissertation Title: Nixon’s FBI: The Bureau in Crisis
Major Field: United States, Post 1877 (emphasis in Cold War and
Intelligence Community / Defense history)
Minor Fields: Middle East History; US Religious History

M.A.

University of Mississippi
Oxford, Mississippi
History, 2011
Focus: Religious Fundamentalism

J.D.

University of Mississippi School of Law
Oxford, Mississippi
Law, 2007

Summer Coursework

University of Cambridge, Downing College
Cambridge, England
2006

B.A.

Hardin-Simmons University
Abilene, Texas
English and Communication, 2005
Summa Cum Laude

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
July 2015-Present
University of Mississippi Center for Intelligence and Security
Studies
University, MS
200

Interim Director
• Oversee a multi-million dollar budget and teaching staff for a minor of 80 students.
• Design curricula and programs targeted to undergraduate students.
• Ensure deliverables are met for ODNI Centers for Academic Excellence grant.
August 2011-Present
University of Mississippi Center for Intelligence and Security
Studies
University, MS
Instructor
• Teach intelligence analysis, writing, and briefing to upper-level college students.
• Teach about the history of the intelligence community, the intelligence community’s
relationship to policymaking, and national security law to introductory level college
students.
• Chair senior level students’ theses and capstone projects relating to intelligence and
national security.
• Instructor of record for the following courses: ISS 125, Introduction to Intelligence
Studies (Fall 2011, Spring 2012, Fall 2012, Spring 2013, Fall 2013, Spring 2014, Fall
2014, Spring 2015, Fall 2015) and ISS 351 and 352, Advanced Analytics (Fall 2012,
Spring 2013, Fall 2013, Spring 2014, Fall 2014, Spring 2015, Fall 2015); ISS 420 Special
Topics (Summer 2012); ISS 499 Capstone (Spring 2014, Spring 2015, Fall 2015).
December 2012-July 2015 University of Mississippi Center for Intelligence and Security
Studies
University, MS
Associate Director
• Conduct research on behalf of CISS including drafting grant proposals, overseeing book
and article projects, and overseeing faculty research grants. Submitted a grant proposal
that allowed the Center for Intelligence and Security Studies to become one of the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence’s Centers for Academic Excellence in 2012.
• Oversee and produce Days of Intrigue, a weekend-long intelligence and policymaking
case study to teach elite students from across the nation about how intelligence analysis
interacts with policy. The case study has become a standard across the Intelligence
Community for university analytical training, as evidenced by the Defense Intelligence
Agency’s adoption of the Days of Intrigue model for its Centers for Academic Excellence
program. The case study includes practitioners from US intelligence agencies (CIA,
DIA, FBI, NSA, and State INR as well as US politicians who serve as team leaders for
CISS students) and incorporates students from the University’s intelligence minor and
public policy major.
• Prepare student presentations for Five Eyes Analytic Workshop.
201

•

•
•

Establish and maintain academic collaborations with university intelligence studies
programs in the United Kingdom. Because of this collaboration, CISS has cohosted a
series of international intelligence research workshops with Brunel University as well as
held study abroad programs and engaged in scholarly publishing opportunities.
Manage center projects including international conferences / workshops, collaborations,
and publications.
Oversee student research, including presentations to U.S. and foreign intelligence
agencies.

May 2014-Present
American Council on Education
Washington DC
Curriculum Reviewer
• Travel to military bases to review intelligence curriculum and provide undergraduate /
graduate course credit.
• Interview military personnel to award college course credit based upon job duties.
January 2012-September 2012
Institute for Intergovernmental Research
Tallahassee, FL
Contractor
• Researched and wrote a report related to the future of policing and criminal law.
• Presented policy recommendations before the Department of Justice’s Director of Bureau
of Justice Association and the Police Futures Association in Washington, DC.
October 2008-December 2012
Center for Intelligence and Security Studies
University, MS
Project Coordinator
• Recruited high performing high school and university students to intelligence minor.
Cohort GPA averages in the 3.7-3.8 GPA range.
• Managed budgets for grant-related projects, totaling over $6 million.
• Traveled and presented at academic conferences as a representative of the center.
• Ensured program compliance with state and federal laws.
• Oversaw conference logistics for three international conferences.
• Wrote grant proposals and appropriations requests, resulting in an award of $6.8 million
in federal government appropriations and $1.3 million in grant awards.
May 2008-July 2008
District of Columbia
Summer Associate

Office of Attorney General

202

•
•

Drafted legal documents including motions, guardianship petitions, letters, and research
memos.
Corresponded with DDS case managers concerning court order statuses.

June 2007-July 2007
England
Legal Research Intern
•

Institute for Criminal Policy Research, King’s College London,

Wrote literature reviews on social, mental, and criminal issues for inclusion in the
Institute’s peer reviewed publications.

SPECIALIZED TRAINING
• Department of Homeland Security Analytical Writing and Briefing Seminar, 2013
• Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Behavioral Science Research Methods
Certification, University of Virginia, 2011
• University of Mississippi Office of Research and Sponsored Programs Research
Administration and Management Program Certification, 2009
BAR LICENSES
Texas (inactive since 2014)
Passed bar exam in Washington (2008)
GRANTS
- Graves, M., Dissertation Research Grant, University of Mississippi Office of Research
and Sponsored Programs, 2014, $1000, funded.
- Jensen, C. and Graves, M., “2014 Census of Publicly Funded Forensic Crime
Laboratories,” U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2013, $388,847,
not funded.
- Drafted proposal for Jensen, C., “University of Mississippi / Jackson State University
Intelligence Consortium,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence Centers for
Academic Excellence Program, 2011, $1,916,911, funded.
- Subcontractor, Stottler Henke and Pherson Associates, “IARPA SIRIUS Subcontract
with the Center for Intelligence and Security Studies,” IARPA, 2011, $179,573, not
funded.
PUBLICATIONS
BOOK CHAPTERS
- Graves, M., “FBI Historiography: From Leader to Organization.” Intelligence Studies in
Britain and the US: Historiography Since 1945. Eds. Christopher K. Moran and
Christopher J. Murphy. Edinburgh University Press Ltd., 2013, Print.
203

-

Graves, M. “Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.” Encyclopedia of Intelligence. 1st ed.
Boca Raton: Auerbach Publications, forthcoming 2015, Print.

BOOKS
- Tromblay, D. and Graves, M. Historical Dictionary of the FBI. Lanham: Rowman and
Littlefield, forthcoming 2017.
- Jensen, C.J., McElreath, D., and Graves, M. Introduction to Intelligence Studies. 2nd ed.
New York: Taylor and Francis, forthcoming 2016.
- Jensen, C.J., McElreath, D., and Graves, M. Introduction to Intelligence Studies. 1st ed.
New York: Taylor and Francis, 2012, Print.
PEER REVIEWED JOURNAL ARTICLES
- Graves, M.A., Jensen, C.J., Flaschka, W., Hill, C.D. “Days of Intrigue: Lessons Learned
From An Undergraduate Intelligence Case Simulation.” IALEIA Journal of Intelligence
Analysis, 2014, accepted.
- Regens, J.L., Mould, N., Jensen, C.J., and Graves, M.A. “Terrorism-centric Behaviors
and Adversarial Threat Awareness,” Social Science Quarterly, 2014, accepted.
- Regens, J.L., Mould, N., Jensen, C.J., Graves, M.A., and Edger, D.N. “Probabilistic
Graphical Modeling of Terrorism Threat Recognition Using Bayesian Networks and
Monte Carlo Simulation,” Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and
Ergonomics Society, 2014, currently under review.
- Regens, J.L., Mould, N., Jensen, C.J., Edger, D.N., Cid, D. and Graves, M.A., “Effect of
Intelligence Collection Training on Suspicious Activity Recognition by Front Line Police
Officers,” Security Journal, 2014, currently under review.
-

Wigginton, M. P., C. J. Jensen, M.A. Graves and J. Vinson. In press. What is the role of
behavioral analysis in a multi-layered approach to aviation security? Journal of Applied
Security Research.

PROFESSIONAL PUBLICATIONS
- Jensen, Carl and Graves, Melissa. “Police Personnel, 2020.” Bureau of Justice
Association, 2012.
- Graves, Melissa. “McFarland v. Patterson,” Mississippi Review of First Impressions.
Oxford: University of Mississippi School of Law, 2008.
BOOK REVIEWS
- Graves, Melissa. “Review: Who Watches the Watchmen? The Conflict between National
Security and Freedom of the Press, by Gary Ross,” International Journal of Intelligence
Ethics, Vol. 4, No. 1 / Spring/Summer 2013.
AWARDS
204

Nominated, Instructor of the Year, International Association for Intelligence Educators (2012,
2015)
Nominated, Frist Award (University of Mississippi, 2011)
Recipient, Minnie L. Anderson Medal for Character and Service (Hardin-Simmons University,
2005)
Regional Gold American Advertising Award, Student Division, 2004
PAPERS PRESENTED / PRESENTATIONS
Graves, M., “A Post Hoover FBI: The Bureau in the 1970s.” International Studies Association
Annual Conference, February 2015.
Graves, M., “A More Pious Community: Comparing ISIS to Puritans as Religious
Fundamentalists.” Defense Intelligence Agency Five Eyes Analytical Workshop, November
2014.
Graves, M., “The University of Mississippi As a CAE Institution.” Intelligence Community
Centers for Academic Excellence Annual Meeting, September 2014.
Since 2008, presented professional papers and made presentations to groups, including:
American Bar Association
Defense Intelligence Agency’s Five Eyes Analytic Workshop
International Association for Intelligence Education
International Studies Association
The Institute for Defense and Government Advancement
MEMBERSHIPS
International Association for Intelligence Educators
American Bar Association
International Studies Association Intelligence Section
FBI Futures Working Group
SERVICE
University of Mississippi’s Chancellor’s Standing Committee on Accessibility
University of Mississippi’s Chancellor’s Committee on the Status of Women
International Studies Association Young Scholars Committee
President, Board of Directors, Theatre Oxford, 2014-2015

205

